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ABSTRACT
Decolonizing Genderqueer:
An Inquiry into the Gender Binary, Resistance, and Imperialistic Social Categories
by
Lauren Abruzzo

Advisor: Serene J. Khader

This dissertation examines core metaphysical properties of nonbinary and genderqueer
categories in dominant U.S. contexts. I address a prevailing argument that these categories, by
definition, resist the gender binary and are therefore radical modes of existing. In response, I put
forth a view of ‘nonbinary’ and ‘genderqueer’ that I call the Diachronic Approach, which
describes these categories as yet another set of tools within an imperialistic gender system, much
like ‘man’ or ‘woman.’ In other words, they are what I refer to as imperialistic social categories.
While nonbinary and genderqueer people do not fall perfectly within the U.S. gender binary and
are, arguably, oppressed by that binary, they are not necessarily united in a struggle against the
hierarchy imposed by that binary. I examine ways that ‘nonbinary’ and ‘genderqueer’ are
accompanied by their own set of rigid gender norms, such as androgynous gender presentation
and use of ‘they/them’ pronouns. To define these categories as resisting the gender binary by
virtue of participation in such norms, which several theorists do, is to conflate identity and
expression in a way that reinforces another brand of gender normativity. Furthermore, the
argument that ‘nonbinary’ and ‘genderqueer’ resist the gender binary typically fails to consider
the historical and ongoing role of the binary in justifying colonial objectives of exploitation,
displacement, and genocide. I analyze claims that the U.S. gender binary is an imperialistic
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invention designed to label white people as the only ones who embody gender categories
correctly, all while criticizing the presentations and identities of Black and African people,
Indigenous Peoples of the Americas, and non-white people, depending on the context in which
the gender binary is reproduced and enforced. Insofar as ‘nonbinary’ and ‘genderqueer,’ which
are defined in relation to the gender binary, do not inherently reduce or respond to the colonial
harm that it inflicts, they cannot be correctly characterized as resisting oppression owing to that
binary. I end by considering how ‘nonbinary’ and ‘genderqueer’ have come to play an important
function in imperialistic discourses around U.S. “modernity,” “progress,” and “superiority,” as
‘resisting the gender binary’ becomes a Western value in specific, yet worrisome, ways.
I aim to contribute to recent literature that takes seriously the history and present of the
gender binary in dominant U.S. societies impacted by and impacting colonialism, in addition to
relevant implications for how to theorize about social categories in a way that actively refuses
imperialistic logics. It can be inferred from the Diachronic Approach to defining ‘nonbinary’ and
‘genderqueer’ that violence caused by the U.S. gender binary, including that experienced by
nonbinary and genderqueer people, must be evaluated in the context of racism and imperialism,
rather than being treated as entirely analytically distinct. In bridging U.S. metaphysics of gender
and decolonial and postcolonial theory, this project has broader implications for advancing
nonbinary and genderqueer liberatory projects that center colonized and formerly colonized
individuals and communities.
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Introduction
I begin with a question, or rather, a concern: What is ‘genderqueer’?
The Oxford English Dictionary (2022) describes ‘genderqueer’ as “designating a person
who does not subscribe to conventional gender distinctions, but identifies with neither, both, or a
combination of male and female genders; (also occasionally) of or relating to such a person.” In
referencing its departure from exclusively “male and female genders,” this definition and similar
popular definitions understand the category ‘genderqueer,’1 like the closely related category
‘nonbinary,’2 at least to some extent with reference to the gender binary. The gender binary
describes the set of values and beliefs upholding the falsity that ‘man’ and ‘woman’ are the only
gender categories that a person can inhabit. The harms of the gender binary are, at minimum,
physical, emotional, and material—for example, when trans women, who are often not
considered to meet binary standards of cisgender womanhood, are denied housing, employment,
and healthcare (Beltran et al. 2019; Hill et al. 2017; Hughes et al. 2021); when trans men are
pressured to conform to binary standards of masculinity, all while being susceptible to genderbased violence in social and medical spheres, such as reproductive healthcare (Leigh 2021;
Seelman et al. 2020); when trans and cisgender women experience domestic and institutional
violence due to misogynistic norms set out by the gender binary (Boserup, McKenney, and
Elkbuli 2020; MacKinnon 1979; Wilt and Olson 1996); and when nonbinary and genderqueer
people are treated as childish and unrealistic for their gender identifications, expressions, and

1

I define genderqueer, preliminarily, as a social category that does not conform of the gender binary of ‘man’ or
‘woman’ and that rose into mainstream usage following its appearance in 1980s queer zines and subsequent
presence in the activist work of Riki Anne Wilchins and others in the 1990s (Hendrie 2019, 238; Tobia 2018).
2
I define nonbinary, preliminarily, as a social category that does not conform to the gender binary of ‘man’ or
‘woman’ and that rose into the mainstream usage as a general term following the introduction of ‘genderqueer.’
While I use the ‘nonbinary’ and ‘genderqueer’ almost interchangeably in this dissertation, some have drawn
distinctions between the terms (e.g., Retta 2019).
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pronouns (McGaughey 2020) and face disproportionately high rates of physical violence and
harassment in the public sphere (Harrison, Grant, and Herman 2012). It is no surprise that, in
light of these harms, theorists and activists have pointed to the importance of resisting the gender
binary when building coalition movements against systemic violence—for instance, as Angela
Y. Davis (2003a; 2020) claims, police brutality and mass incarceration.
Genderqueer and nonbinary categories have recently been lauded for working toward this
very feat: resisting the gender binary and the harms that it inflicts on trans and gender-variant3
people. In The Guardian’s “Genderqueer generation” series, Adrienne Matei (2020) asserts that
“[a] growing number of US kids are rejecting traditional gender identities in favor of being nonbinary,” a sentiment which suggests that opting for a nonbinary or genderqueer identity is itself a
way of undermining the gender binary. In the academic sphere, philosopher Robin Dembroff
(2020) claims that ‘genderqueer’ “destabilizes” the gender binary insofar as genderqueer people
reject norms of gender expression, sexuality, and other gendered expectations and do so because
it is their “felt or desired” (13) mode of being.
While derailing the gender binary is a worthy aim, and nonbinary and genderqueer
categories certainly deviate from the gender binary, there are good reasons be skeptical that
simply existing as a member of these categories amounts to a criticism of that binary. The aim of
my dissertation is to untangle this debate so as to clarify accurate metaphysical properties of
nonbinary and genderqueer categories in the political, economic, and social contexts in which
these terms are situated.
3

I define gender variance as a cluster of phenomena involving nonconformity or deviation from the gender identity
and/or presentation associated with particular gendered norms and expectations relative to a given context. I derive
this definition from that provided by Simons, Leibowitz, and Hidalgo (2014, 126): “Gender variance is an umbrella
term used to describe gender identity, expression, or behavior that falls outside of culturally defined norms
associated with a specific gender.” I define gender nonconforming as, more specifically, a cluster of phenomena
involving nonconformity or deviation from the gender identity and/or presentation associated with the binary
category (‘man’/‘woman’) that one is or would be assigned under a gender binary system.

2

In reply to views such as Dembroff’s, which I will reconstruct in Chapter 1, I hypothesize
that, at least in dominant U.S. contexts (henceforth, the focus of my analysis), ‘nonbinary’ and
‘genderqueer’ do not resist the gender binary by definition. In Chapter 2, I argue that ‘nonbinary’
and ‘genderqueer,’ like ‘man’ and ‘woman,’ reproduce harmful gender norms and expectations
and do not necessarily locate themselves outside of the dominant U.S. gender system. Nonbinary
and genderqueer people, moreover, do not all necessarily share a political stake in resisting the
gender binary. There are contexts in which the most privileged genderqueer people reap financial
benefits from the gender binary, and so would not have a net interest in promoting its demise.
The most marginalized genderqueer people, furthermore, do not always seek to disrupt other
people’s understandings of the gender binary, as this could threaten their safe navigation of a
violent system. The idea that genderqueer people inherently resist the gender binary just by being
genderqueer (an idea which follows from the claim that the category ‘genderqueer’ inherently
resists the gender binary) thereby dilutes the notion of ‘resistance’ to oppression: Resistance
becomes something that, for example, the most privileged genderqueer people can enact simply
by existing—all while even being rewarded by the gender binary in material ways. A theory of
resistance should not enable this form of complacency, which itself has the capacity to sustain
and advance oppression. There is a difference, I take it, between being harmed or disadvantaged
by an oppressive system, and resisting that system.
In Chapter 3, I argue that, in dominant U.S. contexts impacted by and impacting EuroAmerican colonialism, the gender binary functions at least in part to cause colonial harm, yet
‘genderqueer’ and ‘nonbinary’ are not inherently anti-imperialistic and so cannot be correctly
considered to resist the gender binary. When I state that one function of the gender binary is to
cause colonial harm, I mean that the harms of colonialism and the harms of the gender binary
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converge: The gender binary justifies the existence of two (and only two) categories, ‘man’ and
‘woman,’ that are accompanied by racist gender norms and expectations where white people are
taken to correctly embody ‘man’ and ‘woman’ categories and Black and African people,
Indigenous Peoples of the Americas, and non-white people are not (Bakare-Yusuf 2003; Connell
2007; Garry 2011; Giraldo 2016; Lugones 2007; 2010; Oyěwùmí 1997; Segato 2016; 2021;
Snorton 2017; Spillers 1987). In this sense, the gender binary is a tool of U.S. colonial
domination of non-white people. I therefore define a particular colonial meta-axis that overlaps
with the gender binary component of the dominant U.S. gender system (and potentially other
components of that system). I argue that an adequate defense of the idea that ‘genderqueer’ and
‘nonbinary’ resist the gender binary must include an articulation of how the category also resists
this colonial meta-axis. That is, in order for these categories to be correctly said to resist the
gender binary, they must also resist this colonial meta-axis. This is true at least insofar as they
are defined in relation to the gender binary: namely, as deviations from that binary. Notice,
though, that I am not quite making the stronger claim that for any practice to resist the gender
binary it must resist the colonial meta-axis. Rather, I am just saying that for these categories,
which understand themselves as not conforming to the gender binary, the historical underpinning
of that binary is metaphysically relevant to the question of resistance or political orientation in its
respect.
These two claims will be the focus of my negative argument, spread across Chapters 2
and 3, respectively. As noted, Chapter 1 will first provide a reconstruction and original defense
of the view that I am rejecting in these chapters—i.e., the view that ‘nonbinary’ and
‘genderqueer’ resist gender binary by their very definition. I will explain both a colloquial view,
such as one appearing in The Guardian, and an academic view, typified by Dembroff. After
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providing reasons to doubt these claims in Chapters 2 and 3, I move to my positive argument in
Chapter 4, which I call the Diachronic Approach to defining ‘genderqueer’ and ‘nonbinary.’
According to the Diachronic Approach, metaphysical properties of these categories are rooted in
their historical underpinnings: in this case, the function that they play in advancing U.S.
imperialism. That function includes normalizing racist gender norms and expectations specific to
the category ‘genderqueer’; enforcing a sharp distinction between what a colonial gaze would
term “gender” and “sexuality” that ignores various ways that colonized and formerly colonized
people experience their identities; promoting harmful and inaccurate generalizations under a
“third gender” banner; defining themselves in relation to the very thing they are said to reject, the
gender binary, thus unwittingly reinforcing its power; and enabling a new colonial binary that
contrasts ‘nonbinary’ to Indigenous and non-white categories such as ‘Two Spirit.’ I therefore
find it more compelling that ‘nonbinary’ and ‘genderqueer’ are just another way to situate
oneself within the dominant U.S. gender system, not unlike ‘man’ or ‘woman,’ and they
constitute what I will refer to as imperialistic social categories, which, by definition, reinforce
the colonial meta-axis that I will have defined in Chapter 3.
In the latter half of Chapter 4, I will explain several meta-philosophical problems that I
believe the Diachronic Approach avoids in its attempt to establish metaphysical properties of
‘nonbinary’ and ‘genderqueer.’ These problems consist in ways that many colloquial and
academic sources construct the phenomenon of resisting the gender binary as an indicator of U.S.
superiority. In other words, resisting the gender binary becomes a Western value that is
weaponized in service of imperialistic objectives. This occurs through at least two mechanisms:
constructing ‘nonbinary’ and ‘genderqueer’ as groundbreaking innovations that belong to the
West’s purportedly forward-thinking approach to gender, including medical technologies of
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gender, and romanticizing Indigenous and non-white categories (by the logic of the new colonial
binary that I will have previously identified) that is still accompanied by a degrading picture of
Indigenous and non-white individuals as superhuman and thereby tolerating of colonial violence.
For further clarity, below is a brief outline of these chapters:
Chapter 1 The counterargument: Why ‘genderqueer’ resists the gender binary
Chapter 2 My negative argument, Part I: Why ‘genderqueer’ fails to resist the gender binary
Chapter 3 My negative argument, Part II: Why ‘genderqueer’ fails to resist the colonial metaaxis and so inadequately addresses the power structure underlying the gender binary
Chapter 4 My positive argument: The Diachronic Approach to defining ‘genderqueer,’ where
‘genderqueer’ is defined as an imperialistic social category
One might wonder why this project is a question of metaphysics, rather than (e.g.)
politics and rhetoric. While it could fall in any of these groupings to some degree, a metaphysical
lens is useful insofar as I am inquiring about the correct way to parse the world. I am examining
the potential of social categories at the margin of the state to critique the systems of power that
people who embody these categories negotiate. In doing so, I am concerned with the ways that
these social categories mark actual metaphysical distinctions. Part of my thesis is that the
distinctions marked by these categories are social, political, and historical in nature, and that
critiquing relevant systems of power thereby demands critiquing the naturalness or obviousness
of distinctions themselves. This must be true at least in the case of gender, by the bounds of my
argument: I do not think that gender is necessarily a correct way to parse the world, and
arguments that assume the inherent critical nature of gender categories like ‘nonbinary’ and
‘genderqueer’ make the mistake of taking gender for granted in a way that, ironically, upholds a
gendered power system.
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On a practical level, I also aim to contribute to the body of literature that centers trans and
nonbinary experiences through metaphysical inquiry—a subset of metaphysics that resists the
idea that trans topics are, as Talia Mae Bettcher (2018) puts it, “philosophically ‘light weight.’”
On the significance of metaphysical inquiry into marginalized social categories, Bettcher writes:
I’m afraid there’s a tendency among some philosophers to suppose that philosophical
investigations into race, gender, disability, trans issues, and so forth are no different
methodologically from investigations into the question whether tables really exist. One
difference, however, is that while tables aren’t part of the philosophical conversation,
trans people, disabled people, people of color, are part of the conversation. Or at least, we
think we are. We’re here. In the room. […]
When we battered tables show up and start philosophizing, only to find these same
erasures and invalidations perpetuated within a philosophical context, we can become
more than a little upset. To repeat, as philosophers, we simply cannot assume that the
methodology must be the same across the board. To invite me to a philosophical forum in
which I prove my womanhood is to do something far different from inviting me to share
my views on mathematical Platonism. Do you understand the risks? It’s one thing to
spout views about the composition problem with both arrogance and ignorance. It
happens. It’s annoying. But it’s quite another thing to do this when we’re talking
about people—people who are in the room, people trying (and succeeding) to
philosophize themselves. (Bettcher 2018)
While I want to avoid giving transphobic “feminist” philosophers any more attention than they
have already garnered, I also want to contribute to the stream of ideas that successfully knocks
down their views (see, e.g., Three Anonymous Philosophers 2019). My project is one of many
analyses of trans and nonbinary identities that demonstrates genuine engagement with and
attention to the robust set of previous literature produced by trans and nonbinary people
themselves. This dissertation, then, is another voice in the room, via Bettcher, that strategically
disavows the commitments of transphobic “feminist” philosophers and the violence that they
attempt to inflict on trans and nonbinary people (and the discipline itself) through the machinery
of metaphysical evaluation.
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While I engage with tools provided by U.S. metaphysics in this dissertation, I am not
confident that this is the best way (or even a good way) to have this conversation. I am
suspicious of metaphysics for its risk of contributing to, for instance, what Sabelo J. NdlovuGatsheni (2018) calls the metaphysical empire, which relies on “its submission of the colonized
world to European memory” that therefore contributes to “the re-making of the African people in
the image of the colonial conqueror” (100). The tools of metaphysics have long been mobilized
in support of Euro-American imperialistic violence; it is in the history and present of this
philosophical subdiscipline. For this reason, I begin from and continuously return to the social,
political, and historical contexts in which these theories operate. I also leave open whether
metaphysics can truly be anti-imperialistic, though perhaps gesturing at the possibility of a
metaphysics that, at the very least, identifies and explicitly denounces imperialist ideologies.
The risk of metaphysical empire is not wholly separate from my positionality as a white
person based in the New York City area. The majority of this dissertation has been written on
unceded land of the Munsee Lenape, Canarsie, Wappinger, and Schaghticoke (Native Land
Digital 2021) and in increasingly gentrified spaces that continue to displace Black and
Latina/o/x4 people. This reality provides important context for the ideas produced in this
dissertation and indicates another problem with metaphysical inquiry grounded in U.S. academic
philosophy, where the makeup of bachelor’s degrees was reported by the American Academy of
Arts and Sciences (Humanities Indicators 2019) to be merely 17.0% “underrepresented
racial/ethnic minorities” in 2014 and, as Eric Schwitzgebel (2020) reports, referencing the
National Science Foundation’s Survey of Earned Doctorates (Kang 2019), white people received

4

I follow Francisco J. Galarte (2021) in employing the category ‘Latina/o/x’ here, among other terminologies, while
denying that the ‘x’ is a perfectly “gender-neutral or all-gender-encompassing term” (139). Rather, I recognize the
term ‘Latinx’ as socially and historically specific and so improperly applying to, for example, many people who are
not currently living.
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85% of philosophy doctoral degrees in 2018. This information is not surprising, but it provides
vital background for establishing how I am in a position of researching and writing philosophy
on these topics with the institutional and financial backing of a doctoral program, while located
in colonized and decolonizing spaces.
My aim is to approach texts in decolonial and postcolonial theory and Black feminisms,
including scholars situated in the Global South, from a place of sincere critical engagement: The
goal is to advance liberatory projects, or at least prevent their hindrance. I therefore lean away
from declining to engage, which would risk partaking in a broader phenomenon that Linda
Martín Alcoff (1991) recognizes as complacency in “The Problem of Speaking for Others.” That
is, such behavior may constitute a disingenuous self-assessment of innocence that motivates
inaction, or “a retreat into a narcissistic yuppie lifestyle in which a privileged person takes no
responsibility for her society whatsoever” (Alcoff 1991, 12). Uma Narayan (1997) also warns
against Western “refusals to judge” (151), arguing that refraining from criticism as a rule is
harmful to the goals of scholarly discourse between feminists in the Global South and the Global
North. According to Narayan, there are significant consequences of Western feminists falling
into the pattern of having “an interest in Other cultures without engaging in negative portrayals
or moral criticisms of that Other culture,” i.e., what she satirically calls the “anthropological
perspective” (136). One upshot, it could be argued, is that white U.S. philosophers have positive
duties to counteract these violent forms of complacency by engaging productively with ideas
produced by and for people localized in highly variegated contexts within Global South. Of
course, it is critical to do so in a way that takes seriously the violence that Alcoff identifies when
she notes that “the practice of privileged persons speaking for on behalf of less privileged
persons has actually resulted (in many cases) in increasing or reenforcing the oppression of the
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group spoken for” (3). With this in mind, I center nuances and disagreement, and I participate in
conversations along key threads in this literature.
I hope to contribute one path (of many possible ones) toward decolonizing the
metaphysics of ‘nonbinary’ and ‘genderqueer’ categories. Just as crucially, this project is also
one of many efforts to bridge U.S. metaphysics of gender with decolonial and postcolonial
feminisms. My objective is to open conversations between theorists, not just to fill gaps in
theory, but to create viable, mutually beneficial trajectories for liberatory academic projects.

10

Chapter One: Are Nonbinary and Genderqueer Radical?
Examining Literature on the Radical Potential of Social Categories
today a man on the street pointed to me & said
“what the hell is that!?”
i wanted to turn around,
tell him that i got this dress on sale
& i got this body for free
but you have been making me pay for both
ever since. (Vaid-Menon 2021, 4)
There are good reasons to believe that surviving an oppressive system is a radical act. By
radical, I mean resisting some form of oppression. Because daily experiences of racism, sexism,
transphobia, ableism, Islamophobia, and anti-Semitism constitute a threat to safety, one might
argue that existing in spite of that threat forms a stance against it (e.g., Ross 2016). For example,
people find community through being victimized by and navigating these political, economic,
and social power structures; relationality within the margins becomes a form of power that reacts
to and counteracts white supremacist power (Graham 2007). Moreover, living as a marginalized
person provides defeating evidence for dominant beliefs about who does and who should survive
and how they should survive, all while giving permission for other marginalized persons to
continue violating those beliefs.
When it comes to the nonbinary and genderqueer categories in the U.S., the question
becomes: Are ‘nonbinary’ and ‘genderqueer’ radical? More specifically, do ‘nonbinary’ and
‘genderqueer’ resist the oppressive system that is the gender binary? Do nonbinary and
genderqueer people resist the gender binary by being nonbinary or genderqueer?
The purpose of this chapter is to construct what I take to be the most compelling
argument which answers ‘yes’ to these questions—i.e., that ‘nonbinary’ and ‘genderqueer’ do
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inherently resist the gender binary. However, my actual answer is ‘no’ (i.e., I do not think that
‘nonbinary and ‘genderqueer’ inherently resist the gender binary), and I will spend the remainder
of the dissertation—Chapters 2, 3, and 4—replying to the claims that I do my best to defend first
in Chapter 1.
I define the gender binary as the false dichotomy which asserts that the only gender
options are the two mutually exclusive and contradictory categories ‘man’ and ‘woman,’ and
which justifies the allocation of resources and safety toward members of those two gender
categories and away from gender categories that do not conform to that system (and does so on
that very basis). This latter material component of the gender binary succeeds in part simply by
concealing the existence of categories that deviate from it, such as ‘nonbinary’ and
‘genderqueer.’ In other words, a feature of the gender binary is a commitment to the notion that
‘man’ and ‘woman’ are the only real gender categories.
The idea that existing as a member of a historically marginalized social category is a type
of resistance to oppression can be attributed to Black feminisms and the writings and teachings
of Indigenous Peoples of the Americas. In the preface to Revolutionary Mothering, for example,
Loretta J. Ross (2016) discusses the life of Black mothers as politically oriented: “Our mere
existence is a subversive act” (xviii). To survive the pain and death that white supremacist
violence inflicts on Black families and communities is radical: It refuses the genocidal function
of the system.
Feminist and queer philosophy has also defended the view that existing as a member of
an oppressed social category is radical. Crucially, Judith Butler (1990; 1993; 2004) and Monique
Wittig (1992) have claimed that gender categories which do not conform to cisheteropatriarchal
norms radically reject that very power structure. In trans philosophy, Sandy Stone (1992), Leslie
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Feinberg (1992), and Kate Bornstein (1994), among others, have each developed relevant
arguments for trans and gender nonconforming categories, claiming that these identities violate
the norms and expectations of dominant gender ideologies and practices.
In recent years, both mainstream texts and philosophical literature have generated
comparable theories in the context of ‘nonbinary’ and ‘genderqueer.’ Riki Anne Wilchins
(1995), an activist credited with introducing the term ‘genderqueer’ (Tobia 2018), is perhaps
most famous for this contribution when they claimed that “the gendeRevolution has begun”
(Wilchins 1995, 4). Other genderqueer and gender nonconforming activists have put forth similar
arguments, often highlighting ways that these categories deviate from the gender binary in
subversive ways. Dembroff has brought these arguments into the academic sphere when they
argue that ‘genderqueer’ is what they call a critical gender kind, or a category which
“destabilizes” at least one aspect of the dominant gender system in the society of interest (12).
For ‘genderqueer,’ this is the binary axis of the dominant Western gender system, in their
terminology—i.e., the conceptual underpinning of the gender binary.
My goal here is to reconstruct and defend both mainstream and academic theories which
assert that ‘nonbinary’ and ‘genderqueer’ categories resist the gender binary—and therefore,
more broadly, that existing as nonbinary or genderqueer is itself a radical act. Preceding my
explanation of these views will be an articulation of prior theories within Black feminisms,
Indigenous studies, feminist and queer theory, and trans theory that endorse the idea that
membership in a marginalized identity category can constitute a political orientation against
oppression. I will end the chapter by defending the idea that the same is true for ‘nonbinary’ and
‘genderqueer,’ positing what I think is the most convincing articulation of the claim that these
categories are subversive in themselves. This chapter will provide the springboard for the
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critique that I will formulate remainder of the dissertation—namely, where I will reject the idea
that ‘nonbinary’ and ‘genderqueer’ are inherently radical, critical, defiant, etc., modes of
existing.

1 Previous literature on the radical potential of social categories
1.1 Marginalized social categories, broadly
Virginia Vargas (2017) puts forth an approach to Latin American feminist epistemology
that focuses on how marginalized social categories resist oppression. According to Vargas, the
radical potential of social categories can be traced to the power of bodies themselves. Bodies, on
Vargas’ view, are sites of meaning that can be changed; “[t]he body as a political subject, bearer
of rights, within a diverse reality of exclusion in the Latin American region, is a concept that has
‘traveled’, interacting with other ideas and cosmologies” (299). Bodies create space to
undermine oppressive political agendas, as is the case with queer, trans, and intersex folks:
“These disruptions create a sexual-political cartography of resistance, together with a redefinition
of the words that have denigrated their bodies (e.g. butch, fag and dyke)” (Vargas 2017, 299–
300). The possibility of locating resistance within categorized bodies, insofar as they are
categorized, creates the possibility of decentering dominant epistemologies.
Sara Ahmed (2017) argues that existing as a marginalized person can be a form of
resisting in light of the reality that not meeting oppressive norms and expectations makes people
the target of relentless questioning, such as “Where are you from?” (116) This questioning can
be motivated by the racist labeling of Black people and non-white people as a threat, and the
response an effort to dispel that notion:
The demand not to be aggressive might be lived as a form of body politics, or as a speech
politics: you have to be careful what you say, how you appear, in order to maximize the

14

distance between yourself and their idea of you. The experience of being a stranger in the
institutions of whiteness is an experience of being on perpetual guard: or having to
defend yourself against those who perceive you as somebody to be defended against.
(Ahmed 2017, 131)
Ahmed poignantly illustrates how being the recipient of these questions—these demands to
explain oneself—takes a toll. In explaining that her girlfriend was asked, “Are you a boy or a
girl?”, Ahmed observes the following: “A question hovering around gender: not being housed by
gender, but being unhoused by gender. Some of these questions dislodge you from a body that
you yourself feel you reside in” (122). The questioning derails one’s sense of self by placing one
up against a preformed image of oneself from a dominant perspective. This experience makes
one feel less at home in one’s body, which is the perpetual “exhaustion of having to insist just to
exist” (Ahmed 2017, 122).
An important implication of Ahmed’s view is that, when one is constantly fielding
inquiries about one’s identity and background (to which the only accepted answers are those that
adhere to ideals and standards of whiteness), living is itself a highly effortful action. As Ahmed
explains: “To be in question is to try to be; to be in question makes being trying” (115). The
result of this ongoing demand for a narrative about oneself is that “[a] body can become a
question mark” (117) and “you feel marked by questions” (120). Deviating bodies are not
allowed to pass or are obstructed in their passing, both literally and figuratively. Privilege, then,
becomes “a buffer zone as a zone without questions” (Ahmed 2017, 132). Being read as a body
that conforms means not being stopped in the first place. To try to attain this privilege when one
does not otherwise have it, i.e., to “pass,” one must notice oneself as the subject of questions:
“Passing is what you do because or when your legitimacy is in question. Trans women may have
to pass in a way that some cisgender women do not: because of this constant questioning of
legitimacy” (Ahmed 2017, 120). According to Ahmed, not meeting dominant norms and
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expectations can require one to assimilate into those standards to avoid having one’s basic worth
placed up for debate. Ahmed therefore presents a promising way to theorize that existing as a
marginalized person in an oppressive society is actively in tension with and, in a crucial sense,
critical of dominant norms and expectations.

1.2 The category ‘Black’
To further consider how social categories can be radical, I turn to historical and
contemporary arguments about resistant racial categories from Black feminisms and critical race
theory (Du Bois 1996; hooks 1981; Lorde 1984; Painter 1996; Snorton 2017). Consider the idea
that, for example, existing as a Black mother in an anti-Black society resists oppression:
Our mere existence is a subversive act. Rethinking mothering from a radical point of
view leads to considering survival as a form of self-love, and as a service and gift to
others whose lives would be incalculably diminished without us. Sharing our strengths
while honoring our weaknesses together is not a contradiction but a way to make love
powerful. (Ross 2016, xviii)
Ross defends this view in the context of recognizing the pain of Black people dying in a white
supremacist society—who have been killed by white people and institutions simply for existing
as Black. Being a Black mother radically refuses ways that white supremacy violently attempts
to prevent the survival of Black families and communities. One implication of this argument is
that living as a member of the category ‘Black,’ in particular, ‘Black mother,’ resists oppression
that members of the category are subjected to. This resistance takes place in part through love—
both self-love and community-centered love, on Ross’ view.
In the edited volume, To Exist Is To Resist: Black Feminism in Europe (2019),
contributors discuss how negotiating life as a Black woman in Europe is itself a radical act. OdaKange Midtvåge Diallo (2019), in her article “At the Margins of Institutional Whiteness: Black
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Women and Danish Academia,” examines the experiences of Black women in the white, male
Danish academic world, arguing that resistance can be understood through the lens of survival
rather than simply practices:
I suggest we look at resistance slightly differently than as directly impactful actions and
words. Rather, I see the strength to show up to work and school every day, writing
papers, reading literature by white men, being graded by white men and women, being
the only Black woman among one’s peers is resistance in itself. I see the women’s refusal
to engage in the silently enforced stereotypes at play as well as not wanting to react when
reactions are expected from their white peers and faculty as resistance. (Diallo 2019, 224)
Existing as a Black woman in violent spaces rejects the foundations of those spaces. The result is
“friction” and “discomfort” (Diallo 2019, 226) as the presence of Black women scholars disrupts
the idea that academia is only for white men. Pointing to the importance of the work generated
by Black women academics, Diallo goes on to state that they “break down barriers just by
existing in the academic space” (227). In the same edited volume, Yeṣim Deveci (2019)
describes how living as a Black woman is an act of resistance in her chapter, “In the Changing
Light; Daring to Be Powerful.” Deveci first discusses how her relationality and engagement with
her students is part of that resistance: “I learn from my students and they from me, all practice is
an attempt to meet the other, a process of connection and collaboration which takes energy and
creativity” (178). But she later takes a less substantive view of resistance:
For those who live without privilege, resistance is part of existence. It is tiring to be
continually resisting, with no real sense that the institutions and structures we come up
against are in any way diminished by our fight. But we are not merely working in an
isolated moment in time, our struggles are long and interconnected. (Deveci 2019, 178)
Surviving the exhaustion of white supremacist violence is radical for Black women. Existing and
embodying these social categories, which ultimately forms communities and networks of
resistance, becomes a force against oppression in anti-Black societies.
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1.3 The category ‘Indigenous’
It might further be argued that to exist as Indigenous Peoples of the Americas on stolen,
unceded land resists colonial violence.5 For instance, Michelle M. Jacob, Kelly Gonzales, Chris
Finley, and Stephany RunningHawk Johnson (2019) describe the radical potential of Indigenous
students and young people via the concept of Tma’àakni, meaning ‘respect’ from the Yakama
peoples:
Through the transformation of collective healing, respect became a tool that guides the
youth to move through the assault of ongoing colonialism, fueled by white superiority,
capitalism, and ignorance, as a resistance to genocide and a demonstration of positive
social change that centers and honors the wisdom of the stewards of these lands. (Jacob et
al. 2019, 1)
They go on to articulate ‘resistance’ as
to celebrate the strengths of indigenous people, and each other. The act of such a
celebration among indigenous people is evidence that, healing from historical trauma and
colonialism is occurring among individuals and collectively within communities. (Jacob
et al. 2019, 3)
While Jacob et al. seem to require more of resistance than existing as a member of the category
‘Indigenous,’ they do suggest how honoring their community on their own land is radical, and it
could be argued that the category itself can confer this kind of celebration in the context of an
Indigenous community that values Tma’àakni.
It is clear how the category ‘Indigenous,’ in this case, Indigenous Peoples of the
Americas, can amount to a political orientation against U.S. colonialism and white supremacy in
specific contexts, particularly in light of the Trail of Tears in the 1830s and 1840s (Cherokee
Nation 2019); the Dawes Act of 1887, the Wounded Knee Massacre of 1890, and the Indian
Relocation Act of 1956 (Kirkwood 2018); the disproportionate vulnerability of Indigenous
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the Trans Philosophy Project as part of the Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy (SPEP) Annual
Meeting in September 2021.
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women to sexual violence (National Resource Center on Domestic Violence 2021), among other
instances of attempted genocide, forcible removal and displacement, and disenfranchisement.

1.4 The category ‘lesbian’
I now move to an analysis of how the category ‘lesbian’ can be considered a radical
departure from the norms and expectations imposed on the category ‘woman.’ Note that the prior
arguments about the categories ‘Black’ and ‘Indigenous’ do not necessarily translate to gender
and sexuality categories, and in fact, assuming an analogy can perpetuate the centering and
normalizing of whiteness (Grillo and Wildman 1991; Moreton-Robinson 2000). At the same
time, it is essential to understand and credit ideological origins of the argument that gender
categories can be radical, as well as to reckon with both key overlaps between these views in the
remainder of this chapter and concerns about co-optation that I will discuss in Chapter 2.
Butler (1990) and Wittig (1992), most prominently, argue that gender categories which
diverge from gender norms enforced by heterosexism radically resist that oppressive system.
Butler describes gender as a “stylized repetition of acts” (191)—a performance that creates the
illusion of an inner gendered self. On Butler’s account, it is radical to perform gender in a way
that violates binary gender expectations, which are rooted in norms of heterosexuality.
According to Butler, butch lesbians do not recreate a heterosexual masculinity but rather make
new meanings for masculinity as it is juxtaposed with what is “culturally intelligible” as female
(167–168). By “culturally intelligible,” Butler means gender categories “which in some sense
institute and maintain relations of coherence and continuity among sex, gender, sexual practice,
and desire” (23); they are features of the social rules that make gender and gender presentation
appear naturally linked to sex. On Butler’s view, butch and femme lesbian identities, despite
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being a nod to heterosexual gendered divisions, also uproot them by performing these gendered
behaviors in tension with expectations that are enforced on the bodies that are performing them.
Butler’s theory has been criticized by Martha C. Nussbaum (2015), among others (Bordo 1993;
Fraser 1995; Hekman 1998; Laurie 2014; Namaste 2009; Xie 2014), and amended by Butler in
Bodies That Matter (1993) and Undoing Gender (2004).
Wittig, on this topic, argues that in order to gain agency apart from the reproductive
impetus of womanhood, women must depart from the category ‘woman’ entirely, which she
thinks lesbians already do by refusing to participate in heterosexuality. Wittig also explores the
role of heterosexual normativity in generating gender categories. While Butler claims that gender
is performance or expression, however, Wittig thinks that gender is the organizing factor for
political, economic, and social hierarchy. She claims that lesbians, by evading heterosexuality,
avoid and challenge the category ‘woman,’ since ‘woman’ only picks up within the framework
of what she calls the heterosexual contract—or the social mandate to participate in normative
heterosexuality (Wittig 1992, 33–45). Wittig names an example of how departing from a gender
category (in this case, ‘woman’) can be a radical rejection of an oppressive gender system,
suggesting the possibility of eschewing a gender category as a means of resisting oppression on
the basis of gender.

1.5 The category ‘trans’
While ‘trans’ is not a gender category, it might be considered a gendered mode of
existing, and more broadly, a social category. Stone’s The Empire Strikes Back: A
Posttranssexual Manifesto (1992), a response to transphobic theorist Janice Raymond’s claims
about trans women in her book The Transsexual Empire, builds on Butler to argue that transness
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interrupts oppressive gender discourse. According to Stone, “the transsexual currently occupies a
position that is nowhere, that is outside the binary oppositions of gendered discourse,” without
itself amounting to a “third gender” (164). Furthermore, responding Butler’s ideas about how
butch lesbians reinscribe gendered meanings through gender performance, Stone states:
In the case of the transsexual, the varieties of performative gender, seen against a
culturally intelligible gendered body which is itself a medically constituted textual
violence, generate new and unpredictable dissonances that implicate entire spectra of
desire. In the transsexual as text we may find the potential to map the refigured body onto
conventional gender discourse and thereby disrupt it, to take advantage of the
dissonances created by such a juxtaposition to fragment and reconstitute the elements of
gender in new and unexpected geometries. (Stone 1992, 165)
In identifying “medically constituted textual violence,” Stone highlights ways that the medical
field enforces a binary of gender with specific assumptions about what constitutes an appropriate
gender performance. This normativity is a barrier to trans people accessing surgery and other
gender-affirming care. Whose story it is of the supposedly correct way to do gender becomes
muddled in the process, which according to Stone, parallels “to aspects of colonial discourse
with which we may be familiar: The initial fascination with the exotic, extending to professional
investigators; denial of subjectivity and lack of access to the dominant discourse; followed by a
species of rehabilitation” (Stone 1992, 163). Trans people violate dominant gender discourse by
embracing incongruities between the limited ideals about gender perpetuated by the medical
system and the many variegated possibilities of performing gender that trans people embody.
In her pamphlet, “Transgender Liberation,” Feinberg (1992) makes room for ‘trans’ to be
radical simply by surviving contexts where the agenda is to eliminate trans people. Feinberg
traces the historical roots of trans oppression as grounded in classist oppression when the ruling
class in Western Europe determined “acceptable self-expression” (12) according to its own
volition, in collaboration with the church. For example, as Feinberg explains, Joan of Arc was
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put to death under a feudalist system due to refusing (multiple times) to wear typically feminine
attire. Near the end of the 17th century, as capitalism replaced feudalism, some Western
European countries inflicted violent punishments on people for their trans experiences (Feinberg
1992, 17). This history of trans struggle can be summarized as follows:
From peasant uprisings against feudalism in the Middle Ages to the Stonewall Rebellion
in the 20th century, transvestites and other transgendered people have figured in many
militant struggles, both in defense of the right to personal expression and as a form of
political rebellion. (Feinberg 1992, 21)
The survival and resilience of trans people, from this perspective, is constructed as a radical
response to transphobic oppression and can be considered evidence of a trans political
orientation.
Additionally, Bornstein (1994) develops a theory of trans identities where what it is to be
trans is to breach oppressive gender standards: “All the categories of transgender find a common
ground in that they each break one or more of the rules of gender: what we have in common is
that we are gender outlaws, every one of us” (69). Being “gender outlaws” is what unites
transgender people and provides the most potential for a home in this community. For this
reason, Bornstein finds solace in idea of a trans community “that’s based on the principle of
constant change” (69) rather than on the addition of new gendered rules. The category ‘trans,’ in
creating the possibility of gender without restrictive, punishable codes of conduct, might
therefore be considered subversive of dominant gender norms and expectations.

2 The potential of ‘nonbinary’ and ‘genderqueer’ to resist the gender binary
The following section unpacks the argument that ‘nonbinary’ and ‘genderqueer,’ by
definition, resist the gender binary. This argument paradigmatically couches ‘nonbinary’ and
‘genderqueer’ as consequently radical social categories—i.e., by virtue of the fact that they are
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said to resist the oppressive system that is the gender binary. I first examine several colloquial
versions of this claim from social media platforms and other mainstream sources. I then
reconstruct academic versions, particularly from academic philosophy, that define ‘nonbinary’
and ‘genderqueer’ as inherently resisting the gender binary.

2.1 The colloquial view
In the Spring 1995 issue of In Your Face, Wilchins (1995) describes recent activism for
trans and gender-marginalized people in the U.S. and ultimately puts forth the term
‘genderqueer’ for those who are, according to the text, most marginalized and most resistant to
gender oppression. In a famous passage, Wilchins states:
It’s about all of us who are genderqueer: diesel dykes and stone butches, leatherqueens
and radical fairies, nelly fags, crossdressers, intersexed, transexuals, transvestites,
transgendered, transgressively gendered, intersexed, and those of us whose gender
expressions are so complex they haven’t even been named yet. […] We’re not invisible
anymore. We’re not well behaved. And we’re not going away. […] the gendeRevolution
has begun, and we’re going to win. (Wilchins 1995, 4)
Since then, Alok Vaid-Menon (2020), an author and performer with 1 million followers on the
social media platform Instagram, claims in their book, Beyond the Gender Binary: “Gender nonconformity causes such a huge reaction because we’re consistently taught that there are only two
fixed and universal genders. Seeing other people defy this mandate brings the entire system into
question” (28–29). They go on to argue that to exist as genderqueer is to denounce the system
that renders binary genders the only permissible ones at the expense of gender-variant modes of
existence.
There are additional arguments on popular social media platforms in favor of the
potential of ‘nonbinary’ and ‘genderqueer’ categories to resist the gender binary. For example,
cosima bee concordia (2021) published the following post on the platform Twitter: “Adding an X
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under gender on official documents functionally marks people as non-normative and worthy of
extra policing. This is an example of reformism making us both visible and more vulnerable—
abolition of gender/sex markers on official documents should always be the demand.” While it
might be important to draw a distinction between being a member of the category ‘genderqueer’
and being the sort of person who partakes in the practice of denoting one’s gender as ‘X’ on a
document such as a driver license, concordia’s argument clearly addresses the idea that
identifying oneself outside of the gender binary resists gender normativity, sometimes even at the
expense of one’s own safety. Additionally, Sonalee (2021) has described the category
‘nonbinary’ as radical via the following Instagram post: “non binary as in abolish all binaries and
f the state.” Sonalee’s statement points to the idea that the category ‘nonbinary’ itself is
politically oriented against all oppressive binaries, presumably including the gender binary, and
is critical of oppressive power structures more broadly. To be nonbinary or genderqueer,
according to these arguments, is to resist oppression.
Another crucial example can be found in Daniel Bergner’s New York Times article, “The
Struggles of Rejecting the Gender Binary” (2019). Bergner routinely associates existing as
nonbinary with resisting the gender binary (or gender as such), as do several of the nonbinary
and genderqueer people interviewed in the article. For instance, Bergner claims that nonbinary
people are “living in opposition to our most basic way of seeing and sorting and comprehending
one another,” implying that divergence from the gender binary also constitutes a formal stance
against it. There is the assumption that ‘nonbinary’ and ‘genderqueer’ introduce a sort of gender
“fluidity” that is radical in itself. Moreover, while reflecting on the possibility of becoming a
professor, one interviewee, Salem, states, “[a]s a nonbinary person, existing in front of people is
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a political statement.” According to this line of argument, to be nonbinary, to not conform to the
gender binary, is to orient oneself toward some political end—i.e., resisting the gender binary.
Part of the evidence for the radical nature of ‘nonbinary’ cited in Bergner’s article is the
lack of research on nonbinary people and the “rarity” of nonbinary and genderqueer people in
particular U.S. contexts: For instance, as Bergner laments, in a national health survey from both
2014 and 2015, only 19 states included a (short) portion that asked about gender identity. There
is also the related implication that ‘nonbinary’ is radical because it reveals problems with
medical narrative of transition, supposedly demonstrating the innovative and timely character of
the identity. As Bergner claims,
some physicians and surgeons who are committed to treating binary trans patients with
hormones and surgery are wary of doing the same for the nonbinary, questioning whether
the interventions are psychiatrically, and therefore medically, necessary. The bible of
psychiatric diagnosis, the D.S.M., gives meager help; its criteria for the condition of
“gender dysphoria” are essentially binary. And insurers sometimes refuse to pay for care
that isn’t couched in a binary narrative. So the nonbinary can be forced to dissemble, to
erase their own truths and fabricate a familiar transmale or transfemale tale, in order to
get the treatment – the hormones and breast removals, the Adam’s-apple reductions and
facial recontourings – they seek. (Bergner 2019)
Bergner’s analysis exposes how difficult it is for nonbinary people to access gender-affirming
healthcare in light of the insidious binary mindset within U.S. healthcare, including LGBTQ
healthcare. It might appear, from this perspective, that ‘nonbinary’ and ‘genderqueer’ are radical
gender categories even against the backdrop of other LGBTQ identities. Bergner describes
Salem’s therapist, Jan Tate, as being motivated by this sort of interpretation of nonbinary identity
in her practice:
She’s especially invested in the battles of people like Salem, who yearn not to go from
one category to the other but to escape altogether. And philosophically, she’s electrified
by the profound challenge that people like Salem put up against dominant
preconceptions. What if our most fundamental means of perceiving and classifying one
another is illusory and can be swept away? (Bergner 2019)
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Bergner goes on to imply that the therapist referring to her pet tortoise with ‘they/them’
pronouns is an obvious illustration of how “she relishes small acts of defiance.” It is unclear
whether Bergner or Tate drives this assumption that nonbinary modes of existing radically upend
dominant conceptions of gender. Whoever the instigator, this example—in addition to Bergner’s
article broadly—is a paradigmatic case of the colloquial view at play.

2.2 The academic view
Philosophical research on the metaphysics of nonbinary and genderqueer categories has
recently articulated justifications for this sort of mainstream approach. Wilchins (2019), in their
foreword to Micah Rajunov and Scott Duane’s edited collection Nonbinary: Memoirs of Gender
and Identity, writes: “As nonbinary comes to the fore, it will challenge everything we currently
think about bodies, sexual orientation, and gender, almost all of which depends implicitly or
explicitly on the binary” (Wilchins 2019, xii). Then, in their introduction, Rajunov and Duane
(2019) state: “‘Nonbinary’ simply means not binary; when applied to gender, it means not
exclusively male or female. Nonbinary is defined by what it’s not. Even the word ‘genderqueer,’
derived from a reclaiming of the word ‘queer,’ encompasses any form of gender that is not
normative” (Rajunov and Duane 2019, xviii). The inherent rejection of gender normativity is
what makes nonbinary and genderqueer categories unique, according to these theorists. At the
same time, these categories are taken to reveal gender possibilities beyond the crisp binary ones
(‘man’ and ‘woman’) that are automatically assigned to people: “The existence of nonbinary
people shows us that gender is messy” (Rajunov and Duane 2019, xxix).
Dembroff has also claimed that a core metaphysical property of ‘genderqueer’ is its
capacity to resist the gender binary. In “Why Be Nonbinary?” (formerly titled “Nonbinary
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identity is a radical stance against gender segregation”), Dembroff (2018) characterizes
nonbinary identity as radical insofar as its existence makes the ‘man’/‘woman’ binary less firm.
‘Nonbinary’ achieves this by opening gender possibilities outside binary options that are
imposed on people without their consent. Instead, ‘nonbinary’ can be elected by nonbinary
person themselves: “Unlike womanhood or manhood, nonbinary identity is open to anyone and
forced upon no one. It is radically anti-essentialist. It is opt-in only” (Dembroff 2018).
Dembroff extends and complicates their view in “Beyond Binary: Genderqueer as
Critical Gender Kind” (2020), where they argue that ‘genderqueer’ inherently resists the gender
binary by appealing to genderqueer people’s testimony about their experience of their identities.
While Wilchins, Rajunov and Duane, and others suggest that ‘genderqueer’ derails the dominant
gender system broadly, Dembroff claims that this identity disrupts a particular component of that
system that they term the binary axis, which describes the ideology that “[t]he genders men and
women are binary, discrete, immutable, exclusive, and exhaustive” (Dembroff 2020, 15). On this
account, genderqueer people reject the binary axis by virtue of participating in practices that
express their gender identities, which might (but need not) include any of the following:
declaring themselves to be members of the category ‘genderqueer’; violating expectations of
masculine or feminine appearance; existing outside of binary sexualities (i.e., ‘gay’ or
‘heterosexual’); or asking to be referred to with ‘they/them’ pronouns (Dembroff 2020, 18).
The result, as Dembroff’s argument goes, is that ‘genderqueer’ inherently critiques a
feature of the relevant dominant gender ideology, which they define as “the beliefs, concepts,
and attitudes toward gender that have the most social power within a society, and that impose
(often unreflectively) their shared epistemic, conceptual, and affective systems onto less
powerful communities” (Dembroff 2020, 12–13n62). Dembroff thereby characterizes
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‘genderqueer’ as what they term a critical gender kind (12)—i.e., a gender category that
“destabilizes” at least one aspect of the dominant gender system in the society of interest, which,
for ‘genderqueer,’ is the binary axis of the dominant gender system in Western contexts. This
makes ‘genderqueer’ into the subcategory Western gender defier (15), on Dembroff’s account.
They contrast the binary axis to three additional axes that also constitute “core elements” of
“Western dominant gender ideology”: the biological axis (the idea that having female anatomy
implies that one is a woman and having male anatomy implies that one is a man); the
teleological axis (the idea that having a particular gender naturally predisposes someone to
behave in particular ways, e.g., in the domain of one’s career or sexuality); and the hierarchical
axis (the idea that men are better than women and that men’s and women’s features are entirely
distinct) (Dembroff 2020, 15–16). If and when ‘genderqueer’ “destabilizes” any of these other
three axes, on Dembroff’s account, it is not because one is genderqueer. Rather, ‘genderqueer’
only intrinsically “destabilizes” the binary axis, and this makes nonbinary and genderqueer
categories into critical gender kinds (and, more specifically, Western gender defiers).
Dembroff claims that genderqueer people, insofar as they are genderqueer, collectively
(19) participate in what they call existential destabilizing (of the binary axis), which is a type of
resistance which “stems from one’s felt or desired place with respect to gender roles,
embodiment, or categorization—typically, one that is deviant given the practices, norms, and
structures that arise from and sustain dominant gender ideology” (13). This is in contrast to
principled destabilizing, which is a more ideological and political rather than phenomenological
form of resistance (though as Dembroff notes, the two can coincide). They appear to define
“destabilizing” as a function of the practices in which genderqueer people partake, and the same
goes for what they call “restabilizing” (i.e., failing to destabilize) (14). According to Dembroff,
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genderqueer people destabilize the binary axis through a variety of possible practices—
specifically, practices that Dembroff takes to be definitional to the category itself and that resist
Western dominant gender ideology. As noted, these practices might include
using gender neutral pronouns (and other terms, like the title ‘Mx.’), cultivating gender
non-conforming aesthetics, asserting nonbinary categorization (e.g., ‘I am agender’),
queering personal relationships, defying sexual binaries, and what I’ll call ‘space
switching’, or moving between male and female gendered spaces. (Dembroff 2020, 17)
Through these kinds of identity-constituting practices, according to Dembroff, ‘genderqueer’
itself resists the binary axis component of Western dominant gender ideology and therefore
amounts to a radical gender category.

3 An original defense of the argument that ‘nonbinary’ and ‘genderqueer’
resist the gender binary
I end Chapter 1 by providing additional justifications for views endorsed by Wilchins,
Rajunov and Duane, and Dembroff, among others, before I begin my critique in Chapter 2. The
following section is an original defense of these perspectives on the grounds that: nonbinary and
genderqueer people radically survive the material harm of the gender binary, refusing eradication
at the hands of an oppressive gender system just by existing as members of these categories; and
‘nonbinary’ and ‘genderqueer’ categories are uniquely fluid and selectable and thus reject the
rigidity built into oppressive social categories. It could be argued, moreover, that these two
features of ‘genderqueer’ facilitate my two proposed mechanisms of resisting the gender binary:
(1) metaphysical disruption, and (2) epistemic disruption.
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3.1 Radical features of ‘nonbinary’ and ‘genderqueer’
Based on my interpretation of the literature presented in this chapter, metaphysical
properties of ‘genderqueer’ that have the greatest potential to resist the gender binary are what I
will call the survival feature and the generative feature of ‘genderqueer.’ Consider these features
candidates, however, as I will ultimately show in Chapters 2 and 3 that ‘nonbinary’ and
‘genderqueer’ do not possess these features (though actually possessing them, I take it, would
succeed in making such categories resist the gender binary by definition).

3.1.1 The survival feature of ‘nonbinary’ and ‘genderqueer’
The possible survival feature of ‘genderqueer’ as a theorical concept should not be
conceptually isolated from Black and Indigenous feminist claims about the radical potential of
Black and Indigenous social categories. In Patricia Hill Collins’ view (2000), Black women
trying to balance certain Black feminist interests and the demands of oppressive structures
amounts to surviving what she calls the “strain” (268) of oppression—a tension that one is
confronted with regularly. Collins’ claim bolsters arguments made by Ross, among others, that
the category ‘Black’ has what I am calling a survival feature of some kind. What I mean by a
survival feature, then, is that to survive as a marginalized person in a violent, unsafe society is to
resist oppression on that very basis, such that it becomes a metaphysical property of the
marginalized category itself. When a category possesses the survival feature, members of that
category exist under a system that functions to marginalize them and even promote their early
death (e.g., Haritaworn, Kuntsman, and Posocco 2014) and so their existence itself is an act of
resisting oppression; it is a radical way of being.
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In the case of ‘genderqueer,’ it could be argued that trans and gender-variant people
surviving material harm caused by the gender binary suggests that living as genderqueer can be
radical in the sense of resisting the gender binary (Campuzano 2009; Galarte 2021). Guiseppe
Campuzano (2009), crucially, explores possible radical, enduring features of the category
‘travesti’ in Peru. According to Campuzano, ‘travesti’ describes a trans category of male folks
who take on feminine features. In Campuzano’s view, travestis disrupt rigid binary gender norms
by virtue of their gender expressions, and often navigate poverty, difficulties of sex work, and
discrimination in health care, including access to HIV/AIDs care. The fact that travestis are
forced to reckon with conditions of depravity due to transphobic oppression in Peru might
suggest that their survival undercuts the very power structure working against them: Existing as
‘travesti’ in a society that supports the exclusion and disempowerment of travestis is a rejection
of the norms and expectations on which that society rests.
The same could be said of trans, gender nonconforming, and genderqueer people in the
U.S., as these individuals are the targets of ongoing violence and efforts to undermine their
safety (HRC Foundation 2020). In their poetry book Femme in Public (2021), for instance, VaidMenon powerfully describes cruel and spiteful reactions to their gender expression on the streets
of New York City. It is as though they cannot pass through without having something taken from
them. Their presence is interpreted as an invitation for acts of hatred in a community where
‘man’ and ‘woman’ are the only genders that are taken to exist. As Vaid-Menon claims in
Beyond the Gender Binary (2020), “[g]ender non-conforming people face considerable distress
not because we have a disorder, but because of stigma and discrimination. There is nothing
wrong with us, what is wrong is a world that punishes us for not being normatively masculine or
feminine” (32). While genderqueer people are not necessarily gender nonconforming (the latter
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term typically deals specifically with gender expression and presentation, while the former with
identity), there is no question that genderqueer people are also punished for not fitting into
normative gender standards. Under the gender binary system in the U.S., ‘man’ and ‘woman’ are
the two accepted gender categories, and the existence and survival of genderqueer people,
despite efforts to punish and erase them, critiques that normativity. This is what it would mean
for ‘nonbinary’ and ‘genderqueer’ to possess what I am calling the survival feature.

3.1.2 The generative feature of ‘nonbinary’ and ‘genderqueer’
One might argue that the unique fluidity and electability of ‘nonbinary and ‘genderqueer’
make them radical in the sense of being generative: They generate radical options. What I am
referring to as a generative feature of a social category describes its capacity to produce
subversive possibilities for modes of existing, generally when situated in conditions of scarcity.
‘Genderqueer’ might appear to possess a generative feature of some sort, particularly in
light of the blatant rigidity of the gender binary. That is, one could argue that insofar as
‘genderqueer’ deviates from the fixed, uncompromising categories of ‘man’ and ‘woman,’ this
category rejects them as the norm. And ‘genderqueer’ does so, at in part, by generating
possibilities outside of the gender binary. These possibilities are, furthermore, chosen rather than
required; recall Dembroff’s claim (2018) that “nonbinary identity is open to anyone and forced
upon no one.” The generative potential of ‘nonbinary’ and ‘genderqueer’ would be radical
insofar as they would acknowledge, e.g., the fluidity and mutability of identity (Alcoff 2006).
‘Genderqueer’ might be considered generative in at least three senses: generative to the
self, generative to other genderqueer and gender-questioning people, and generative to cisgender
people who are not aware that there are gender categories besides ‘man’ and ‘woman.’
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‘Genderqueer’ could be generative to the self insofar as recognizing oneself as genderqueer (or
“opting into” the category) can help one explore the multi-faceted spectrum of gender
presentations and other gendered modes of being that are affirming to that person. It is not
uncommon for genderqueer people, for example, to have fun with gender—or, more technically,
to experience what has been called gender euphoria6—by experimenting with ways of existing
as genderqueer. This might include a genderqueer person finding a home (even a temporary
home) in butch self-expression despite previously only identifying with femininity. While having
fun with gender or experiencing gender euphoria are not necessary components of ‘genderqueer,’
and being genderqueer is not the only way to have these phenomenological states, it might be
thought that relating oneself to the category ‘genderqueer’ can play an important role in making
nonnormative gender experiences possible to that person, sometimes for the first time in their
life. The category ‘genderfluid,’ often considered a subcategory of ‘nonbinary’ or ‘genderqueer,’
perhaps embodies this point most aptly: Insofar as genderfluid people are in flux with their
gender—for example, a genderfluid person could be a man, a woman, or an agender person
during a given stretch of their life or even time in their day—they gain what might be thought of
as permission to explore and even create gender possibilities through their genderfluid
(genderqueer) categorization.
To the extent that ‘genderqueer’ creates gender possibilities for the self, it also does so
for other people who are genderqueer or gender-questioning. That is, one might say that
‘nonbinary’ creates possibilities not only for nonbinary people but for everyone who lives under
an oppressive gender system (Currah 2016, 441; Wilchins 1995, 4). Someone who has never
been exposed to ‘genderqueer’ as a term (or even as a concept), yet who has wondered about
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Gender euphoria has been defined as “the psychological state of bliss and comfort that happens when our gender
expression is aligned with our identity” (Plume 2021).
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whether they really identify with the binary gender that has been assigned to them throughout
their life, might become aware of a new gender option simply by encountering the category
‘genderqueer’ or encountering a genderqueer person existing as genderqueer. The multitude of
nonbinary subcategorizations—such as ‘agender,’ ‘polygender,’ ‘demigender,’ and
‘greygender’—also become possibilities for nonbinary people themselves who have some
conceptual familiarity with nonbinary gender options but do not have the terminology at hand
until they come across other nonbinary people who openly identify with these categories.
Finally, ‘genderqueer’ is generative to anyone who does not know that there are more
than two genders. For example, if a cisgender person incorrectly assumes a genderqueer person’s
gender and is then corrected, the former is being made aware of gender possibilities beyond
‘man’ and ‘woman.’ In dominant U.S. contexts, where the existence of ‘nonbinary’ and
‘genderqueer’ is constantly met with doubt, being a member of such categories violates many
cisgender people’s beliefs that the gender binary offers an accurate description of the world. This
potential generative feature of ‘genderqueer,’ in addition to the two other ways that
‘genderqueer’ could be considered generative, suggests that the category itself upends oppressive
and violent ideas about the staunchness and inflexibility of gender.

3.2 Radical mechanisms of ‘nonbinary’ and ‘genderqueer’
I have just described what I take to be the two most compelling candidates for
metaphysical properties that ‘genderqueer’ possesses and that would make ‘genderqueer’ into a
radical social category. In some ways, this analysis has already gone further in clarifying what
about ‘genderqueer’ could radically resist the gender binary than previous articulations of the
colloquial and academic view. However, the question remains how these potential features of
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‘genderqueer’ could resist the gender binary (if they do). In the rest of this chapter, I will explain
strategies by which ‘genderqueer’ attempts to accomplish this feat. The two main mechanisms of
disruption to the gender binary that I will explore are: [3.2.1] metaphysical, and [3.2.2]
epistemic. I argue that both the survival feature and the generative feature of ‘genderqueer’ (if
accurately ascribed to ‘genderqueer’) can amount to either metaphysical or epistemic disruptions
to the gender binary. Recall that, in Chapter 2, I will argue that ‘nonbinary’ and ‘genderqueer’
possess neither the survival feature nor the generative feature and fail at putting forth both
metaphysical and epistemic disruptions to the gender binary.

3.2.1 Metaphysical disruption to the gender binary
There are many social contexts in which the category ‘genderqueer’ is incorrectly taken
to not exist. This can happen when there is no room for the possibility that ‘man’ and ‘woman’
are not the only two genders, or when there is room for this possibility but there is nonetheless a
failure to account for the fact that there really could be more than two genders. The latter context
is common in spaces that attempt to provide allyship or recognition to trans and gender-variant
people but where misgendering still takes place (often unwittingly and with apology). In any
case, I think it could be argued that the mere presence of nonbinary and genderqueer people in
these contexts metaphysically disrupts what is permitted with respect to gender possibilities
therein.
Some theorists, particularly in the mainstream activist and colloquial views I
reconstructed earlier, have couched this notion of metaphysical disruption to the gender binary in
terms of “visibility” and the power of “representation.” As the argument goes, visibility of
genderqueer people in public spaces challenges existing notions of gender that pervade a society
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that privileges cisgender, heterosexual people at the expense of queer and trans people. In such a
society, genderqueer people are taken to not exist, so their existence itself rejects these norms.
In other words, existing as genderqueer attempts to render the category real in contexts
where there is no social position available for genderqueer people, which is a compelling
framework for identifying the radical potential of the category. The concept of a social position
has its roots in feminist philosophy. Simone de Beauvoir (1953), for example, describes the
“situation” of women as being oppressed by men and being in the position of “the Other” in
relation to men. To be a woman, according to de Beauvoir, is to be susceptible to particular
norms by virtue of being assigned the sex ‘female.’ Sally Haslanger (2012), however, claims that
de Beauvoir oversimplifies a metaphysics of gender. On Haslanger’s account, gender is “socially
constituted,” in contrast to sex, which is “socially distinguished” (190), though both are socially
constructed. That is, sex categories (e.g., ‘male,’ ‘female,’ ‘intersex’) might be based on natural
properties, but the lines drawn between them are socially invented. By contrast, gender
categories (e.g., ‘man,’ ‘woman,’ ‘nonbinary’7) are constituted by social relations. Drawing an
analogy, Haslanger explains that
landlords and tenants are socially constituted because the conditions that must be met in
order to be a landlord or tenant are social conditions. The category of gender […] is also
socially constituted, that is, one is a man or woman (cf. male/female) by virtue of the
social relations one stands in. (Haslanger 2012, 190–91)
To embody the social position ‘woman’ on Haslanger’s account is to meet the conditions
governing the social relation between men and women. Dembroff (2018), who calls de
Beauvoir’s account the gendered social position view of gender, also criticizes de Beauvoir.
Unlike Haslanger, though, Dembroff is explicitly concerned with the fact that previous theories
of gendered social position do not explain how nonbinary identity can exist. Ásta (2018) unpacks
7

Note that Haslanger does not explicitly discuss nonbinary identity here.
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this dilemma further through the terminology of social location in what she calls a conferralist
framework for examining social categories:
Our subjective social identity can be the location we inhabit stably, but it need not be. It
may be a location on a social map that most contexts don’t allow us to inhabit.
Sometimes there is no location in the current context that we identify with. And
sometimes there are very few contexts with locations that we identify with. Our struggle
then is to make it the case that there are more contexts in which there are locations that
we can identify with. (Ásta 2018, 123)
While Ásta’s account perhaps fails to explore ways that genderqueer people can “inhabit stably”
a genderqueer category even when denied access to a genderqueer “location on a social map,”
her view deals well with the idea that many contexts lack a genderqueer social position. That is,
many social contexts in dominant U.S. societies only allow for binary categorizations (‘man’ and
‘woman’) regardless of a person’s “subjective social identity.” Ásta’s theory also help us
diagnose this reality of cisnormativity as a problem: Genderqueer people not being assigned the
identity ‘genderqueer’ is a feature of a social world that peripheralizes trans and gender-variant
people. After all, if ‘nonbinary’ and ‘genderqueer’ became a gendered social position in many
more contexts, misgendering of (and, more broadly, refusal to acknowledge the existence of)
nonbinary and genderqueer individuals would likely be less prevalent.
One might argue, then, that when nonbinary and genderqueer people navigate contexts
where there is no social position for these categories (or a shaky social position, as in wellintentioned yet imperfect contexts), they are crafting that very social position for themselves and
for other trans and gender-variant people who do not see themselves as conforming to binary
gender categorizations. This is what I mean by a metaphysical disruption to the gender binary.
It is clear that, if ‘genderqueer’ possesses a survival feature or a generative feature, then
either (or both) of these features can partake in metaphysical disruption to the gender binary. For
the survival feature, where ‘genderqueer’ is radical insofar as genderqueer people survive the
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violence of the gender binary, ‘genderqueer’ vanguards a social position for genderqueer people
in the face of attempted eradication of that social position. This is the “struggle” (123) to which
Ásta refers and that ‘genderqueer’ might appear to advance. The creation of a social position for
‘genderqueer’ via the existence of genderqueer people in cisnormative spaces could also be
considered evidence of the generative feature at work: When one genderqueer person locates
themself on the social map, in Ásta’s terminology, there is increased possibility not only for
other genderqueer people to follow suit but also for wider recognition of that social location by
people and structures that benefit from the gender binary remaining intact.

3.2.2 Epistemic disruption to the gender binary
Consider a philosophy classroom in the U.S. composed of one genderqueer student and
twenty students who identify within the gender binary and who do not know that there are more
than two possible gender categories (or perhaps they know that there are more than two genders
but compartmentalize this knowledge at their convenience). If the genderqueer student identifies
or expresses themself as genderqueer, which would serve as counterevidence to the other
students’ beliefs about the number of possible gender categories, then this genderqueer person
might be said to participate in epistemic disruption to the gender binary: It is no longer
reasonable for the other students to believe (or to pretend) that there are only two genders.
The type of epistemic disruption I am articulating might be considered a disruption to
what Charles Mills (2007) calls an epistemology of ignorance. Mills examines the notion of
white ignorance as an example of an epistemology of ignorance: an epistemically deficient state
in dominant agents that results from white supremacy. Specifically, as Mills shows, white people
fail to form true beliefs and to dissociate from false beliefs about the realities of racist
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oppression. Constitutive of white ignorance is the assumption that white racial identity is the
norm. This assumption operates to subjugate non-white people by making their existences and
moral worth unintelligible within the broader epistemic community (Mills 2007, 26). Mills
describes how “white normativity manifests itself in a white refusal to recognize the long history
of structural discrimination that has left whites with the differential resources they have today,
and all of its consequent advantages in negotiating opportunity structures” (28). White ignorance
is partly an ignorance of self, an obstruction of self-knowledge about how white people benefit
materially from racism that enables white people to continue benefiting, all while untroubled.
Mills’ view suggests how epistemic disruption to dominant knowledge systems can be
politically, economically, and socially motivated, as it can come at the expense of dominant
knowers retaining social power.
The concept of epistemic disruption can also be traced to Eve K. Sedgwick’s
Epistemology of the Closet (1990). According to Sedgwick, Western societies constitute a
heterosexist external world, immersed in what she calls the “hygienic Western fantasy of a world
without any more homosexuals in it” (Sedgwick 1990, 42). Existing as gay disrupts this
epistemological “fantasy,” one might argue, as it becomes difficult for heterosexual people to
continue rationally believing that there are no gay people.
Another way to conceptualize epistemic disruption is through Kenji Yoshino’s notion
(2000) of an epistemic contract in “The Epistemic Contract of Bisexual Erasure.” This epistemic
contract, according to Yoshino, is a tacit agreement of bisexual erasure that creates bisexual
invisibility in academic and legal work. Through the epistemic contract, ‘homosexual’ and
‘heterosexual’ (the given options in the sexual binary) come to appear mutually exclusive and
comprehensive identity categories, without leaving the possibility of bisexuality. The epistemic
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contract, crucially, includes people who know that bisexuality exists (Yoshino 2000, 358).
Yoshino argues that binary sexualities (which Yoshino calls “monosexuals”) have a vested and
mutual interest in erasing bisexual people: “It is as if these two groups, despite their other
virulent disagreements, have agreed that bisexuals will be made invisible. I call this the epistemic
contract of bisexual erasure” (Yoshino 2000, 362). He cites statistics that bisexual people are not
actually minorities within the population relative to gay and heterosexual people, showing how
the epistemic contract of bisexual erasure does indeed constitute an erasure of something that
exists in abundance. The mutual agreement between gays and heterosexuals to erase bisexuality
is what Yoshino calls “the political explanation” for bisexual erasure and constitutes “the
epistemic contract” (388) to which Yoshino refers:
As I define it, an epistemic contract is […] not a conscious arrangement between
individuals, but rather a social norm that arises unconsciously. It might be fairly asked
why the epistemic contract (or, for that matter, the social contract) is expressed as a
contract as opposed to a norm. My answer is that I believe that contractual language
better captures the fact that the arrangement arises between distinct groups who enter it
because of overlapping but not congruent interests. Norms appear to arise from society as
a whole, while “social contracts” seem to arise out of the constituencies into which
society is fractured. “Don’t ask, don’t tell,” for example, is a contractual formulation of
the norm of gay silence that lays bare the interests (and implicitly the constituencies)
involved: straights will not inquire if gays will not flaunt. The choice, however, is
ultimately semantic—one could easily rephrase the substance of what follows in the
language of norms.
The epistemic contract is epistemic insofar as it relates to the nature of knowledge. It is a
social arrangement about what can be acknowledged or known. This arrangement arises
between groups that have distinct but overlapping interests in the promulgation or
repression of certain kinds of knowledge. (Yoshino 2000, 391–92)
As such, the epistemic contract is a contract insofar as it is composed of multiple parties with
distinct yet overlapping interests—in this case, gay and heterosexual people who pretend that
bisexual people do not exist.
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As Yoshino argues, there are at least three mutual interests in erasing bisexual people that
both gay and heterosexual people possess (and which forms their epistemic contract). One
interest that gays and heterosexuals share is that of stabilizing sexual identity—heterosexual
people because of the power they accrue through their identity, and gay people for solidarity
purposes. Bisexuality as a concept undermines the stability of identity “because it makes it
impossible to prove a monosexual identity” (Yoshino 2000, 362). For example, when bisexuality
is a legitimate possibility, attraction to women becomes insufficient evidence to show that a man
is heterosexual; therefore, bisexuality becomes “threatening” (Yoshino 2000, 362) to the
cherished assumption of heterosexuality. I do worry that there might be epistemic contexts for
which proving heterosexual identity also requires adequate evidence that one is not attracted to
the same sex. Nonetheless, this is usually under the suspicion that the person is gay and hiding,
not that they are bisexual.
A second interest motivating the epistemic contract of bisexual erasure is maintaining the
legibility of sex as a bodily demarcation and social signifier: “to be straight or gay is to
discriminate erotically on the basis of sex” (Yoshino 2000, 362). Bisexuality disrupts this idea
when “both” sexes become erotic possibilities: “Bisexuality endangers all of these interests
because it posits a world in which sex need not (or should not) matter as much as monosexuals
want it to matter” (363). Yoshino’s claim is that bisexuality undermines a binary understanding
of what ‘sex’ means based on norms and expectations of desire placed on sexed bodies. I would
argue, however, that these norms and expectations are better couched as in the domain of gender,
rather than sex, and, furthermore, some bisexual people also discriminate erotically, such as
bisexual people who prefer one gender to another, or who are attracted to members of particular
gender categories qua members of those categories. It is also likely that many bisexual people
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(particularly cisgender bisexual people) have a vested interest in upholding the sex binary. In any
case, it could be argued that ‘bisexual’ as a sexual category undermines the epistemic contract of
bisexual erasure by undoing the rigidity of sex to some degree.
Yoshino describes a third interest underlying the epistemic contrast as rooted in
monogamous expectations of U.S. society—heterosexual people because soothing their fears of
HIV supposedly requires the belief that they are isolated from the possibility of transmission, and
gay people because of desire to fit into heteronormative society. According to Yoshino, the
stereotype that bisexuals are non-monogamous disrupts this imagination (363). While I have
some concerns about couching biphobic stereotypes as political tools, it is interesting to consider
how categories might produce beliefs which create turbulence in the epistemic landscape that
oppresses members of those categories.
Yoshino, crucially, perhaps couches this epistemic contract in a way that is too strong.
After all, there are certainly cases where gay and heterosexual people’s behaviors are better
explained by explicit biphobic prejudice rather than an interest in pretending that bisexual people
do not exist. Yet most relevant about Yoshino’s claim is the implications for how bisexual
people resist this epistemic contract. Specifically, Yoshino points to ways that “bisexuals are
increasingly nominally visible, even if politically repressed” (433). For instance, the National
Bisexual Liberation group, formed in New York City in the 1970s, could be considered an
interruption to the epistemic contract of bisexual erase through its production of “monthly social
events and consciousness-raising exercises” (Yoshino 2000, 432), among other contributions. An
important result of Yoshino’s argument, then, is that inserting bisexuality into the epistemic
landscape counteracts the repression of knowledge about the existence of bisexual people.
Rendering bisexuality intelligible, as a violation of the epistemic contract of bisexual erasure, is a
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form of epistemic disruption to biphobic oppression. Notably, Yoshino misses the fact that this
tactic of epistemic disruption need not require the existence of bisexual organizations (though the
rate of knowledge diffusion might be faster through institutional routes). Rather, it just as well
might require the category ‘bisexual’—and bisexual people existing. Each time a gay or
heterosexual person comes to know about the existence of the category ‘bisexual,’ this would
also disrupt the epistemic contract.
The same might be said of ‘genderqueer,’ which like ‘bisexual’ deviates from an
oppressive binary and by consequence (or as a characteristic of this binary) is often rendered
invisible. In the case of ‘genderqueer,’ both men and women are invested in the erasure of
genderqueer people. This is clearest through a comparison to the first interest in the epistemic
contract cited by Yoshino: Men and women care about and believe in the stability and rigidity of
gender identity, and the existence of genderqueer people threatens this. If there were only two
genders, then this would reaffirm the lifelong endorsement in and adherence to the gender binary
that benefits both men and women (though perhaps in different ways and to different degrees):
from one’s work, to one’s educational path, to one’s social networks, and beyond. Men seek to
uphold their power derived from the patriarchy, where a condition of possibility for this power is
the existence of the gender category ‘man.’ Furthermore, as for gay people, (transphobic) women
may be invested in maintaining the boundaries and existence of the gender category ‘woman’ to
form “feminist” coalition movements with the stated aim of addressing patriarchal oppression.
Surely, formulating a comprehensive theory of an epistemic contract of genderqueer
erasure is not needed to make the comparison to Yoshino’s view, though I have hopefully
provided a starting point for drawing such a comparison. I now want to clarify how the survival
feature and the generative feature of the category ‘genderqueer’ facilitate epistemic disruption of

43

this sort. If ‘genderqueer’ were ascribed the survival feature, then this might constitute an
epistemic disruption to the gender binary insofar as that binary relies on people incorrectly
believing that there are only two possible gender categories, and the existence of nonbinary and
genderqueer people provides defeating evidence to that belief. This epistemic disruption is made
clear by hateful reactions to genderqueer people that stem from confusion: What is that person’s
gender? Why aren’t they wearing the clothes they are supposed to? This confusion, when
expressed, is itself a form of violence that parallels to Ahmed’s discussion of ruthless
questioning that marginalized people face. To the extent that genderqueer people survive this
violence, this questioning, their existences mark a refusal to conform to the epistemic “fantasy”
(Sedgwick 1990, 42) that there are only two gender options in the world.
It could also be argued that the potential generative feature of ‘genderqueer’ advances
epistemic disruption to the gender binary. Consider the claim that genderqueer people, simply by
existing, give permission for other genderqueer or gender-questioning people to exist as
genderqueer (as stated earlier, this is one way in which ‘genderqueer’ might be considered
generative and thus subversive). This permission can take place by providing the language to
conceptualize gender to which other genderqueer or gender-questioning people did not
previously have access. In other words, it might be thought that the generative feature of
‘genderqueer’ resists what Miranda Fricker (2007) has called hermeneutical injustice, which
takes place “when a gap in collective interpretive resources puts someone at an unfair
disadvantage when it comes to making sense of their social experiences” (1). Hermeneutical
injustice is considered a type of epistemic injustice, which Fricker defines as a wrong committed
against someone in their faculties as a knower, a thinker, a reasoner, etc., paradigmatically due to
prejudice associated with the latter’s social position. A common case of hermeneutical injustice

44

is when women were victimized by sexual harassment before the term ‘sexual harassment’ had
been invented and disseminated into popular usage (Fricker 2007, 6). Without such terminology,
women continued negotiating this form of sexist violence without the tools to interpret their
experiences.
A gender-questioning person might be the victim of hermeneutical injustice when they
experience inarticulable feelings of not matching their forcibly assigned binary gender but not
knowing about any gender categorizations outside of the binary. When such a person becomes
introduced to the categories ‘nonbinary’ and ‘genderqueer’—e.g., through the experience of
encountering a genderqueer person who exists openly as genderqueer—they gain an opportunity
to develop the language to understand themselves within the economy of gender possibilities.
Therefore, one way to conceptualize the generative feature of ‘genderqueer’ putting forth
epistemic disruption to the gender binary is through resistance to hermeneutical injustice against
genderqueer people—i.e., the lacuna in many people’s understanding of possible gender
categories, particularly those categories that do not align with the gender binary. It might be
argued that this hermeneutical injustice is alleviated when nonbinary, genderqueer, and genderquestioning people have access to the multifaceted and everchanging language of gender,
something that is made possible in part by the existence of genderqueer people themselves.

3.3 Objection: Being genderqueer or doing genderqueer?
Two immediate concerns with these renditions of the idea that ‘genderqueer’ is inherently
radical are as follows: that they require expressions or outward manifestations of ‘genderqueer,’
rather than mere existence as a member of the category, and relatedly, that they require
genderqueer people to “come out” in an important, yet troubling, way.
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The first concern that is these analyses of ways that ‘genderqueer’ could mount
metaphysical and epistemic disruption to the gender binary have largely relied on genderqueer
people doing things associated with their identity, instead of simply existing in that category. Yet
if ‘genderqueer’ is to be an inherently radical category, then being genderqueer must be
sufficient. Dembroff circumvents this concern by taking expressions of ‘genderqueer’ to partially
constitute the identity ‘genderqueer.’ In other words, they think that participating in practices
such as requesting to be referred to with ‘they/them’ pronouns is itself a sort of experience that
constitutes genderqueer identity. They are careful not to specify which practices would be
necessary or sufficient, though—only that some expression(s) of ‘genderqueer’ are what makes
somebody a member of that category.
I could leave my reply to the first objection at that; however, I do not agree with
Dembroff that being genderqueer requires doing genderqueer. That is, I think that Dembroff asks
too much of identity. My primary issue is that Dembroff’s view implicitly obligates genderqueer
people to “come out” in order to be considered authentically genderqueer, and this requirement
disproportionately undercuts the validity of non-white genderqueer people and genderqueer
people navigating poverty, who are least likely to enjoy the safety and resources to “come out”
without serious consequences to their well-being (Decena 2008; Koch-Rein, Haschemi Yekani,
and Verlinden 2020).
As such, I want to focus on the second concern, which is in line with my objection to
Dembroff’s view in following chapter: that requiring metaphysical or epistemic disruption seems
to require genderqueer people to “come out.” Many of the arguments I presented in this chapter
hinge on genderqueer people existing openly—not just existing. This objection is particularly
relevant for epistemic disruption, which typically demands confronting the knowledge, belief,
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attitudes, etc., of other people by existing as genderqueer. One way to sidestep this concern is by
only focusing on ways that a genderqueer person participates in metaphysical and epistemic
disruption to their own understandings of gender. Sometimes internalized oppression is not
letting oneself pass, and asking oneself questions (e.g., questioning the validity of one’s own
gender-variant experience), to draw from and build on Ahmed’s view. This is especially
powerful when considering the high rates of suicide and mental illness in nonbinary and
genderqueer youth (Price-Feeney, Green, and Dorison 2020). One might therefore argue that
surviving as genderqueer, surviving the questions that one asks oneself, and generating space for
oneself to exist within the complexity of gender are radical practices. However, this response is
not wholly satisfying: Arguments put forth by Wilchins and Dembroff, among others, do not
limit themselves to what genderqueer people’s existence does for themselves only as resistance to
the gender binary. Rather, these theorists argue that to exist as genderqueer is to undermine the
power of the gender binary in a broader sense (not just for each genderqueer person in isolation).
For this reason, I find this second concern with the arguments presented thus far highly
compelling, and perhaps even defeating to the very idea that ‘nonbinary’ and ‘genderqueer’ are
inherently radical in the ways I have described. I will spend the remainder of the dissertation
providing additional evidence for why this thesis is false, ultimately defending a view that I take
to illustrate more accurate properties of the categories ‘nonbinary’ and ‘genderqueer.’

47

Chapter Two: A Genderqueer Politics of Resistance?
Why Genderqueer Does Not Resist the Gender Binary
I now begin the first part of my negative argument that ‘nonbinary’ and ‘genderqueer’ are
not the sort of social categories that would be correctly characterized as radical, critical, defiant,
etc. I take it that whether a category is “radical” (or critical, defiant, etc.) depends on whether it
the sort of thing that resists oppression.
In the case of ‘nonbinary’ and ‘genderqueer,’ the most compelling argument that these
categories resist oppression is centered around the idea that they resist the gender binary. I now
argue that, if these categories resist the gender binary, they do so minimally and not by
definition—only when corroborated with other features such as engaging in practices that resist
that binary. Specifically, Chapter 2 will counter the claim I attempted to defend in Chapter 1—
i.e., the claim that ‘nonbinary’ and ‘genderqueer’ inherently resist the gender binary and are
therefore radical ways to exist in the world. My central concern is that simply being a
genderqueer person does not imply a political orientation in light of the variety of (sometimes
contradicting) political stakes that genderqueer people in the U.S. have and the reality that these
categories introduce harmful gender norms and expectations of their own. Part of my argument
will be that, if ‘genderqueer’ resists the gender binary by definition, this implausibly trivializes
the meaning of resistance. In Chapter 3, which is the second part of my negative argument, I
specify what I take to be a more accurate reconstruction of the power structure underlying the
gender binary and explain why it is a problem that these categories, which define themselves in
relation to that binary, do not address this power structure and so do not resist the gender binary.
The following chapter will include both an internal critique and an external critique of the
argument presented in Chapter 1 that ‘nonbinary’ and ‘genderqueer’ resist the gender binary. The
internal critique will interrogate what I have been calling the radical features of ‘genderqueer,’ as
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well as the radical mechanisms of ‘genderqueer.’ There will also be two components of my
external critique: first, an exploration of why the sort of genderqueer politics that would be put
forth by a politically oriented genderqueer categorization is problematically one-dimensional,
and second, concerns about the implications that such a view would have on the meanings of
resistance.

1 Internal Critique Part I: Failure of radical features: Why ‘nonbinary’ and
‘genderqueer’ do not possess the survival feature or the generative feature
In Chapter 1, I outlined and defended what I took to be the most persuasive argument that
‘genderqueer’ resists the gender binary by definition. The first part of this argument was that
‘genderqueer’ possesses at least two characteristics that make it into such a radical category:
what I termed the survival feature and the generative feature. These two features are the most
plausible candidates for specifying what about ‘genderqueer’ would position it against the
oppressive system that is the gender binary. I now criticize this argument on the grounds that it
does not apply properly across members of the category considering variations in privilege,
power, and interest among genderqueer people.

1.1 Failure of the survival feature
Recall that when a category possesses what I term the survival feature, members of that
category survive under a system that functions to marginalize them and even attempt to promote
their early death. I claim that unlike the categories ‘Black’ and ‘Indigenous,’ ‘genderqueer’ is not
a good candidate for possessing the survival feature because, on the one hand, it does not apply
to genderqueer people who hold also hold significant power, and on the other hand, it misapplies
to the most marginalized within the genderqueer community.
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The survival feature does not apply correctly to genderqueer people who can appeal to
dominant, intersecting identities that enable them to avoid threats to survival owing to the gender
binary. This is perhaps most forceful in cases where that dominant, intersecting identity is the
category ‘white’ given the extreme violence of white supremacy inflicted by people and
institutions in the U.S. and the corresponding benefits that white people accrue. White
genderqueer people can certainly invoke white identity to avoid threats to survival owing to the
gender binary. While this may not be the case for all white genderqueer people all the time, as
many white genderqueer people may still be still susceptible to harm by virtue of deviating from
the gender binary, it is an option in many contexts, which is enough to warrant my hesitation to
ascribe the survival feature to ‘genderqueer.’ I am thus pointing out a counterexample to show
why ‘genderqueer’ cannot be defined as subversive in this way.
White gender-marginalized people can sometimes avoid harms of gender marginalization
by invoking white identity to side with white gender-dominant people. White women, for
instance, often have the option to associate with white men to gain access to power and resources
that sexism would otherwise blockade. A crucial example is when Senator Susan Collins, a white
woman, voted to confirm Brett Kavanaugh as Supreme Court Justice in October 2018 despite
hearing evidence that he is a perpetrator of sexist violence. It is no secret that Susan Collins’ vote
contributed to sexism (S. Nelson 2018). But this very act of sexism also served her racial power:
By sympathizing with her fellow white men Republican senators, she identified herself as a
someone who supporters of those white men should likewise support. On the broader
significance of Susan Collins’ behavior, Alexis Grenell (2018) explains, moreover, that “white
women benefit from patriarchy by trading on their whiteness to monopolize resources for mutual
gain [with white men].” Accessing the power of white men is a unique option to white women
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that is not necessarily precluded or inhibited by their gender-based marginalization.8 This also
invokes what Nkiru Nzegwu (2006) refers to as “the white-male yardstick that rewards their
[women’s] subordinate status by ranking them as higher and superior to other racial groups in a
world dominated by white men” (217, emphasis added). The white-male yardstick enables white
women to gain proximity to white men via racial hierarchization and to do so by capitalizing on
their gender subordination.
White trans and genderqueer people sometimes have the option of accessing white
cisgender people’s power to avoid transphobic violence. It is a white-cisgender yardstick, so to
speak. Of course, this is not always the case as shown by reports such as “Punished By Design:
The Criminalization of Trans and Queer Incarcerated Survivors,” published by the prison
abolitionist organization Survived & Punished, which argues that “[t]rans, queer, and gender
nonconforming people, particularly survivors of sexual and domestic violence, are systematically
criminalized and significantly overrepresented in the criminal legal system” (N. Said, Lindsay,
and Tien 2022, 9). Notably, even as this document shows, queer and trans survivors of color face
disproportionately high susceptibility to these forms of violence (N. Said, Lindsay, and Tien
2022, 9, 15, 18, 22–26). White trans and genderqueer people, like white cisgender people, still
benefit from carceral solutions to violence—an instance of what Sarah Lamble (2014) calls
queer investments in punishment, e.g., “calling for more police in gentrified ‘gay
neighborhoods’” (151). Another case is when the U.S. nonprofit GLAAD and other LGBTQfocused organizations lauded the conviction of Allen Andrade, a man of color, for the 2008
murder of Angie Zapata, a trans woman of color, in Greeley, Colorado, as a victory for LGBTQ
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See, also, Stephanie E. Jones-Rogers’ discussion (2019) of white women’s violent role in slavery (particularly
married white women) and accruement of power and wealth in They Were Her Property: White Women as Slave
Owners in the American South.
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“rights” (Galarte 2021, 57). However, it might not be obvious that this carceral answer was not
actually a victory for all of the trans community, given the disproportionately high rates of police
brutality and mass incarceration targeting Black and Latinx trans people (Burns 2020).
Additionally, white trans and genderqueer people benefit from visibility in death as a
mechanism of increased security, as do white cisgender people. According to Francisco J.
Galarte (2021), white trans people placed political value on Zapata’s death; her death became
part of a trans political narrative furthered by nonprofits such as GLAAD. This politicization,
insofar as it was accompanied by extreme visibility, selectively benefited white trans people at
the expense of Black and Latinx trans people, whose experiences of visibility often correlate
with transphobic and racist violence (Galarte 2021, 29). In Galarte’s words, the “valuation [of
trans women of color] in death does not do anything to improve the lives of others like them”
(58). If some white trans and genderqueer people sometimes have access to this “trading on their
whiteness to monopolize resources for mutual gain” (Grenell 2018) with cisgender people, where
appealing to white identity is enough to escape or mitigate gender-based threats of harm, then it
cannot be definitional to the very broad categories ‘nonbinary’ and ‘genderqueer’ that they are
radically surviving those gender-based threats of harm.
To further articulate why the survival feature does not define ‘genderqueer,’ I want to
explore how the survival feature applies incorrectly to the most marginalized genderqueer people
by reinforcing a harmful stereotype: that what it is to be queer or trans is to suffer. This
stereotype depicts non-white genderqueer people as inherently victimized by both their gender
and their “culture.” As I will argue, ascribing the survival feature to ‘genderqueer’ lends itself to
the reproduction of this stereotype. That is, ‘genderqueer’ cannot be defined as radical, critical,
defiant, etc. insofar as genderqueer people survive violence and efforts to promote their
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premature death, if this definition leaves room for the idea that what it is to be genderqueer is to
be a victim or potential victim of violence—a particularly harmful idea when applied to Black
and Latina/o/x genderqueer people and non-white genderqueer people. This stereotype (which, it
should be noted, is also a trope) is powerfully illustrated by Galarte’s critique of public methods
by which trans women of color become visible through death. Galarte explains his own
proximity to the murder of Gwen Araujo, a trans teenager, due to sharing a hometown in
Brawley, California, and being among the “Chicana/o/x Latina/o/x trans and queer people” who
thus “felt the impact of her murder close to home” (Galarte 2021, 25). He describes the “dolor,”
which he characterizes as a process of loss, that he experiences as both a response and an
alternative to what he calls “the narrative demands placed upon Araujo and her family in the
wake of her death” (27, emphasis added). These “narrative demands” stem from Araujo’s
visibility as a trans girl of color and include, for example, the portrayal of “stereotypical notions
of Latina/o/x culture, gender, and sexuality” in the Lifetime network film about Araujo’s life and
death, A Girl Like Me: The Gwen Araujo Story (2006)—such as the representation of Araujo’s
grandmother as “the quintessential overbearing Mexican American matriarch” (Galarte 2021,
28). According to this narrative demand, her family’s “culture” becomes central to her suffering
as a trans girl. Galarte comments on the distortions imposed on Araujo and her family:
Race and transsexuality work in proximity in the Araujo archive, resulting in fragmented
and transfigured narratives about her life. The transfigured narratives about Araujo are
put to work to animate rights-based trans politics directed at reforming the US legal
system; in these instances, dolor emerges as residue from the process of extracting
strategic value from Araujo’s death to secure future rights and privileges for more
privileged, nonracialized LGBTQ subjects. Dolor, however, as a brown affect cannot
always be productively redirected in the service of bolstering the punishment systems and
economic arrangements that make life unlivable for the most vulnerable. (Galarte 2021,
27)
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As in the Zapata case, the death of a trans person of color is weaponized to demonstrate the need
for increased trans “rights” and carceral solutions to violence. The mechanism is an
appropriation by white queer and trans people of the communal pain inflicted by Araujo’s death.
Galarte goes on to observe problems with the consequent publicization of trans women of color
following the death of Araujo and her portrayal on-screen, claiming that:
[o]ne could make the argument that Araujo’s death brought visibility to trans politics and
was a precursor of the transgender tipping point, but the number of deaths of trans
women of color after Araujo was killed belies the notion that visibility around trans
violence somehow works to reduce that violence. Transgender women of color continue
to live within a context of economic, social, and political precarity, while a privileged
subject such as Caitlyn Jenner may enjoy a certain visibility and cultural intelligibility as
a transgender subject. (Galarte 2021, 29)
According to Galarte, the death of a trans girl of color became a strategy for white LGBTQ
political aims of “visibility” where white trans people can survive but non-white trans people
experience increased vulnerability.
For genderqueer categories, survival cannot be a site of disruption (what I have called the
survival feature of a social category) considering the “narrative demands” on non-white
genderqueer people that accompany attempts to undermine their survival, building on Galarte’s
framework. Visibility through the death of non-white trans and genderqueer people brings
visibility to trans and genderqueer people surviving this system; it is as though the “narrative
demands” of death become applicable to living trans people through the apparatus of visibility.
While visibility can benefit white trans and genderqueer political aims, such as more people
understanding what ‘trans’ and ‘genderqueer’ mean and increased efforts by lawyers and
politicians to “include” genderqueer people in the U.S. legal system, it undermines the survival
of non-white trans and genderqueer people. White trans and genderqueer people capitalize off of
the deaths of non-white trans and genderqueer, particularly Black and Latina/o/x trans women,
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using these deaths to further political interests that only benefit white trans and genderqueer
people. This is because visibility threatens living non-white trans and genderqueer people by
creating increased susceptibility to stereotyping and violence. The survival feature does not
apply accurately to non-white genderqueer people in a climate where “narrative demands” are
ubiquitous for these individuals. That is, ‘genderqueer’ cannot be properly ascribed the survival
feature when this ascription creates the possibility of tropes about the lives of non-white
genderqueer people: namely, that to be a trans or genderqueer person of color is to somehow be a
victim of one’s trans identity and one’s “culture,” as Galarte describes in the racist
representations of Araujo and her family. As such, the survival feature fails to correctly classify
‘genderqueer’ as a category.
One might object that genderqueer people can be properly said to radically survive on the
condition of being genderqueer (and, hence, the survival feature would apply) when considering
survival in the face of self-inflicted threats to safety. The Trevor Project’s “National Survey on
LGBTQ Youth Mental Health” (2021) found that over half of trans and nonbinary young people,
ages 13 through 24, had “seriously considered attempting suicide in the past year,” and 20% did
attempt suicide. As the objection goes, genderqueer people existing as genderqueer can be
viewed as a radical act of survival that warrants the ascription of the survival feature to the
category ‘genderqueer.’ The radical act would consist in resisting the gender binary’s function of
erasing people who are neither men nor women.
However, I think that the category ‘genderqueer’ should not be defined based on the
capacity of genderqueer people to survive self-inflicted harm. Such an argument would
reproduce a similar stereotype to the one I mentioned above: that to be queer or trans is to suffer.
While suffering internally owing to one’s queerness is certainly a reality for many genderqueer
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people, it cannot be definitional to the category. One reason is, of course, that not all genderqueer
people suffer in this way. There are genderqueer young people, for instance, whose parents
celebrate their identities, use their pronouns, and permit them to explore gender nonconforming
clothing choices without shaming them. Another reason is that the argument that ‘genderqueer’
by definition means surviving self-inflicted harm owing to the violence of the gender binary
forecloses (or risks foreclosing) a future where genderqueer people have access to affirming and
recuperative healthcare resources, including mental health treatment. ‘Genderqueer’ cannot be
defined as radically surviving harm to oneself because such an argument does not pay adequate
attention to structural causes of that harm, instead attributing it to the genderqueer person
themselves. As I will explore further in the next section, genderqueer people (and so the category
‘genderqueer’) are not separable from the social, political, and historical environments in which
they are located. Systems of power are part and parcel of the category’s meaning, and so should
be relevant to how metaphysics tries to make sense of it.

1.2 Failure of the generative feature
The argument that ‘nonbinary’ and ‘genderqueer’ introduce a sort of gender “fluidity”
often lacks a sophisticated inquiry into ways that these categories impose gender rigidity. I
previously described the generative feature of a social category as the capacity of that category to
produce deviant possibilities for ways of existing in the world, including possibilities for the self,
for other members of that category, and/or for other people in that social context. For
‘genderqueer,’ this might be best understood in terms of the unique flexibility and electability of
the identity. Namely, it could be argued that ‘genderqueer’ resists the gender binary insofar as it
creates the possibility of nonnormative gender exploration (even freedom) and is chosen by its
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members by virtue of not being systematically assigned to people in the U.S. (while the
categories ‘man’ and ‘woman’ are systematically assigned). I now argue that the generative
feature fails because any gender exploration that is facilitated by genderqueer categorization is
still in relation to normative requirements laid out by the gender binary. Moreover, requiring
generative properties of ‘genderqueer’ is itself a demand for a fixed genderqueer identity of sorts,
which is (somewhat ironically) contrary to the premise of generativity.
First, I argue that the generative potential of genderqueer is stunted by its localization
within an economy of gender normativity. A genderqueer person who is new to their identity
might partake in gender experimentation, like trying out nonconforming modes of expressing
themselves aesthetically, but this experimentation is still relative to the norms and expectations
set out by gender binary. This is one reason why Wittig denies that the category ‘woman’ can
escape heterosexist norms and expectations, and therefore argues that lesbians, who by definition
violate the heterosexist norms and expectations, do not constitute women at all. As I discussed in
Chapter 1, what it is to be a woman, according to Wittig, is to be a tool in what she calls the
heterosexual contract, which mandates that women are sexually and romantically partnered with
men. The category ‘woman’ does not pick up outside of this contract; it is only sensible within
the framework of heterosexuality, which is also a framework of men’s political, economic, and
social dominance over women. While Wittig uses this view to argue that people who would be
ascribed ‘woman’ have a vested interest in eschewing the category altogether, I think it also has
applications to understanding how ‘genderqueer’ is necessarily situated within a framework of
cisnormativity, where cisgender men and woman are taken to be the norm, and genderqueer
people are taken to be deviations from that norm. Perhaps, one could argue, there is no
independent existence of the category outside of these restrictive gender expectations.
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Butler takes a different approach, arguing that resisting gender norms and expectations is
possible through subversive renditions of category membership expressions. Yet Butler only
takes particular behaviors to be subversive: for example, those that create new meanings for
already “culturally intelligible” (Butler 1990, 23, 167–68) gendered behaviors. In Chapter 1, I
explored butch lesbians as an example of this form of subversion—i.e., since butch lesbians
perform masculinity and express affection for women while simultaneously being held to the
bodily expectation that they are feminine and attracted to men. Butler (1992), notably, denies
that certain gender nonconforming behaviors resist oppression on the basis of gender in an
Artforum interview with Jack Bankowsky and Liz Kotz. Specifically, Butler is skeptical about
the supposedly radical nature of gender expressivity that, according to Butler, is actually a
misinterpretation of their theory in Gender Trouble:
The bad reading goes something like this: I can get up in the morning, look in my closet,
and decide which gender I want to be today. I can take out a piece of clothing and change
my gender, stylize it, and then that evening I can change it again and be something
radically other, so that what you get is something like the commodification of gender, and
the understanding of taking on a gender as a kind of consumerism. (Butler 1992)
Butler corrects this “bad reading” of Gender Trouble by clarifying that they do not think that
experimenting with gender presentation by itself liberates people from gender normativity:
[…] my whole point was that the very formation of subjects, the very formation of
persons, presupposes gender in a certain way—that gender is not to be chosen and that
“performativity” is not radical choice and it’s not voluntarism. I just finished writing
another manuscript in which I spend page after page trying to refute the reduction of
gender performance to something like style. Performativity has to do with repetition, very
often with the repetition of oppressive and painful gender norms to force them to
resignify. This is not freedom, but a question of how to work the trap that one is
inevitably in. (Butler 1992)
According to Butler, generating new modes of gender expression only creates and recreates
meaning within the pre-existing gender system; it is not a radical rejection of gender-based
oppression but a fraught attempt to negotiate it—over and over again.
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In the case of ‘genderqueer,’ it might be said that a genderqueer person’s self-expression
is still of normatively laden gendered features even when it appears to represent some kind of
gender freedom through subversion. While I reject Butler’s notion that ‘gender’ is limited to the
habitual and repeated performance of gender norms, their explanation of the failure of gender
performativity to be radical is useful for showing why ‘genderqueer’ does not possess the
generative feature (and perhaps why it might be hard to show why any gender category possesses
the generative feature). For instance, a genderqueer person who has been assigned ‘man’
throughout their life and who has therefore been expected to present themself in a masculine way
might experiment with feminine clothing, appearance, affect, etc. This exploration of gender,
when stemming from their self-understanding as genderqueer, initially seems to reveal the
generative feature at work. After all, they appear to be finding new gendered meanings for
themself—specifically, gendered meanings that violate their expected expression given their
assigned gender. However, I am doubtful that this sort of gender exploration is radical because,
in the example above, femininity is still inscribed with cultural signification (drawing from
Butler) even when accompanied by gender nonconformity. That is, it might seem that this
genderqueer person is creating space to “resignify” norms of femininity, yet in reality, any
meanings that they create are still in reference to the original oppressive norms and expectations
of femininity and so do not identify themselves outside of the gender system. At the very least, I
do not think it is obvious that genderqueer people necessarily create new meanings of gender,
and there is good reason to be cautious when making such an argument.
Of course, genderqueer people such as the person in my example above do not reinforce
gender normativity in any particularly harmful way as compared to individuals who identify
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within the gender binary (trans and cisgender people who only associate with ‘man’ or
‘woman’). In Trans Rights Without a Theory of Gender?, Currah (2016) argues that,
[j]ust as transgender people are not necessarily the harbingers of gender revolution, they
are not necessarily the select guardians of the traditional gender regime. They just are—
like everyone else. Their gender identity is no more or no less fixed than that of their cis
doppelgangers. (Currah 2016, 446–47)
The idea that trans people (in my argument, genderqueer people) necessarily partake in radical
practices by virtue of their categorization, or necessarily reinforce harmful gender norms more
than members of dominant gender categories, is not self-evident. Instead, the categories ‘trans’
and ‘genderqueer’ are just another way to locate oneself within an oppressive gender system. For
‘genderqueer,’ this means that genderqueer people still find gendered meanings within the
gender binary even when deviating from that binary; being gender nonconforming, for example,
still references the binary norms and expectations that were oppressive in the first place
(nonconforming to what?).
This brings me to my second reason to question that ‘genderqueer’ generates varying
modes of self-expression which resist oppression based on the gender binary: because the very
act of generating these self-expressions (such as presenting as androgynous) produces and is in
agreement with gender norms and expectations of the category ‘genderqueer.’ The category
‘genderqueer’ is imbued with normativity, such as expectations of androgyny, to which someone
can conform by being gender nonconforming. In other words, I claim that the generative feature
as a demand on ‘genderqueer’ ironically demands a stable (oftentimes androgynous) identity of
sorts, which contradicts the very nature of a generative property.
The point I make here is best illustrated through discussions about the corporatization of
genderqueer identity. Consider, for example, Currah’s description (2022) of the branding of trans
identity in a way that conceals ongoing material oppression against trans people:
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For the privileged among us, gender non-normativity can be something we cultivate,
invest in, and brand. Neoliberal technologies of governance have proven able to
accommodate some new articulations of social difference—Goldman Sachs flies the
transgender flag!—without having to do much to modify the fundamental algorithms for
the distribution of inequality. (Currah 2022, 150)
As I argued in Chapter 1, “gender non-normativity” in the case of ‘genderqueer’ might involve
generating newfound modes of self-expression that also open the door for other genderqueer and
gender-questioning people to find a home within the range of gender categorizations. It is also a
way for other people within that social context to learn about and make space for categories that
exist outside of the gender binary. Collectively, this is the generative feature. But I now ask:
How can ‘genderqueer’ (or any gender category, for that matter) correctly be said to possess the
generative feature when the generative feature can itself be commodified and made into a
gendered expectation? The generating of possibilities outside of the gender binary is not radical
when those possibilities are accompanied by oppressive norms that disguise persistent
asymmetries in access to basic resources. Crucially, in “Non-binary gender identity and
algorithmic-psychometric marketing legibility,” Camilla Cannon (2021) describes how
media depictions […] portray non-binary identity as a more ‘authentic’ gender identity
than cisgender and binary transgender identities, suggesting that all consumers should
engage in individualized consumptive patterns that transcend the broad categories of
‘men’s fashion’ and ‘women’s fashion’ in order to attain an authentically gendered self.
(Cannon 2021, 1–2)
The result of increasing intelligibility of ‘nonbinary’ in both media and marketing algorithms is
generating transgressive purchasing possibilities not only for nonbinary consumers but for other
consumers, as well (Cannon 2021, 6). Cannon argues that nonbinary identities become
intelligible (or “legible”) in marketing algorithms through surveillance strategies that pick up on
consumers’ online behavior involving the transgressing of binary gendered expectations (11–13).
This behavior is then coded into data categories. Yet, as Cannon notes, these transgressive
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possibilities can still be harmful by virtue of carrying normative weight. Cannon cites, for
instance, the harms to nonbinary people who are “illegible” (13) in such a system—i.e., who do
not transgress binary norms in the expected way based on the dominant construction of
nonbinary identity. Such individuals might experience the denial “of legal, economic, and social
services” (Cannon 2021, 13), among other harms.
The branding of nonbinary and genderqueer categories prevents these categories from
generating radical possibilities (i.e., that resist the gender binary) by their definition, even if they
generate new or deviating possibilities. This is because those deviations become expected of the
category when there is uptake into dominant systems. Thus, there is good reason to be doubtful
that ‘genderqueer’ possesses what I have been calling the generative feature, and it should not be
deemed politically oriented against the gender binary on this basis.

2 Internal Critique Part II: Failure of radical mechanisms: Why ‘nonbinary’
and ‘genderqueer’ do not put forth metaphysical or epistemic disruption to
the gender binary
The second part of the argument that I reconstructed in Chapter 1 concerns how these
radical features (the survival feature and the generative feature), if correctly ascribed to
‘nonbinary’ and ‘genderqueer,’ actually resist the gender binary. I divided these strategies or
mechanisms of resistance into two categories: metaphysical and epistemic. While more
candidates for radical mechanisms of ‘genderqueer’ are possible, the metaphysical and epistemic
mechanisms that I described are the ones that I took to be most probable candidates. In this
section, I shift to my critique of this argument based on the idea that these mechanisms are not
inherent to the category ‘genderqueer’ and, in fact, are and can be stifled by genderqueer people
themselves who do not share the same political orientation of upending the gender binary.
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2.1 Failure of metaphysical disruption to the gender binary
‘Genderqueer’ is best framed as putting forth metaphysical disruption to the gender
binary via its potential for creating a social location for genderqueer people, particularly in
contexts where this location is shaky or nonexistent. I argue that ‘genderqueer’ fails to partake in
metaphysical disruption to the gender binary because genderqueer people can actively enforce
the gender binary and benefit from doing so. Since the gender binary directly serves the
elimination of the social position ‘genderqueer,’ enforcing it precludes the possibility of
metaphysical disruption. Thus, the category itself cannot be accurately defined on this basis.
Cheshire Calhoun’s rejection (2000) of lesbian identity as a political orientation is
instructive. In response to Wittig, among others, Calhoun argues that lesbian deviation from
heterosexuality does not imply resistance to patriarchal oppression. This is because
heterosexuality itself does not indicate the subordination of women and the dominance of men;
rather, heterosexuality marks a sexual social status that inferiorizes sexualities which are
considered to deviate from the norm. According to Calhoun, one implication of Wittig’s view
(i.e., that “[l]esbians are not women” (Wittig 1992, 32)) is that being a feminist means being a
lesbian because the category ‘lesbian’ escapes the norms and expectations associated with
women’s subservient sexual and domestic labor for men’s benefit. However, as Calhoun argues,
‘lesbian’ only escapes one type of women’s labor—that of an intimate relationship with a man—
yet women’s subordination also persists in the form of, for example, sexual harassment in the
workplace and state restrictions to women’s reproductive choices (Calhoun 2000, 41).
Furthermore, according to Calhoun, ‘lesbian’ does not necessarily constitute a political
orientation against the patriarchy because lesbians can enforce patriarchal norms. Calhoun
describes how Sarah Hoagland (1988), among others, presents an alternate way of solving this
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problem by claiming that ‘lesbian’ does not resist gender oppression via not being heterosexual,
but rather if and when ‘lesbian’ does not participate in heterosexual “interactions.” This is
because “[l]esbians themselves may be misogynistic and may engage in the same dominancesubordinance relations that typify heterosexualism” (Calhoun 2000, 42). As such, it is not
necessarily the case that lesbians have a collective interest in uniting against the patriarchy (i.e.,
in being feminist), contrary to what Wittig has claimed. Calhoun puts forth her own solution by
defining heterosexuality differently (and in accordance with lesbian politics, she thinks). Contra
Wittig, Calhoun claims that heterosexuality must be about more than male dominance, which is a
focus of feminist politics. Rather, heterosexuality is also about lesbian politics: It is about “the
‘right’ of access to sexual-romantic-marital-familial relationships” (Calhoun 2000, 48), such as
achieving the status of a legitimate partnership.
Calhoun’s view provides an initial platform for arguing that, while ‘genderqueer’
deviates from the gender binary (from trans and cisgender men and women), this does not mean
that it presents a metaphysical disruption to the gender binary. Specifically, many genderqueer
people actively support the gender binary. By ‘actively support the gender binary,’ I do not mean
the reality that genderqueer people must frequently understand themselves in relation to the
gender binary without their consent, as a way of negotiating the gender binary—for example,
genderqueer people are often forced to choose between men’s and women’s restrooms without
any option for a nonbinary or all-gender restroom (Dembroff 2020, 9). This is oftentimes an
unavoidable reality of navigating cisnormativity. Instead, I am referring to harmful practices in
which some genderqueer people participate by choice and not merely to survive an oppressive
system. For instance, there are genderqueer people who might label others as exclusively
masculine-presenting or exclusively feminine-presenting and pressure them to conform into one
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mutually exclusive gender expression. Some genderqueer lesbians, more specifically, might
identify other lesbians only with reference to ‘butch’ or ‘femme’ classifications and assume that
a person can only embody one or the other. Furthermore, it often happens that genderqueer
people act as though there are only two genders, all while knowing that there are more than two
(and, in fact, while existing in one such category that falls outside of the binary). This
phenomenon is similar to what Yoshino describes as a case of bisexual invisibility, which he
claims is a result of bisexual erasure:
Many who would not deny that bisexuals exist when the subject of bisexuality arises can
nonetheless revert to the straight/gay dichotomy when the topic shifts. I myself can speak
at length about bisexuals at one moment and then, in the next, field a question such as “Is
X straight or gay?” without instinctively feeling as if an important possibility—the
bisexual possibility—has been elided. (Yoshino 2000, 358–59)
In the case of ‘genderqueer,’ it is not uncommon for genderqueer people themselves to label
other people’s genders as though ‘man’ or ‘woman’ are the only possibilities, asking questions
like “Is X a man or a woman?” or assuming that others’ pronouns are either ‘she/her’ or ‘he/him.’
Of course, participating in these practices does not imply that they believe there are only two
genders. But behaving as though there are only two genders (i.e., as reflected in one’s practices)
still reinforces iterations of what Dembroff calls the binary axis of Western dominant gender
ideology. Playing into these norms and expectations is not limited to genderqueer people, of
course. The point is just that genderqueer people do not as a class reject the gender binary. In
fact, they might support it, which, ironically, is supporting the very ideology justifying practices
which attempt to erase ‘genderqueer’ as a social location. This idea connects with Bettcher’s
description (2020) of the problem of ‘trans*’ as an umbrella identity for trans and gender-variant
people: “[M]any trans people may not self-identify as trans* and so there is a problem of
wrongfully imputing identities (and political agendas) that run contrary to self-identifications.”
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The category ‘trans’ is not necessarily oriented towards a single political end, as shown by the
fact that trans people do not unanimously align with the political implications of the category
‘trans*.’ Assuming that ‘genderqueer’ has a political orientation runs into the same problems that
‘trans*’ does: Not all genderqueer people actively support the goal of eliminating the gender
binary in any given context. The upshot is that ‘genderqueer’ cannot be defined as
metaphysically disrupting the gender binary.

2.2 Failure of epistemic disruption to the gender binary
It could be argued that ‘genderqueer’ epistemically disrupts the gender binary insofar as
it creates knowledge about the existence of people who deviate from the gender binary and
knowledge that ‘man’ and ‘woman’ are not the only possible gender categories (i.e., that the
gender binary is a falsity). In Chapter 1, I framed this idea in terms of ‘genderqueer’ upending an
epistemic contract of sorts: namely, the imaginary where genderqueer people do not exist. I also
acknowledged the possibility that ‘genderqueer,’ by creating ripe conditions for sharing and
producing new gender terminologies with people who might not otherwise be exposed to these
interpretive tools, undermines hermeneutical injustice against genderqueer people. I now reject
the argument that ‘genderqueer’ undertakes epistemic disruption to the gender binary for two
reasons: first, because epistemic disruption to the gender binary can sometimes counteract the
security of many of the most marginalized genderqueer people in the U.S. and so is not
automatically desirable, and second, because this expectation problematically blurs the
distinction between expecting genderqueer people to be radical as members of the category and
expecting them to be radical by partaking in practices in which not all genderqueer people have
the safety and resources to partake.
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First, I argue that disrupting an epistemic contract of genderqueer erasure, to borrow from
Yoshino, is not an immediately desirable end for some genderqueer people in some U.S.
contexts. There are cases, for example, where existing openly as genderqueer—i.e., the primary
method by which members of the category ‘genderqueer’ could partake in resistance by virtue of
category membership—blockades people’s access to “networks and resources,” as Carlos Ulises
Decena (2008, 341) claims. According to Decena, living as an “out” gay person in the U.S. may
be a reality for white, middle-class people, but for non-white people, the disruption that stems
from an open gay identity does not necessarily further their interests. Decena examines the
testimonies of gay and bisexual men who are Dominican immigrants in New York City, arguing
that how queer people exist with respect to the “closet” must be understood in the context of
broader power relations, not just individual choice. The queer Dominican men who Decena
interviewed oftentimes found safety and comfort in being out “tacit[ly]” (340), or implicitly,
ambiguously, and without disclosure. One man in particular, Máximo Domínguez, noted that he
does not discuss his sexual identity with his family but kisses his boyfriend in their presence,
while another man, Pablo Arismendi, introduces his boyfriend to family as his “friend” but still
integrates him within familial contexts (Decena 2008, 341–43). While Decena’s analysis
obviously does not encapsulate (nor does it try to encapsulate) all experiences of Dominican
immigrant gay and bisexual men in New York City, he introduces the possibility that there are
modes of existing as queer without doing so explicitly—in this case, such that there does not
appear to be epistemic disruption to family-based understandings of queer identity—and that this
epistemic maintenance, so to speak, as the opposite of disruption can be critical for safeguarding
family life and establishing personal boundaries with family members. Many genderqueer
people, particularly non-white genderqueer people and genderqueer people navigating poverty,
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have a stake in undertaking this sort of epistemic maintenance, i.e., preventing epistemic
disruption to their family life, work life, public life, etc., to continue accessing necessary
“networks and resources” (Decena 2008, 341). This is reminiscent of Serene J. Khader’s
discussion (2019, 8) of “the transition costs of proposed feminist change” to women in the
Global South, in cases where, for example, increasing a form of independence from male
partners (a Western feminist ideal) is in tension with women’s own interests and so transitioning
into “some different, more egalitarian, type of kinship” (Khader 2019, 72–73) would be
accompanied by decreases in some women’s well-being along specific metrics. Similarly, it
cannot be assumed that all genderqueer people have an immediate interest in creating turbulence
in other people’s rigid binary understandings of gender identity, given resulting consequences to
their immediate well-being.9
Second, while refusing hermeneutical injustice against genderqueer people is a worthy
aim, accomplishing this feat asks too much of the category ‘genderqueer.’ Recall the relevant
argument that I attempted to defend in Chapter 1: that ‘genderqueer’ resists hermeneutical
injustice by producing gender terminology that genderqueer people can then access to understand
themselves better. This argument is particularly powerful when contextualized in an epistemic
environment that sustains a lacuna in interpretive resources for queer and trans people.
However, I think that merely existing in the category ‘genderqueer’ does not have to
involve the sort of practices that would disseminate relevant interpretative tools, such as the
name and meaning of the category itself. Certainly, one might argue that ‘genderqueer’ is a first
step toward doing so, or even a necessarily precondition. While this is plausible, it is not enough
to warrant the status of a metaphysical property of the category. This is because, even on
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See, also, binaohan’s critique (binaohan 2014, 39–51) of the “closet” as imperialistic.
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Dembroff’s view, where practices such as asking to be referred to with ‘they/them’ pronouns,
stating “I am genderqueer,” or using all-gender restrooms are partly constitutive of the category
itself, it cannot be guaranteed that any one of these practices would produce the sort of epistemic
disruption required to reduce hermeneutical injustice against genderqueer people. Consider how
it could be argued that a practice such as outwardly stating oneself to be genderqueer is the most
likely identity-expressing practice in which a genderqueer person might partake that would also
directly respond to the gap in resources where many gender-questioning people do not even have
access to the language of ‘genderqueer.’ Even then, requiring this one practice asks too much of
the category ‘genderqueer,’ including on a view like Dembroff’s where the relevant practices are
identity-constituting and identity-expressing. After all, genderqueer people should never be
required to state that they are genderqueer in order to have their identities validated and
understood. This is not a problem with Dembroff’s argument necessarily (even though I disagree
that to exist as genderqueer requires practices that express identity) because Dembroff does not
require any particular practice or set of practices to constitute the category ‘genderqueer.’
However, it is a problem with the idea that to exist as genderqueer requires such practices—for
example, subversive practices in the sense of targeting hermeneutical injustice against
genderqueer people. It would have to be clarified which practices are identity-constituting in
order to complete the argument that the category itself generates interpretative tools; otherwise, it
is unclear how identity-constituting and identity-expressing practices would accomplish this feat.
Namely, is it the practice of asserting oneself to be genderqueer, having an appearance that could
signal oneself as genderqueer, and/or navigating both male- and female-coded spaces? It is not
enough to gesture at possible practices when trying to ascertain which interpretative tools are
generated and how those tools might be useful to efforts to resist oppression on the basis of the
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gender binary. Yet specifying such practices risks alienating many genderqueer people who do
not have the safety or resources to participate in those practices without a serious risk to their
own livelihood.10 After all, many genderqueer people must be strategic about if and how they
choose to live openly as genderqueer for the purpose of their own well-being. The result is that
genderqueer cannot be defined as epistemically disrupting the gender binary in the sense of
ameliorating hermeneutical injustice because this would demand more of the category
‘genderqueer’ than is reasonable to expect of genderqueer people by the category’s definition.

3 External Critique Part I: The narrowness of a genderqueer politics
One might worry that I have built my critique thus far on the assumption that the best
formulation of the argument that ‘genderqueer’ inherently resists the gender binary is the
argument that I put forth in Chapter 1. Surely, though, one might question whether, for example,
my articulation of the potential survival feature and generative feature of ‘genderqueer’ as
metaphysically and epistemically disrupting the gender binary is not the best (or, at the very
least, the only) way to formulate this argument. In short, the worry is that I set up a strawman. To
bypass this possible objection, I now move to a critique that does not depend on the internal
characteristics of the counterargument that I reconstructed in the latter part of Chapter 1, though
it will still engage with other theorists from Chapter 1 such as Wilchins and Dembroff. For the
remainder of this chapter, my analysis will mostly target the broader strokes of the sort of
argument that I highlighted in Chapter 1. I will claim that membership in the category
‘genderqueer’ should not be sufficient for resistance to the gender binary if, on the one hand, this
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In many ways, my argument here is a return to the objection I presented at the end of Chapter 1, where I expressed
initial concerns with the implication that being genderqueer must involve “coming out” or being “out” as
genderqueer.
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articulation of one-dimensional resistance to power is confining and worrisome, and on the other
hand, resistance here should respond directly to harm caused by the gender binary, which
categorization alone cannot achieve. I address the former reason in Part I of my external critique
and the latter reason in Part II.
An immediate concern is normative: I am worried that arguing that ‘genderqueer’ is
radical co-opts Black and Indigenous feminist claims about the radical potential of the categories
‘Black’ and ‘Indigenous.’ Notably, the category ‘genderqueer’ could still be radical even if my
normative concern holds up. My point here is more methodological: Credit must be given to the
origins of that argument in order for the argument itself to avoid reinforcing oppressions that
non-white people, including genderqueer people, face. Problems with co-optation, such as the
co-optation of ‘intersectionality’ by white women and institutions (K. Davis 2020), are welldocumented (Alcoff 1991; Collins 2000; hooks 1981; Mohanty 2003; Narayan 1997; Spivak
1988). For example, in Emmalon Davis’ related concept of epistemic appropriation (2018), the
consequences involve derailing marginalized people’s access to and credit for the epistemic tools
they created (what she calls epistemic detachment) and entrenching certain usages of those tools
by powerful and privileged people to enhance their power and privilege (what she calls epistemic
misdirection) (E. Davis 2018, 705). One normative worry with asserting the radical potential
‘genderqueer’ is that it risks these issues with co-optation. When theorists such as Wilchins and
Dembroff claim that ‘genderqueer’ inherently resists the gender binary, without citing the
ideological origins of arguments about radical identity categories, they actively participate in
epistemic detachment: The intellectual, emotional, and spiritual contributions of Black and
Indigenous individuals become the target of attempted erasure (however inadvertently). This
attempted erasure is part of a long-standing pattern of ignoring the creations of Black and
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Indigenous women (E. Davis 2018, 706–13), thus “distorting those persons and their lives”
(727). Moreover, considering the fact that category ‘genderqueer’ first appeared in published
writing in a newsletter by white genderqueer activist Wilchins (Tobia 2018), epistemic
misdirection takes place when white genderqueer people claim radical identity in contexts
influenced by and influencing white supremacy to further a specific dominant thread of LGBTQ
interests. The result is concealing (again, even inadvertently) the abundant resources accrued by
virtue of white identity, which enables the ongoing distribution of those resources toward white
people and away from Black, Indigenous, and non-white people.
The broader normative concern about co-optation is bolstered and complicated by more
specific concerns with accounts of resistance against gender or sexual oppression that do not
factor in enmeshed oppressions (e.g., Cohen 1997; Combahee River Collective 1977; Lorde
1984; Mohanty 2003). The Combahee River Collective (1977), in a statement that famously
clarifies the contours of Black feminisms, argues that the movement must confront the
multitudes of oppressions experienced by Black women and women of color. Audre Lorde
(1982) has also voiced an oft-cited line of argumentation highlighting the dimensionality of the
fight(s) for Black liberation: “There is no such thing as a single-issue struggle because we do not
live single-issue lives.” The fact of multifaceted and linked oppressions, it could then be argued,
provides good reason to believe that resistance to those oppressions should reflect that nuance.
Kimberlé Crenshaw (1991) also addresses the importance of multi-dimensional analyses of
oppression and resistance. She defines the vital concept of structural intersectionality as “the
ways in which the location of women of color at the intersection of race and gender makes our
actual experience of domestic violence, rape, and remedial reform qualitatively different than
that of white women” (Crenshaw 1991, 1245). Failing to consider how race and gender combine
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and multiply harm obscures the very nature of that harm—in this case, by presenting an
inaccurate picture of how sexism works in tandem with anti-Black racism in a white supremacist
system. Over a century earlier, Sojourner Truth (1851) spoke at the Women’s Convention in
Akron, Ohio, and remarked on the tactics by which white supremacy denies ways that Black
women experience womanhood in the first place, particularly the denial of grace and humanity
given to her as a Black woman (see Painter 1996). In examining sexism, only examining the
category ‘woman’ fails to account for the many women whose legitimate claim to womanhood is
constantly obfuscated or rejected by systems that further racist oppression.
To diagnose these concerns in the case of ‘genderqueer,’ I argue that the idea that
‘genderqueer’ inherently resists the gender binary [3.1] disguises the reality that Black,
Indigenous, and non-white genderqueer people in the U.S. generally suffer more extreme
violence and cruelty from the gender binary than white genderqueer people, building critically on
arguments such as Truth’s and Crenshaw’s, and thereby [3.2] limits possibilities of liberation
from the gender binary.

3.1 A genderqueer politics that ignores racialized vulnerability to harm
I first want to explore how arguing that ‘genderqueer’ inherently resists the gender binary
puts forth a genderqueer politics that ignores the possibility that not all genderqueer people share
a common political goal—an idea that I mentioned earlier in this chapter but will further develop
here—partly owing to the reality that not all genderqueer people suffer from the gender binary in
the same way or to the same extent. This type of view, I think, is guilty of something similar to
what Chandra Talpade Mohanty (2003) calls the feminist osmosis thesis, or the fallacy that what
it is to be a woman is to resist sexist oppression. As Mohanty explains, the feminist osmosis
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thesis obscures specific experiences of women who are marginalized on the basis of race and
class under the banner of a “universal sisterhood” (Mohanty 2003, 112) that actually just centers
the perspectives and goals of white Western women. This occurs through the process of
assuming that women are, by definition, united transnationally in their struggle against the
patriarchy, all while concealing white Western women’s roles in past and ongoing imperialism
(114). From this perspective,
[…] the unity of women is best understood not as a given, on the basis of a
natural/psychological commonality; it is something that has to be worked for, struggled
toward—in history. What we need to do is articulate ways in which the historical forms
of oppression relate to the category “women” and not try to deduce one from the other.
(Mohanty 2003, 116)
One worrisome implication of the feminist osmosis thesis is that individual women become
members of the category ‘woman’ through the natural absorption of a feminist mentality. But
Mohanty suggests, instead, that theorists must consider how women have experienced
oppressions in various multidimensional ways historically and presently on the basis of race,
class, sexuality, and other social categories.
While all genderqueer people do not fall perfectly within the gender binary, they are not
necessarily united in a struggle against the hierarchy imposed by that binary. To think otherwise
is to run into the same issues raised by the feminist osmosis thesis (but in the genderqueer
context). Consider how, for example, white genderqueer people’s interest in cloaking the
experiences of non-white genderqueer people is in direct tension with liberation from the gender
binary, as non-white genderqueer people are the most oppressed by the gender binary. As
Michelle Garcia (2016) argues in her article “Whitewashing the Orlando shooting victims only
makes LGBTQ people of color more vulnerable to violence,” many public reactions to the
shooting at the gay nightclub Pulse in Orlando, Florida, on June 12th, 2016, ignored the fact that
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90% of the victims were Latinx, many of whom were Puerto Rican. More broadly, this is a
failure to contend with the reality that non-white queer people are more susceptible to
homophobic and transphobic violence. Despite perhaps conflating race and ethnicity at points in
the article, Garcia compellingly concludes that the consequences of this failure to take seriously
increased risk of harm faced by non-white queer people are increased political, economic, and
social investment in LGBTQ issues that mostly benefit white people, such as same-sex
marriage—while putting aside issues that non-white LGBTQ people have attempted to address,
“including LGBTQ youth homelessness, immigration, criminal justice reform, and high rates of
HIV among young gay and bi men of color” (Garcia 2016). While Garcia does not address this
directly, there is also the issue of white queer people co-opting the pain of the Pulse shooting
without acknowledging that the primary targets of the violence were non-white queer people.
The case of white genderqueer people is no different. These acts of co-optation, whitewashing,
and disguising of the realities of non-white genderqueer people are in immediate support of the
gender binary (in addition to white supremacy) because non-white genderqueer people are the
most marginalized by the gender binary in terms of vulnerability to violence and exclusion.
The point is that genderqueer people can clearly support the gender binary via how they
act, which disqualifies genderqueer people from rejecting the gender binary as a unit. Therefore,
being genderqueer does not naturally make one resist the gender binary—i.e., there is no
“osmosis,” to borrow from Mohanty’s characterization of the issue.

3.2 A genderqueer politics that curbs liberation from the gender binary
I just argued that the idea that ‘genderqueer’ inherently resists the gender binary conceals
variations in oppressions faced by genderqueer people as a category. I now argue that this
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concealment is objectionable at least insofar as it truncates what liberation from the gender
binary could mean. If resisting the gender binary is a step toward liberation from the gender
binary, or at least pointed in one such direction, yet genderqueer people can and do truncate that
liberation, then it is unlikely that the category ‘genderqueer’ inherently resists the gender binary.
A central case of liberation from the gender binary being truncated is limiting the harm of
the gender binary to members of the category ‘genderqueer.’ For queer sexual identities, it has
been argued that non-heterosexual sexual categories are not the only vilified sexualities that
should be the focus of queer activism (Bassichis and Spade 2014; Cohen 1997; Collins 2016;
Katz 2016). Rather, as Cathy J. Cohen (1997) claims, the narrative must be reconstructed to
think about how race, gender, and sexuality interact. Otherwise, such a queer politics would rest
on “the unchallenged assumption of a uniform heteronormativity from which all heterosexuals
benefit” (Cohen 1997, 452). This assumption is objectionable because many heterosexual
sexualities are also marginalized, such as the sexual desires of women of color on welfare (442)
who are not necessarily gay or bisexual, for example. The upshot is that queer activism without
nuance in its discourse around queerness risks erasing Black and non-white intracommunal
solidarities: “a queer politics which demonizes all heterosexuals discounts the relationships […]
that exist between gays and straights, particularly in communities of color” (Cohen 1997, 450).
b. binaohan (2014) has made a related yet diverging claim in the context of the nonbinary
and genderqueer identities. According to binaohan, cisgender people of color are among the most
victimized by the gender binary, in addition to trans and genderqueer people of color; in fact, on
binaohan’s view, cisgender people of color are more victimized by the gender binary than white
genderqueer people (121–22). They cite the racist gender norm that all Asian people (including
cisgender people) are feminine. Here, cisgender people of color are actively disadvantaged by a
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gender norm and expectation that directly stems from the gender binary. According to binaohan,
oppression on the basis of deviating from the gender binary, which binaohan calls binarism, is
“properly understood as a sub-privilege of whiteness, with a focus on gender” (124). To the
extent that binarism is a tool of white supremacy, binaohan is skeptical that white genderqueer
people are victimized by binarism at all. They do not name another form of oppression on the
basis of gender that white genderqueer face, but instead appear to deny that white genderqueer
people experience oppression on the basis of gender in the first place. To assume otherwise, they
argue, would serve the oppression of trans women of color; according to binaohan, it would be
ridiculous to think that a white nonbinary person is in any way marginalized relative to a Black
or brown trans woman, or that the latter could be a perpetrator of some type of oppression
against the former (the accusation of binarism) (126), as such a claim would cloud the fact that
white people’s political, economic, and social power is foundational to white supremacy.
Notably, binaohan’s example of the feminization of Asian people only shows how
oppression on the basis of gender (in this case, the rigid enforcement of expectations about how
one expresses one’s gender) serves racist oppression, but they do not necessarily show how the
gender binary itself is white supremacist and, hence, benefits white people, including white
genderqueer people, and also violently disadvantages people who are not genderqueer. A more
apt example, I think, would be the coerced placement of Indigenous children into boarding
schools on the basis of the binary genders ‘boy’ and ‘girl’ during Euro-American colonization of
the Americas (Whyte 2018, 135). In this case, white European colonizers violently attempted to
absorb Indigenous children into the colonial binary system.11 Today, Indigenous Peoples of the
Americas who are not (or not entirely) men or women, such as Two Spirit individuals, continue
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For example, as Kyle Whyte (2018, 128) claims, “Anishinaabe intellectual traditions do not emphasize a binary
gender system, but rather embrace gender diversity and fluidity.”

77

to experience and resist efforts by the state to erase their existences (Pullin 2014). It is clear from
these acts of violence and resistance that many Indigenous Peoples of the Americas, even those
who would consider themselves exclusively ‘man’ or ‘woman,’ are and have been victimized by
the gender binary. This example on its own may not single-handedly defend binaohan’s claim
that the gender binary victimizes non-white cisgender people more than white genderqueer
people (of course, the ‘cisgender’ label might not apply to, e.g., an Indigenous person who
considers themselves to be exclusively a man or a woman), or the claim that white genderqueer
people are not victimized at all—although, crucially, both of these claims may be true. My point
is just that the gender binary does not harm all genderqueer people the same way, nor does it
only harm genderqueer people (it also harms non-white cisgender people). While Dembroff’s
view does not rely on the idea that the gender binary impacts genderqueer people uniformly,
their failure to engage with this nuance does not leave room for the possibility that there might
be contexts where white genderqueer people can almost entirely (or perhaps, entirely)
circumnavigate the harms of the gender binary by being white—an idea that I explored at the
beginning of this chapter—or that their experience of the gender binary is categorically distinct
from that of non-white genderqueer people.
One upshot is that liberation from the gender binary is not just for genderqueer people. I
worry, then, about the following implication of arguments such as Wilchins’ and Dembroff’s: If
the category ‘genderqueer’ inherently resists the gender binary, and this is partly because of
ways that genderqueer people are centrally harmed by the gender binary (e.g., via the attempted
erasure of genderqueer people), then why would it not be the case that other social categories
that are also harmed by the gender binary also inherently resist the gender binary? This result
may not be problematic at all, but it would certainly require more evidence to defend than
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Wilchins, Dembroff, or other theorists have provided in support of the idea that ‘nonbinary’ and
‘genderqueer’ resist the gender binary by definition.
One vital assumption I have been making is that a theory of resistance to the gender
binary should be concerned with its implications for liberation from the gender binary, and it
should be dissatisfied when its implications for liberation inadequately capture the people and
communities who are negotiating oppression based on the gender binary. In the next section, I
will unpack the notion of ‘resistance’ here further. The relevant questions become: What should
resistance require? What are theorists and activists saying about resistance when they claim that
‘genderqueer’ as a social category inherently resists the gender binary, and why should that
concern those who are invested in liberation from that binary?

4 External Critique Part II: On resistance
A key assumption behind the argument that genderqueer is radical is the following: To be
harmed is to resist. Specifically, the assumption is that being harmed or surviving despite threats
of harm as genderqueer (the survival feature) or creating multiplicitous opportunities to
overcome or evade harm as genderqueer (the generative feature) would make ‘genderqueer’
resist the gender binary, the purported ultimate cause of this harm. One underlying thread
throughout this chapter has been my argument that, even if genderqueer people all suffer from
the gender binary—though this claim is itself controversial (binaohan 2014)—this does not
imply that they all resist the gender binary. My main concern with views such as Wilchins’ and
Dembroff’s is that it is not clear how practices like asking to be referred to with ‘they/them’
pronouns “destabilize” the gender binary, in Dembroff’s terms, which is a worry about the
concrete meaning of resistance here and in philosophical theorizing broadly. I now argue more
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directly that ‘genderqueer’ does not enact resistance to the gender binary because it is not clear
what resistance here would signify. This section will engage with prior literature on resistance in
an effort to clarify what it could mean for ‘genderqueer’ to resist (or fail to resist) the gender
binary.
I focus on Dembroff’s theory because Dembroff most explicitly engages with the idea
that ‘genderqueer’ puts forth resistance through a possible range of genderqueer practices that
constitute the category ‘genderqueer.’ Specifically, of the activists and theorists from Chapter 1
who assert the radical potential of nonbinary and genderqueer identities, Dembroff is perhaps
clearest about what this actually requires of the category. I will then argue that resistance to the
gender binary must be grounded in practices, but not simply those practices which constitute
expressions of genderqueer categorization. Resistance to the gender binary should involve
practices that respond directly to harm and, for ‘nonbinary’ and ‘genderqueer,’ the forces of
power actively causing that harm—an idea that will be the focus of Chapter 3.
In response to Dembroff, I want to mention two points of analysis. The first is that
Dembroff’s explicit emphasis on genderqueer defiance through practices parallels with a more
implicit emphasis on defiance through existing-in-the-category. Recall that Dembroff claims that
genderqueer people, insofar as they are genderqueer, “collectively” (19) participate in what they
call existential destabilizing (of the binary axis), which “stems from one’s felt or desired place
with respect to gender roles, embodiment, or categorization—typically, one that is deviant given
the practices, norms, and structures that arise from and sustain dominant gender ideology” (13).
How, though, does category membership foster existential destabilizing of Western dominant
gender ideology? They provide an answer to this question in their explanation of the axes of
Western dominant gender ideology (biological, teleological, hierarchical, and binary). Consider
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the following: “For example, those persons who consistently claim categorization other than the
gender they were assigned based on their natal genitalia—a property typically considered
sufficient for being trans—collectively destabilize the biological axis” (Dembroff 2020, 16,
emphasis added). Destabilizing here appears to take place through the “claiming” of a gender
category, which I do not think automatically corresponds to a practice such as outwardly
asserting that categorization (though perhaps Dembroff expects us to make this connection in the
context of their argument). Dembroff goes on: “Similarly, butch lesbians, who defy social
expectations with respect to gender presentation and sexuality, collectively destabilize the
teleological assumption” (16). While defiance via gender presentation is certainly a practice,
defiance via sexuality appears less so, unless one takes the problematic view that sexual
categorization must correspond precisely with certain sexual behaviors. Dembroff presents an
immediate resolution to my potential worry when they note that a strength of their view is its
ability to explain how, in Emily Brehob’s terms (2018), “[t]here’s something incredibly
powerful—revolutionary, even—about challenging someone’s understanding of gender with
your very existence” (quoted in Dembroff 2020, 20). As such, ‘genderqueer,’ according to
Dembroff, “challenges dominant gender ideology with its ‘very existence’” (20), where
Dembroff understands the “very existence” of ‘genderqueer’ as the practices in which
genderqueer people engage. So, my ‘existing-as-a-category’ and ‘practices’ interpretations of
Dembroff’s view actually converge on Dembroff’s account, even though, as I noted previously, I
find this conflation troubling since not all genderqueer people can exist openly as genderqueer
without serious threats to their safety.
My second point is that, in any case, it is still not clear to me how these practices amount
to “destabilizing” of the binary axis. The reader is left with the question of what terms such as

81

“destabilizing,” “challenging,” and “defying” mean, which makes the argument risk circularity (a
problem that Dembroff themself worries about when it comes to previous theories). In response,
I suggest that Dembroff implies something distinctly epistemic (in addition to metaphysical)
about resistance: According to Dembroff, members of the category ‘genderqueer’ “destabilize
the idea that they must belong to one of two discrete, exhaustive, and exclusive gender kinds
(men/woman): that is, binary kinds that do not overlap (discrete), account for all persons
(exhaustive), and are such that one person cannot belong to both kinds (exclusive)” (16,
emphasis added). There is the possibility that Dembroff uses the term “idea” in a more general
way (like “concept”) rather than in a specifically epistemic way. But there is also a possibility
that Dembroff is talking about something epistemic. One way this could be epistemic is that
genderqueer people disturb other people’s ideas about how people should be categorized (i.e.,
only as ‘man’ or ‘woman’). Yet there are at least two reasons to doubt that Dembroff is talking
about disrupting other people’s ideas: The first reason is that Dembroff stipulates that other
people’s reception to “destabilizing” practices is not what makes those practices defiant:
“expression is multiply realizable and need not not [sic] gain uptake” (20, emphases added).
Notably, though, even if there need not be uptake from other people, maybe ‘genderqueer’ still
challenges or critiques other people’s ideas about what is possible with respect to gender
categorization. Even so, to the second reason, Dembroff describes the examples of critical
practices as “familiar tools that genderqueer persons use to resist the idea that they themselves
must comply with binary categorization” (17, first emphasis added). So perhaps genderqueer
people disturb their own ideas about what is possible with respect to their gender categorizations,
not other people’s. The implication is that being genderqueer is radical because of the space that
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existing as genderqueer creates for oneself, and this takes place via identity-expressing practices
that existentially destabilize the gender binary. Yet is this all that resistance should mean?
Dembroff’s theory (as well as others who claim that ‘genderqueer’ automatically resists
the gender binary) leaves crucial questions unanswered: What should resistance require and
why? How does category membership fulfill these criteria, if at all?
I now turn to previous literature on resistance to engage more fruitfully with these vital
questions. Michel Foucault (1978), crucially, discusses resistance as not mutually exclusive but
instead coinciding with power: “Where there is power, there is resistance, and yet, or rather
consequently, this resistance is never in a position of exteriority in relation to power” (95). That
is, power and resistance are not mutually exclusive but rather coincide. Foucault appeals to
discourse as an example of a tool that both oppresses non-heterosexual people and opens
avenues for resistance to that oppression:
There is no question that the appearance in nineteenth-century psychiatry, jurisprudence,
and literature of a whole series of discourses on the species and subspecies of
homosexuality […] made possible a strong advance of social controls into this area of
‘perversity’; but it also made possible the formation of a ‘reverse’ discourse:
homosexuality began to speak in its own behalf, to demand that its legitimacy or
‘naturality’ be acknowledged, often in the same vocabulary, using the same categories by
which it was medically disqualified. (Foucault 1978, 101)
Foucault describes resistance as leveraging dominant language against the very power structure it
attempts to support—something to which the existence of oppressive discourse ironically lends
itself. Critically building on Foucault, Lila Abu-Lughod’s “The Romance of Resistance” (1990)
attempts to locate the meaning of ‘resistance’ by exploring what a theory of resistance says about
power. According to Abu-Lughod, “we should use resistance as a diagnostic of power” (42).
This definition is useful because it traces power diachronically and sheds light on the
interworking of multiple types of power. For example, as Abu-Lughod argues, this
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understanding of resistance makes it clear how it is possible for Bedouin folks resist both
Western/capitalist domination and the expectations of elders—which are examples of distinct
forms of power that can still be experienced and negotiated simultaneously.
On the topic of maneuvering against oppression, María Lugones (2003) has claimed that
the strategy/tactic (theory/practice) dichotomy is misguided in that it privileges the vantagepoint
of the strategist (the “brothers” (207) of those in power) at the expense of the tacticians, whose
practical options are reduced to what the strategist deems possible. Lugones presents her
alternative of “tactical strategic active subjectivity” (215), where resistors enact agency through
collectively formed intentions. Streetwalker theorizing, in Lugones’ terms, is one such example
of resistance (222) and takes place when a person “asks over and over again: Within which
conceptual, axiological, institutional, material set of limitations is the meaning of the possible
being construed?” (231) Lugones’ idea of the tactical strategist (the streetwalker) seems to be
rooted in ways that marginalized communities can generate knowledge outside of dominant
people and institutions. Like Abu-Lughod, Lugones theorizes resistance in parallel with
oppression and power, though her approach differs. According to Lugones, an account of
oppression must include two seeming contradictory (but actually compatible) things: that
oppression is “inescapable,” and that liberation is feasible (Lugones 2003, 53–63). Liberatory
potential can be found when people remember the selves that they inhabited when they were in
an oppressive context and navigate outside of it. From Lugones’ perspective, then, resistance is
at least partly a matter of how one reflects on one’s feelings, thoughts, and actions in the contexts
in which one negotiates.
These theories provide a framework to engage with the notion that ‘genderqueer,’ by
definition, resists the gender binary. On the one hand, Dembroff, for instance, appears to position
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genderqueer people as streetwalker theorists, in Lugones’ terminology. That is, one might say
they are collectively and actively living out tactical strategies of resistance via existential
destabilizing. On the other hand, there seems to be a worrisome triviality to this so-called
resistance, particularly if genderqueer people participate in defiant practices merely in order to
disturb their own ideas about what is possible with respect to their gender categorizations. The
worlds of communities and “hangouts” as resistance that Lugones envisions are reduced to a
series of individual phenomenologies. Furthermore, describing how “genderqueer people resist
captivity within the gender binary” (Dembroff 2020, 18, emphasis added) is just one example of
a common appeal to metaphors that shirk the needed explanatory work.
Building on prior theories of resistance, I now want to defend my own minimum theory
of resistance to the gender binary to fill these gaps in previous articulations of the idea that
‘genderqueer’ is radical, critical, defiant, etc. My argument has two components, the second of
which I will unpack in Chapter 3:

Resistance to the gender binary should not be limited to practices that express
genderqueer identity because this requirement is a symptom of cisnormativity and so
does not challenge the very structure it is said to. Instead, these practices must target the
gender binary without constituting identity but while retaining an outward manifestation
of some kind.

Resistance to the gender binary—at minimum, for a social category which is defined in
relation to that binary—should respond directly to the harm caused by the power
structure in which the gender binary is enmeshed.
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First, why should it not be the case that practices which express or constitute genderqueer
identity are defined as resisting the gender binary?
Requiring for resistance practices which “express” genderqueer identity—when those
practices deviate from aesthetic, temperamental, and otherwise normative expectations of the
gender binary—is actually just a reinforcement of cisnormativity. For example, androgyny, using
‘they/them’ pronouns, and other allegedly radical practices on Dembroff’s view are also all
expectations of ‘nonbinary’ and ‘genderqueer’ under a cisnormative framework. Expecting that
nonbinary people dress androgynously, for example, is clearly a symptom of cisnormative
expectations that women are feminine, men are masculine, and so nonbinary people must be
androgynous. As I mentioned earlier, Dembroff does not require any single or set of identityexpressing practices and instead gives examples of what those practices might entail. Yet even
so, it is hard to come up with an example of an identity-expressing practice that does not
conform to expectations around deviating from the binary in some capacity. That is, in each of
the examples cited by Dembroff, practices that clearly do not conform to the binary are taken to
be nonbinary practices: e.g., “using gender neutral pronouns (and other terms, like the title
‘Mx.’), cultivating gender non-conforming aesthetics, asserting nonbinary categorization (e.g., ‘I
am agender’)” (Dembroff 2020, 17). Asking to be referred to with ‘they/them’ pronouns does not
conform to the binary of pronouns, and Dembroff takes this very fact to indicate that it is a way
to express genderqueer identity—and, furthermore, to resist the gender binary. However, as I
claim, such assumptions are, ironically, cisnormative.
One might reply that it is conceivable that certain identity-expressing practices, such as
stating “I am genderqueer” or “I am neither a man nor a woman,” have potential to resist the
gender binary, even if they become normatively associated with the category itself. In response, I
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think that these practices would only resist the gender binary in contexts where ‘genderqueer’ is
not intelligible or where its intelligibility is very limited. For example, in a context with one
genderqueer person and all cisgender people who have never heard of ‘nonbinary’ or
‘genderqueer’ as a concept, the genderqueer person noting themself to be genderqueer (or that
they are neither a man nor a woman) would disrupt everyone else’s conception that there are
only two genders. There might also be cases where being read as genderqueer or gender
nonconforming meets these criteria. However, existing as genderqueer does not equal being read
as genderqueer (and, unfortunately, this is a reality that genderqueer people are all too familiar
with). There are, moreover, only some contexts where people are unaware that there are more
than two genders and so where such disruption would actually be effectual. In fact, in many
contexts people are aware that there are more than two genders and that the ideology
underpinning the gender binary is a fallacy. But even in highly ignorant contexts where people
do not know about genders that are not ‘man’ or ‘woman,’ genderqueer people participating in
practices such as noting oneself to be ‘genderqueer’ would only be targeting the ideology of the
gender binary (what Dembroff calls the binary axis), rather than, for example, the practical and
material components of the gender binary. Of course, I am not claiming that ideological
disruption can never be resistance; only that ideological disruption is only disruption in very
specific contexts when it comes to the gender binary. As such, it cannot be definitional to the
category.
What, then, should resistance to the gender binary require, if not identity-expressing
practices? I think that resistance to the gender binary should require some kind of outward
manifestation, rather than only existing as genderqueer. In this case, Dembroff’s suggested
practices could resist the gender binary, but only insofar as they are practices that go out of the
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way of identity rather than being necessarily affiliated with identity, and only when they
undermine the idea that there are only two mutually exclusive gender categories (the ideology of
the gender binary). The reason why I defend the idea of some kind of outward expression for
resistance is that claiming genderqueer categorization for oneself without doing anything would
permit a slew of internal behaviors to count as resistance that should not be labeled as such. For
example, when someone hears another person assuming other people’s genders (and doing so as
though ‘man’ and ‘woman’ are the only genders), they could consider themself resisting of the
gender binary by internally believing that what they heard was an instantiation of what binaohan
calls binarism—without actually saying or doing anything. Requiring an outward manifestation
for resistance to the gender binary is useful to avoid a contradiction with being a bystander in
conflicts that instantiate political, economic, and social injustice. If genderqueer people, for
example, believe that their categorization as ‘genderqueer’ is enough to resist the gender binary,
this would mean that there would be certain contexts in which they would be bystanders to
binarism. In such situations, their passivity would be reminiscent of Alcoff’s concept (1991, 12)
of a “retreat” that privileged people take from taking responsibility for oppressive systems—in
Alcoff’s view, with their stated justification that they do not want to talk over marginalized
people. Certainly, not all genderqueer people are in positions of power relative to the gender
binary at any given moment and so would not be bystanders in the example above, but as I
explored earlier, there are situations in which genderqueer people, owing to a dominant,
intersecting identity such as ‘white,’ actively benefit from the gender binary and so would
amount to bystanders in similar cases. As such, if genderqueer people are considered to
collectively resist oppression because of an entirely internal state with no outward expression, by
definition and therefore regardless of the context, then this would have disconcerting
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implications for what resistance means: Resistance would indicate something much flatter than it
perhaps should, and so should not apply to the category ‘genderqueer’ as a whole.
It may still be important to determine which outward practices are enough to constitute
resistance to the gender binary, while taking seriously concerns with defining resistance too
substantively (Khader 2011; Shelby 2016). As such, I now move to my second argument about
resistance: Claiming that ‘genderqueer’ resists or tries to resist the gender binary, without
reference to historical and ongoing oppressive forces that the gender binary feeds off of and
feeds into, mischaracterizes power, to build on Abu-Lughod’s view. More precisely, Dembroff’s
reconstruction of Western dominant gender ideology is missing an axis which I term a colonial
meta-axis, a concept that is also missing in the other defenses of ‘genderqueer’ as radical that I
reconstructed in Chapter 1. The idea is that for ‘nonbinary’ and ‘genderqueer’ to resist the gender
binary, these categories must respond directly to the harm caused by the power structure in
which the gender binary is located, given that they are defined in relation that binary. The focus
of the next chapter will be articulating this colonial meta-axis as a social and historical force that
interacts with the gender binary in important ways. The result will be a revised social ontology.
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Chapter Three: Coloniality and the Gender Binary
Implications of a Colonial Meta-Axis for the Failure of Genderqueer
to Resist the Gender Binary
The argument that I put forth in Chapter 3, as in Chapter 2, relies on counterexamples to
the views put forth in Chapter 1 which assert that ‘nonbinary’ and ‘genderqueer,’ by definition,
resist the gender binary. One overarching claim in Chapters 2 and 3 is that ‘nonbinary’ and
‘genderqueer’ do not inherently resist the gender binary because nonbinary and genderqueer
people themselves do not necessarily critique the relevant power structures simply by embodying
a category label, and how members of nonbinary and genderqueer categories actually behave can
disqualify the categories themselves from correctly being ascribed radical, critical, defiant, etc.,
metaphysical properties. Specifically, nonbinary and genderqueer people do not necessarily share
a political stake in resting the gender binary (Chapter 2), and as I will now show (Chapter 3),
they do not necessarily resist an important colonial function of the gender binary—which I will
argue should be a feature of a social category that is defined in relation to the gender binary in
dominant U.S. contexts.
Consider a genderqueer philosophy graduate student named Q at a university in the U.S.
who uses ‘they/them’ pronouns and is the only person in their department who is genderqueer or
uses pronouns besides only ‘she/her’ or ‘he/him.’ One might be tempted to argue, as I explained
several theorists would in Chapter 1, that Q’s existing as genderqueer challenges the social norm
that everyone is either a man or a woman and that everyone uses only those pronouns which are
expected of that person based on whether they are perceived as a man or a woman. By deviating
from this norm, Q appears to disrupt that very norm, and so contributes to interrupting an aspect
of the dominant gender system in the U.S.—specifically, the gender binary component of that
system. It might appear, then, that Q resists the gender binary just by being genderqueer. On a
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view such as Dembroff’s, their resistance to the gender binary relies on them resisting a
combination of internal and external expectations and behaviors associated with the gender
categories ‘man’ and ‘woman’ and doing so based on how they feel about where they fit into the
gendered social world (this is existential destabilizing).
I think, however, that Q’s deviation from the gender binary only appears to be disruption
when a watered-down version of resistance to the gender binary is employed. This was my
concern at the end of Chapter 2. I now articulate and expand on this concern by exploring how
the argument typified by Dembroff ignores the reality that Euro-American colonialism played
and continues to play in establishing this gender binary in the first place. Misunderstanding the
power dynamics underpinning the gender binary fundamentally misunderstands how resistance
to that binary should take place for a social category that is defined with respect to it. This is the
line of argumentation that Chapter 3 puts forth: that while practices which resist the gender
binary are possible, the categories ‘nonbinary’ and ‘genderqueer’ do not advance such practices
by their very definition.
For one, Q’s deviation from the gender binary is only a deviation because the gender
binary exists, and Euro-American colonialism is a crucial explanatory factor for why the gender
binary exists in dominant U.S. societies. Furthermore, even if Q’s deviation from the gender
binary were a disruption of that binary, Q’s membership in the category ‘genderqueer’ would not
necessarily critique the gender binary in dominant U.S. contexts. Rather, it seems just as well
that Q’s being genderqueer is another way for them to be included into that same gender system
that was and is used as a tool of colonial domination—in other words, that ‘genderqueer’ itself
can be imperialistic.
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In the following two chapters, I will outline this critique in more depth. The core of my
view is that the argument that ‘genderqueer’ inherently resists the gender binary fails because an
important function of that binary is to inflict colonial harm on Black and African people,
Indigenous Peoples of the Americas, and non-white people, yet ‘genderqueer’ does not by
definition prevent, reduce, or respond to this harm. In Chapter 4, I will present a different theory
of ‘genderqueer,’ which I call the Diachronic Approach, that I think accurately captures ways in
which the category’s core metaphysical properties are rooted in its imperialistic past and present.

1 The U.S. gender binary as a strategy for causing colonial harm
The goal of this section will be to establish that the gender binary serves a colonial
function—namely, to politically, economically, and socially dominate Black and African people,
Indigenous Peoples of the Americas, and non-white people in parts of both the Global North and
the Global South. Hence forth, I will call the gender binary which pervades dominant U.S.
societies impacted by and impacting colonialism the U.S. gender binary.12
Significant decolonial and postcolonial literature on gender has examined colonial
properties of gender broadly, which I will engage with here, but I will mostly be concerned with
literature that focuses on colonial properties of the gender binary and binary gender categories
(i.e., ‘man’ and ‘woman’) as well as implications of the colonial properties of gender broadly on
issues relating to the gender binary and binary gender categories. Two relevant lines of
argumentation in decolonial and postcolonial literature that I will examine are as follows: That
U.S. colonialism introduces gender categories that are different from the existing gender
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This characterization is influenced in part by Jules Wong and Nic Koski’s reference to the “American gender
binary” in their presentation at the 2021 SPEP Annual Meeting’s Trans Philosophy Project.
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categories in precolonial societies and that create a (new) gender binary; and that U.S.
colonialism increases (or creates, according to some arguments) sexist and binarist oppression in
those societies. By ‘binarist oppression,’ or ‘binarism’ (to borrow from binaohan), I mean
oppression stemming directly from the political, economic, and social system that is the gender
binary. Before analyzing this literature, I will attempt to articulate the violent role of the gender
binary in U.S. slavery and anti-Black racism, specifically, to contextualize this discussion.

1.1 Euro-American colonialism and the introduction of a gender binary during U.S. slavery
There is strong evidence that the gender binary was and is a mechanism to dehumanize
Black and African individuals during U.S. slavery. This function has also been strategically
reclaimed by such individuals to resist slavery and evade capture—which, as C. Riley Snorton
(2017) argues, is most crucially highlighted by “the frequency with which narratives of fugitivity
included cross-gendered modes of escape” (56).
Hortense Spillers (1987) explores how the racialization of Black and African people
navigating U.S. slavery is a process of eroding gender distinctions to thereby dehumanize (67).
This is a process of objectification—that is, viewing individuals as bodily resources in attempt to
strip from them their humanity. To demonstrate “the dehumanizing, ungendering, and defacing
project of African persons” in their treatment as “human cargo” (Spillers 1987, 72), Spillers
describes white European colonizers attempting to take away the femininity of ‘female’
individuals by rendering motherhood a process of commodification (a currency), and the
masculinity of ‘male’ individuals by legally detaching the right to fatherhood, all while making
accusations of fatherlessness through “the African father’s banished name and body” (80).
According to Spillers, “[u]nder these conditions, one is neither female, nor male, as both subjects
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are taken into ‘account’ as quantities” (72). This dehumanizing process is part of a violent
scheme to depict Black and African people solely by their economic usefulness; as Spillers
argues,
the socio-political order of the New World […] with its human sequence written in blood,
represents for its African and indigenous peoples a scene of actual mutilation,
dismemberment, and exile. First of all, their New-World, diasporic plight marked a theft
of the body—a willful and violent (and imaginable from this distance) severing of the
captive body from its motive will, and the female body and the male body become a
territory of cultural and political maneuver, not at all gender-related, gender-specific. But
this body, at least from the point of view of the captive community, focuses a private and
particular space, at which point of convergence biological, sexual, social, cultural,
linguistic, ritualistic, and psychological fortunes join. This profound intimacy of
interlocking detail is disrupted, however, by externally imposed meanings and uses: 1)
the captive body becomes the source of an irresistible, destructive sensuality; 2) at the
same time—in stunning contradiction—the captive body reduces to a thing, becoming
being for the captor; 3) in this absence from a subject position, the captured sexualities
provide a physical and biological expression of “otherness”; 4) as a category of
“otherness,” the captive body translates into a potential for pornotroping and embodies
sheer physical powerlessness that slides into a more general “powerlessness,” resonating
through various centers of human and social meaning. (Spillers 1987, 67)
Part of objectifying Black and African individuals negotiating U.S. slavery involves white
European colonizers interpreting them as not having genders, i.e., as being in a category that
cannot be the subject of ‘man’ and ‘woman’ gender ascriptions. The gender binary functions
here as a system to which Black and African people are taken to not apply and, hence, to be
lesser, according to colonial ideology. For example, people assigned ‘female’ are subjected to
what might be considered “male brutality and torture inflicted by other males” (Spillers 1987,
68). Additionally, U.S. medical institutions exploit “the captive body” for “medical education”
(Spillers 1987, 68) and supposed scientific research. This is especially prominent in the heinous
experimentations that mark the founding of U.S. gynecology, as Snorton argues: “Anarcha,
Betsey, Lucy, and the unnamed other captives were rendered as raw materials for making the
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field of ‘women’s medicine,’ from which they were excluded as women according to the
attenuating frame of plantation medicine’s sexual economics” (Snorton 2017, 53).
In such cases, according to Spillers, white European colonizers, the “captors,” attempt to
erase and uncomplicate the “profound intimacy of interlocking detail” of the individuals
negotiating “capture” (Spillers 1987, 67). Instead, they are reduced to, one the one hand, a form
of hypersexualization as a way to alienate them and commodify their reproduction, and on the
other hand, a stripping of gender to justify claims that they are different and therefore less-thanhuman. One mechanism by which this takes place is through the ascription of “property” that
precludes the possibility of “kinship” designation (74–75). The gender binary facilitates this
“property” ascription by defeminizing people deemed ‘female’ who are navigating slavery (79)
and emasculating people deemed ‘male’ who are navigating slavery (80):
Therefore, the female, in this order of things, breaks in upon the imagination with a
forcefulness that marks both a denial and an “illegitimacy.” Because of this peculiar
American denial, the black American male embodies the only American community of
males which has had the specific occasion to learn who the female is within itself, the
infant child who bears the lift against the could-be fateful gamble, against the odds of
pulverization and murder, including her own. It is the heritage of the mother that the
African-American male must regain as an aspect of his own personhood—the power of
the “yes” to the “female” within. (Spillers 1987, 80)
Without a designation as properly ‘man’ or ‘woman’—as assimilating into the U.S. gender
binary—Black and African people negotiating U.S. slavery are precluded from the being read as
kin to white European colonizers. To perpetuate this classification, the children of Black and
African individuals are further ungendered: “In the context of the United States, we could not say
that the enslaved offspring was ‘orphaned,’ but the child does become […] the man/woman on
the boundary, whose human and familial status, by the very nature of the case, had yet to be
defined” (Spillers 1987, 74). White European colonizers assume that Black and African
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individuals are exchangeable, interchangeable—i.e., “fungible” (Snorton 2017)—through this
colonial process of denying them gender assignments that align with the U.S. gender binary.
It is clear that the U.S. gender binary attempts to support the colonial function of labeling
Black and African people as inferior to white European people—i.e., degendering as
objectifying. Critically, this very degendering, objectifying function of the U.S. gender binary
has been mobilized by Black and African people to resist slavery and evade capture. Snorton
argues that the very idea of gender as navigable comes from such individuals (57); they “made
use of gender fungibility for fugitive movement” (53), and as such, “the interchangeability of
gender figured one aspect of blackness’s capacity” (62). Nonconformity to the U.S. gender
binary becomes a possibility of maneuvering slavery and rejecting racist oppression. For
example, as Snorton describes, Mary Jones was apprehended and tried for theft in 1836 after
leaving an exchange with “a white master mason” (59) holding his wallet, according to a report
in the New York Herald. The exchange took place at the Greene Street brothel, “where Jones was
a greeter and performed cooking and assorted domestic tasks for other sex workers” (Snorton
2017, 59). At her trial, Jones’ attire was ridiculed and became the subject of questioning by
members of the court, to which she replied:
“I have been in the practice of waiting upon Girls of ill fame… and they induced me to
dress in Women’s Clothes, saying I looked so much better in them and I have always
attended parties among people of my own Colour dressed in this way—and in New
Orleans I always dressed in this way.” (quoted in Snorton 2017, 60)
Snorton references the lithograph that circulated after the jury found Jones guilty and that labeled
her The Man-Monster, depicting her in a white dress as “Peter Sewally, alias Mary Jones” (60–
62). According to Snorton, Jones’ gender navigability puts forth resistance through multiple
channels. It is a form of validation that Jones enjoyed within particular contexts, such as in New
Orleans, that she did not experience at her trial (60). It is also, through the lithograph, a disregard
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for the dominant power structures that criminalized her: In Snorton’s words, “it is clear that the
practice of ‘cross-dressing,’ a process without a stable gender referent, created an imaginative
context for Jones and her johns, as the ungendering of blackness created a space for emergence
within dynamics of political, economic, and cultural modes of exchange” (Snorton 2017, 63).
There is good reason, then, to interpret nonconformity to the U.S. gender binary as a
mode of resistance that stems from Black folks navigating U.S. slavery through gender
negotiations. From this perspective, gender is not simply a binary system of power but also a
reclaimed tool to subvert U.S. colonial domination. When gender exists “as an always racial and
racializing construction—as a strategy for living and dying” (Snorton 2017, 66), gender
nonconformity becomes an approach to survival, even repair and “redress” (Snorton 2017, 66),
under conditions of U.S. colonial violence.

1.2 Euro-American colonialism and the introduction of a gender binary in parts of Africa
and Latin America
I now turn to my analysis of decolonial and postcolonial literature that examines how
types of Euro-American colonialism introduce a gender binary (or various gender binaries) in
parts of Africa and Latin America. This literature will provide a framework with which to engage
with the topic of U.S. colonial harm inflicted on communities both within and outside of the U.S.
It could be argued that claims about the colonial properties of the gender binary apply to colonial
interventions perpetrated by Western/Global North societies broadly. However, I will also
address the problem of generalizing Euro-American colonial interventions across time and place.
A stronger statement of the argument I examine in this section is that Euro-American
colonialism created gender categories where they did not previously exist. Instead, according to
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this strong version, precolonial societies were organized and hierarchized according to social
features besides gender. This argument is famously defended by Oyèrónkẹ́ Oyěwùmí (1997),
who claims that the Yorùbá people in West Africa did not have a gender system before British
colonial domination and violence. According to Oyěwùmí, “gender was not an organizing
principle in Yorùbá society prior to colonization by the West” (31). Precolonial Yorùbáland
included social categories to distinguish reproductive anatomy (i.e., ‘anamales’ and
‘anafemales’) that were not imbued with gendered norms and expectations, such that there was
effectively no binary opposition of gendered norms and expectations (Oyěwùmí 1997, 34). As
such, colonial intervention also came with the enforcement of a rigid binary system of gender
that Western scholars have often overlooked when examining Yorùbá society: “The usual gloss
of the Yorùbá categories obinrin and ukinrin as ‘female/woman’ and ‘male/man,’ respectively, is
a mistranslation. These categories are neither binary opposed nor hierarchical” (Oyěwùmí 1997,
32–33). Yorùbáland, moreover, did not employ gendered pronouns such as ‘she/her’ and
‘he/him.’ Rather, there were pronouns based on seniority and authority that did not have
gendered connotations (40). Expanding on the Yorùbá example, Oyěwùmí argues that “Western
categories like gender are globalized and deployed as universally valid even as other more
important local categories may have been rendered irrelevant and therefore inconceivable” (77).
In other words, it is a mistake to think that the Western binary categories ‘man’ and ‘woman’
exist everywhere (that they are the only ones possible, ubiquitously), and British colonial
intervention and violence is at least partly responsible for introducing and normalizing these
gender categories.
Bibi Bakare-Yusuf (2003) objects to Oyěwùmí’s argument on the grounds that the latter
focuses on the most advantaged in Yorùbáland. As Bakare-Yusuf claims, “[w]e cannot simply
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use the experience of princesses and privileged women to evaluate the position and experience of
most women in society” (7). Bakare-Yusuf criticizes Oyěwùmí for failing to consider unequal
power in society when she appeals to more socially dominant individuals as paradigmatic cases
of Yorùbá people who do not relate to each other via gender categorizations that are imbued with
norms and expectations.
Even with Bakare-Yusuf’s objection, it still seems reasonable to conclude that
colonialism introduces some gender norms and expectations into Yorùbá society, as there is good
evidence that, prior to Western intervention, the Yorùbá people did not endorse the same gender
norms and expectations that were programmed after Britain’s violent arrival. While age was
perhaps a more important organizing metric for Yorùbá society, there certainly could have been
some form of gender organization that nonetheless changed as a result of colonial violence.
Furthermore, the gender categories that colonialism introduced were and are binary in nature:
The mutually exclusive and opposed gender options ‘man’ and ‘woman’ were not present
previously, or, at least, the norms and expectations that British colonial domination associated
with those binary gender categories did not exist prior.
María Lugones (2007; 2010) engages critically with Oyěwùmí’s view while doubling
down on the idea that gender did not exist precolonially, arguing that both gender and sex did not
exist before Euro-American colonialism. According to Lugones, sex is socially constructed for
imperialistic ends. Lugones describes how
intersexed individuals were recognized in many tribal societies prior to colonization
without assimilation to the sexual binary. It is important to consider the changes that
colonization brought to understand the scope of the organization of sex and gender under
colonialism and in Eurocentered global capitalism. If the latter did only recognize sexual
dimorphism for white bourgeois males and females, it certainly does not follow that the
sexual division is based on biology. (Lugones 2007, 195)

99

Euro-American colonial intervention corresponded with the imposition of a sexual binary
(‘male’ versus ‘female’) where Indigenous Peoples of the Americas were considered to not fall
into that binary, and where individuals who would be considered to hold ‘intersex’ identity in
dominant U.S. contexts were deemed deviant despite being acknowledged by Indigenous
communities precolonially. Lugones goes on to argue that colonialism introduced gender
categories, including a gender binary (‘man’ versus ‘woman’). Lugones claims that more than
two gender categories were acknowledged within many Indigenous tribes prior to colonization
(196), including the category ‘berdache,’ which did not fall within the colonial categories ‘man’
and ‘woman’: “the male berdache have been documented in nearly 150 North American societies
and female berdache in half as many groups” (Lugones 2007, 201).
According to Lugones, Euro-American colonial rule employed a gender binary to draw
distinctions between the colonizers and the colonized so as to dehumanize the latter. Indigenous
Peoples of the Americas and African people navigating slavery were considered to fail to meet
the new, invented gender system and hence became targets of moral criticism. Lugones arrives at
what she calls the colonial/modern gender system by engaging with the work of women of color
feminists and Aníbal Quijano’s concept (2000) of the coloniality of power. The coloniality of
power includes the idea that race as global capitalist demarcations of people into social
categories can be traced to yet has persisted beyond Euro-American colonialism. The aim was to
localize resources in the control of people who were labeled ‘white’ under this economic system
(Quijano 2000, 217), which, in Quijano’s terms, was “expressed in the ‘racial’ distribution of
work, in the imposition of new ‘racial’ geocultural identities, in the concentration of the control
of productive resources and capital, as social relations, including salary, as a privilege of
‘Whiteness’” (218). This economic component of Euro-American colonialism marked the start
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of capitalism, according to Quijano, despite the preexistence of ‘capital’ as a concept (219).
Lugones explains that the coloniality of power thereby aimed to divide the human population
“into two groups: superior and inferior, rational and irrational, primitive and civilized, traditional
and modern” (Lugones 2007, 192). These demarcations constituted and continue to constitute an
attempt to justify colonial violence, exploitation, and extraction in the Americas.
Lugones objects that Quijano’s view does not properly account for ways that gender fits
into the racist, capitalist power structure he identifies. The result is mystifying how women of
color, or “nonwhite colonized women” (Lugones 2007, 190), experience violence. Lugones
proposes that the coloniality of power must be co-constituted by gender, even though Quijano
does not describe it this way. When evaluating the coloniality of power through the inseperable
concept of gender, according to Lugones, two sides of the colonial/modern gender system
become discernable: the light side and the dark side. The “light side” includes “[b]iological
dimorphism, heterosexualism, and patriarchy” (190) and is the typical subject of white feminist
objectives. It appears that biological or sexual dimorphism, on Lugones’ view, means the
expectation of “assimilation into the sexual binary” (195). Attempting to resist oppression on the
basis of gender only on the “light side” reinforces oppression, as only white women are assigned
the status of ‘woman’ on the “light side” (202): That is, “[s]exual purity and passivity are crucial
characteristics of the white bourgeois females who reproduce the class and the colonial and racial
standing of bourgeois, white men” (Lugones 2007, 206). The “dark side” of the colonial/modern
gender system includes a denial of recognition according to biological or sexual dimorphism.
According to Lugones, “[s]exual features of colonizers led them to imagine the indigenous
people of the Americas as hermaphrodites or intersexed, with large penises and breasts with
flowing milk” (195). Moreover,

101

Females excluded from that description [of white women] were not just their
subordinates. They were also understood to be animals in a sense that went further than
the identification of white women with nature, infants, and small animals. They were
understood as animals in the deep sense of “without gender,” sexually marked as female,
but without the characteristics of femininity. Women racialized as inferior were turned
from animals into various modified versions of “women” as it fit the processes of global,
Eurocentered capitalism. (Lugones 2007, 202–3)
Lugones describes how colonialism thereby introduced a new racialized category ‘woman’ into
Indigenous communities in the U.S., as well as in Indigenous communities in Latin America via
Spanish colonial intervention, which served to advance Euro-American colonial projects of
political, economic, and social domination. That is, the colonial/modern gender system employs
coloniality, via Quijano, which to Lugones is
not just a classification of people in terms of the coloniality of power and gender, but also
the process of active reduction of people, the dehumanization that fits them for the
classification, the process of subjectification, the attempt to turn the colonized into less
than human beings. (Lugones 2010, 745)
In this process, the categories ‘man’ and ‘women’ themselves become normative, a standard that
only white European people are permitted to meet. To this end, the introduction of colonial
gender categories was and is strategy “to damn the colonized” (Lugones 2010, 743).
Notably, as Isis Giraldo (2016) claims, Lugones does not adequately clarify whether she
thinks that colonialism introduces the gender binary or gender as such. In other words, it is not
obvious from Lugones’ account if she claims that there was any kind of gendered organization or
gendered norms and expectations in Indigenous societies in the Americas prior to the violence of
colonial involvement. Ann Garry (2011) has also contended, instead, that what matters is not the
number of colonially imposed genders but rather the ways in which new gender systems are
enforced.
As a way of handling these potential ambiguities in reply to Oyěwùmí and Lugones,
some put forth the more modest claim that colonialism did not introduce gender itself but instead
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introduced gender categories that were not the same as the binary categories ‘man’ and ‘woman’
which were enforced through colonial domination and violence. In her paper “Gender and
Coloniality: From Low-Intensity Communal Patriarchy to High-Intensity Modern Colonial
Patriarchy,” translated by Pedro Monque, Rita Laura Segato (2021) argues that gender existed
precolonially, though its character was different than colonially imposed gender. Segato focuses
on gender in what she calls the village-world, which is the state of a community that comes
before and is retained through colonialism, or “a surviving fragment that maintains some of the
characteristics of the world prior to colonial intervention” (Segato 2021, 786). In the villageworld, masculinity is still placed in contrast to femininity and afforded increased accolades,
suggesting the presence of gender precolonially:
Historical and ethnographic data on tribal worlds show that these had recognizable
structures of difference and hierarchy similar to what we would call gender relations.
These societies allot differential prestige to masculinity and femininity, and the positions
are occupied by people we might call men and women. (Segato 2021, 788)
There was clearly a gender system that existed prior to colonialism, or at minimum, something
that resembles gender, according to Segato. However, Segato argues that gender in the villageworld was less restrictive than the gender that colonialism has attempted to force onto
Indigenous peoples:
Despite the recognizable character of these gender positions, the tribal world allows for
more transit and circulation between positions than modern Western gender permits.
Indigenous peoples like Venezuela’s Warao, Panama’s Guna, Paraguay’s Aché,
Suriname’s Trio, Brazil’s Javaés, the pre-Colombian Incas, and many Native American
peoples, Canadian First Nations, as well as all Afrodiasporic religions, have vocabularies
and stable practices for what we may call transgender life or experience. These societies
allowed what Westerners call same-sex marriages, and they had other forms of gender
transitivity that the rigid, colonial-modern gender system disallowed. (Segato 2021, 788)
Colonial gender categories forbid movement across gender norms and expectations, rendering
the dominant Western concepts of ‘queer’ and ‘trans’ deviant categories despite the fact that
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experiences or identities in the village-world that would be labeled as such from a colonial gaze
were and are recognized in certain contexts. Thus, by introducing a colonial rendition of
diametrically opposed categories ‘man’ and ‘woman’ into Indigenous societies that did not
previously have the same categories, or had more elastic and fluid notions of these categories,
colonialism introduces a new gender system that includes a colonial gender binary.

1.3 Euro-American colonialism and the introduction of sexist and binarist oppression
The introduction of a colonial gender binary in dominant U.S. societies, which was and is
accompanied by the imposition and enforcement of racist gender norms and expectations, serves
the purpose of subjugating Black and African people, Indigenous Peoples of the Americas, and
non-white people in parts of the Global North and the Global South. The gender binary attempts
to do so via oppression on the basis of racialized notions of gender. I now want to describe and
evaluate the claim that colonialism introduced a new normativity to gender that was different
than in precolonial societies. As before, some argue for the stronger claim that there was no
gender normativity before colonialism—i.e., there was no sexism or binarism. Others argue for
the weaker claim that precolonial societies were not as sexist, or were not as binarist, as they
were post-colonially. The latter claim is often accompanied by a recognition that some
precolonial societies in fact include forms of oppression based on gender that cannot be wholly
explained by colonial intervention and violence.
First, I examine the stronger claim that Euro-American colonialism introduced gender
hierarchization in precolonial societies where it did not previously exist at all. Oyěwùmí, for
instance, has argued that British colonialism imposed the subordination of Yorùbá people who
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were forcibly assigned the colonial gender ‘woman’ yet who were not marginalized in their
society before colonial intervention:
The emergence of women as an identifiable category, defined by their anatomy and
subordinated to men in all situations, resulted, in part, from the imposition of a
patriarchal colonial state. For females, colonization was a twofold process of racial
inferiorization and gender subordination. [...] The creation of “women” as a category was
one of the very first accomplishments of the colonial state. [...] It is not surprising,
therefore, that it was unthinkable for the colonial government to recognize female leaders
among the peoples they colonized, such as the Yorùbá. […] The transformation of state
power to male-gender power was accomplished at one level by the exclusion of women
from state structures. This was in sharp contrast to Yorùbá state organization, in which
power was not gender-determined. (Oyěwùmí 1997, 124–25, quoted in Lugones 2007,
197)
Colonial domination and violence prohibited those who were assigned ‘woman’—namely,
anafemales—to participate in public life, achieve leadership positions, or hold power over
property and additional resources. However, before colonial intervention, anafemales were not
subordinated in this way and did in fact have access to power and resources, as shown by (e.g.)
precolonial “female chiefs and officials” (Oyěwùmí 1997, 125). Women’s reproduction and
marriage also became surveilled by the state during colonial rule (127). Moreover, anamales in
Yorùbá could benefit from this colonial hierarchization when they participated in the
subordination of anafemales: “The African males designated as chiefs by the colonizers had
much more power over the people than was vested in them traditionally” (Oyěwùmí 1997, 125).
Coinciding with anamales gaining a form of power was anafemales losing power. In this way,
British colonial domination and violence was accompanied by the imposition of a patriarchal
system onto the Yorùbá people.
Lugones, like Oyěwùmí, argues that colonialism introduced sexist oppression that rested
on the binary gender categories that it created in the first place. As noted earlier, Lugones holds
that the colonial/modern gender system viewed colonized women as overly sexual yet
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genderless, and colonizer women gendered and pure (Lugones 2007, 202–3). This created a
“light side” and a “dark side” of that system that served to advance colonial rule. The
colonial/modern gender system attempted to further colonial aims specifically by passing moral
judgment and inflicting violence on colonized women. Lugones references evidence that many
Indigenous societies can be considered matriarchal, or gynecratic, and “understood gender in
egalitarian terms” (196), yet were forced into patriarchal orders in order to survive colonization
(200). Gynecratic tribes held up women as powerful and respected their thinking and reasoning
capacities. Colonial efforts to undermine the gynecratic organization of Indigenous tribes such as
the Cherokee and the Iroquois was an effort to undermine their power and prevent resistance to
genocide and displacement. For example, “[t]he Iroquois shifted from a Mother-centered,
Mother-right people organized politically under the authority of the Matrons, to a patriarchal
society when the Iroquois became a subject people” (Lugones 2007, 200). Moreover, Indigenous
men could benefit from colonial power by showing “indifference” (Lugones 2007, 200) to
violence against Indigenous women. Positioning women as inferior to men required a gender
binary: two genders in direct opposition to each other, where one was deemed naturally superior.
By imposing this binary, according to Lugones, colonialism imposed sexist oppression.
One concern with Lugones’ theory (that perhaps also has ramifications for Oyěwùmí’s) is
that she incorrectly assumes that what she calls the colonial/modern gender system applies
similarly across precolonial societies, for any iteration of Euro-American colonialism. This
worry about overgeneralization is articulated in Raewyn Connell’s Southern Theory: The Global
Dynamics of Knowledge in Social Science (2007). According to Connell, searching for concepts
that are supposed to explain all forms of colonial violence and resistance contributes to the
ongoing domination of ideas produced within loci of power in the Global North (what she calls
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the metropole) and erasure of ideas produced within the Global South.13 Connell argues that the
social sciences fall prey to this error by assuming “one, universal, body of concepts and methods,
the one created in the global North” (Connell 2007, ix) and argues instead that social science
analyses must be contextualized—for example, by taking seriously the ways that masculinity
varies in different parts of the world and throughout history. In her chapter “Modern general
theory and its hidden assumptions,” Connell critiques the ways that social science employs
concepts designed to be universal—i.e., what she calls general theory, or “theorising that tries to
formulate a broad vision of the social, and offers concepts that apply beyond a particular society,
place or time” (28).
It might be worried that Lugones partakes in a form of general theory by considering
Euro-American colonial intervention on precolonial gender systems with such broad strokes,
though a more targeted critique of Lugones, where Connell explicitly addresses her views,
appears in her later article “Rethinking Gender from the South” (2014). Here Connell claims that
Lugones generalizes Euro-American colonialism in a way that denies contextual nuance and
responses to colonial violence from Indigenous communities themselves. According to Connell,
Lugones
speaks of gender as “a colonial imposition.” This claim will hardly work for South Asia,
East Asia, North Africa, Australia, or the Pacific, which had strongly marked gender
orders before the European colonial impact, and it is debatable for sub-Saharan Africa
and the Americas too. There is certainly a profound connection between colonialism and
modern gender orders, but it is much more complex than Lugones allows. We have to
recognize the resilience of precolonial gender orders, the very turbulent gendered history
of colonization itself (now being traced by historians in some detail), the influence of the
colonized on the colonizers, and the complex structures of gender relations resulting in
the postcolonial era. (Connell 2014, 532)

13

See, also, Frantz Fanon’s critique (1952) of colonial universalizing in Western philosophical work.
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Connell suggests the possibility that the colonial imposition of gender is a mutually impactful
process that takes place differently in various parts of the globe, all while adapting and shifting
in form. Lugones, according to Connell, fails to recognize these realities. As a result, Lugones
obscures resistance to colonial domination and violence, as well as dynamics within Indigenous
communities that affect colonialism in turn.
Crucially, Connell also emphasizes the problem of assuming that theory produced in the
Global South could not apply outside of its local context—e.g., the imperialistic assumption that
‘Latin American feminism’ could never have anything to say about ‘feminism’ as such (Connell
2014, 531). This concern is part of Connell’s argument that scientific fields and the humanities
assume that the Global South does not produce theory, including methods, concepts, and terms
(521). A problem in feminist theory, likewise noted by Connell, is that much of the work deemed
credible from a colonial perspective has been produced in cities in the Global North. My reply to
Connell, then, is that Lugones’ theory should not be restricted too far, or else a potential
implication is that Lugones’ analysis can only apply within Latin American feminist contexts. Of
course, one might simply say, in conversation with Lugones and Connell, that Lugones’
generalizations are warranted under some circumstances but not in others: For example, maybe
Lugones must acknowledge differences in colonial interventions in different times and places
throughout the world, in addition to ways that Indigenous communities continuously resist and
impact colonial forces and resulting systems, while her conclusions still have more widely
applicable implications for feminisms transnationally.
In any case, one particularly important aspect of the objection raised by Connell is that
Lugones perhaps underexaggerates “the resilience of precolonial gender orders.” It might be
objected, more specifically, that Lugones’ theory does not adequately deal with the existence of
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sexism in precolonial societies. I therefore want to move to the weaker claim that colonialism
increased the amount of (preexisting) sexism from precolonial to postcolonial. Segato, crucially,
argues that patriarchy existed in the village-world before colonization. She examines how
precolonial gender systems interact with colonial gender systems. Like Lugones, Segato thinks
that reading colonial intervention and violence through the lens of gender exposes the
widespread impact of colonial gender systems across many facets of society (Segato 2021, 787).
However, in examining how precolonial gender systems engage with colonial gender systems,
Segato comes to a different conclusion: that sexist oppression is not a colonial invention but
rather a feature of precolonial social organization to some degree. It is just that colonialism
enhanced sexist oppression. Segato therefore refers to precolonial patriarchal order as “lowintensity patriarchy” and postcolonial patriarchal order as “high-intensity patriarchy.”
Low-intensity patriarchy, or patriarchy in the village-world, was not based on the colonial
gender binary but rather “a dual structure that is plural in essence” (Segato 2021, 781). In the
village-world, masculinity had a quality of being earned through particular community-centered
struggles, such the masculine need to “confirm and reconfirm his endurance and aggressiveness,
as well as his capacity to dominate women” (Segato 2021, 789). The aim is “to demonstrate that
he possesses the full assortment of powers—physical, martial, sexual, political, intellectual,
economic, and moral—that would allow him to be recognized as a masculine subject” (Segato
2021, 789). This construction of masculinity in the village-world, in contrast to a construction of
femininity that does not hold the same prestige, constitutes the low-intensity patriarchy that
Segato claims existed before colonial intrusion.
According to Segato, colonialism increased patriarchy in the village-world by targeting
pre-existing organizational features of low-intensity patriarchy and enhancing gendered
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asymmetry, all while making this process appear natural. This transformation generates highintensity patriarchy. Segato gives the following examples of shifts in what it means to be a man
through colonial rule: Men are taken to be authorities on communicating with “white
administrators” (Segato 2021, 789), while women are marginalized in these negotiations (790);
men leaving their community to engage with these condescending “white administrators” is a
form of disempowerment, namely, as they are “emasculated before the white world” (791); and
men’s public roles are augmented, ultimately defining the public realm as for men, and placed
counter to women’s expected localization in the private realm (791). Colonialism also made
patriarchy more disguised by rendering the public realm ‘egalitarian,’ all while asymmetries
persisted. Segato claims that, in the village-world, patriarchy was obvious; it was not coded in
administrative language. The masquerading nature of the newer, more extreme patriarchy was
part of the colonial change: In a supposedly equal public realm, anyone who differs from the
norm becomes “the other,” which “turns difference into something marginal and problematic”
(Segato 2021, 790). By contrast, in societies such as Amazonian and Chaqueño communities,
women play advising roles in political decisions. While in such communities women’s public
contributions are restricted, women must be addressed for decisions to finalize; otherwise there
are serious consequences to the relevant men (792).
Another crucial feature of high-intensity patriarchy is its utter brutality toward women.
According to Segato, colonialism introduces the objectification of women (790), as well as
impunity for violence against women (791–92). In earlier work, Segato (2016) has described the
terrorization of women’s bodies (“misogynist cruelty” (620)) as a flagrant demonstration of
colonial domination:
[I]t is only logical to suspect that women’s victimization supplies the platform upon
which power settles its pact and displays its sovereignty, discretionary power, and
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arbitrariness. Something of great magnitude and importance, central to the whole edifice
of power, must surely rely and depend on the constantly renewed destruction of women’s
bodies, upon the spectacle of her subjugation, on the showcasing of her subordination.
Something essential and foundation for “the system” must depend on women not
escaping that position, that role, and that function. (Segato 2016, 620)
The inferiorization of women is integral to colonial violence. Segato has described the violence
imposed on all minoritized individuals under colonialism as a form of feminization, which
Segato claims can only truly be understood when issues of violence are viewed as connected
rather than disparate events (Segato 2016, 619). So, while patriarchy existed precolonially on
Segato’s view, it certainly became more prominent (and vicious) as a result of colonialism.
There is strong evidence, then, that colonial rule is marked by a new form and degree of
violence toward women. There is also strong evidence that colonial rule is marked by violence
toward people who do not conform to a colonial gender binary. The introduction of binarism—a
term I draw from binaohan but which I define as oppression on the basis of (deviating from) the
gender binary—is best highlighted by the reality that many Indigenous societies celebrated and
continue to celebrate people who are neither men nor women (or, more accurately, who would be
assigned ‘man’ or ‘woman’ under a colonial gaze) rather than oppressing them (Lugones 2007,
196; Segato 2021, 788).
Ana Mariella Bacigalupo (2004), who like Segato affirms that precolonial genders
existed, explores the gender-fluctuating categories of the Mapuche (i.e., Reche) people in Chile.
She refers to these individuals as ‘co-gendered.’ According to Bacigalupo, the category ‘machi
weye,’ or male shamans, as co-gendered people vacillate between both feminine and masculine
behaviors and responsibilities, yet in their communities have held “spiritual and political power
that gave them a privileged vantage point,” including “the tools to travel between terrestrial and
celestial realities and to negotiate the relationship between them” (Bacigalupo 2004, 515).
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Spanish colonial intervention and domination, as Bacigalupo argues, coincides with efforts to
restrict the power and privilege of co-gendered people. She poignantly describes “the Spaniards’
abhorrence of gender inversion” (Bacigalupo 2004, 514) and the corresponding inferiorization of
co-gendered individuals that colonialism introduced:
A Reche man who abandoned his male gender to become a machi weye, a nonman, did
not undergo a profound loss of status, privilege, or power, because womanhood and
femininity were socially valued. A Spanish man who became effeminate and lost his
manhood, however, lost the privilege men held over women and effeminates in Spanish
society. (Bacigalupo 2004, 514)
It was not until Spanish conquest that the machi weye’s gender and often flexible sexuality
became “deviant” and “dangerously antagonistic to the Spanish patriarchal order” (Bacigalupo
2004, 509). It is clear from arguments such as Bacigalupo’s that what I have been calling binarist
oppression was and is a tool to undermine the spiritual, political, and social powers of cogendered people in Reche society. Correspondingly, white European people have accrued
resources as a result of this disempowerment: In binaohan’s words, “all white people benefit
from the binary, inasmuch as they benefit from colonialism” (binaohan 2014, 124). White
European colonizers are advantaged by the gender binary insofar as the gender categories ‘man’
and ‘woman’ are taken to be properly embodied by white people only and become a status
marker that Indigenous peoples are denied under this colonial gender system.
It is also important to note that societies can have a gender-complementary or dualgendered organization while advancing specific interests of individuals who would be considered
‘man’ or ‘woman’ under a colonial gaze. It is clear that colonial intervention in such societies
would attempt to replace a hierarchically neutral binary system with an oppressive form of
binarism. Khader (2019) and Nzegwu (2006) have explored ways that two-gender systems need
not be accompanied by oppressive gender dynamics. In Decolonizing Universalism, Khader
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argues that gender complementarianism—broadly, “worldviews according to which men and
women should occupy different social roles” (Khader 2019, 99)—need not be accompanied by
women’s disempowerment, though, crucially, Khader does argue that such systems can be
oppressive. According to Khader (2019, 104), women can gain control and self-worth from their
role under a particular gender complementarian system called (household) headship
complementarianism. While acknowledging that gender complementarianism can show up in
harmful ways, such as separating women from the households in which they were born (105) and
decreasing women’s access to household resources (106–8), Khader makes the important point
that this form of organizing has positive potential—i.e., of improving women’s well-being under
nonideal conditions. This view undercuts white Western feminist claims that women must be
abused by such a system simply because it includes gender-based roles and responsibilities.
According to Khader, headship complementarianism does not necessarily further sexist
oppression, though it can, and this is true insofar as this system can improve women’s well-being
in specific, tangible ways. For example, Usha Menon (2000) has claimed that upper-caste Oriya
Hindu women in India can find self-esteem, direction, and a form of authority from playing
active roles in the family sphere under a headship complementarian system, where their religious
commitments hold that women’s household and reproductive roles are invaluable to their
families and communities. Engaging with Menon, Khader argues that improving women’s wellbeing is evidence of the possible usefulness of headship complementarianism to the extent that
this objective can be,
in some limited contexts, worthy of support by feminists—because women’s basic wellbeing can only be achieved through headship-complementarian strategies in those
contexts, or because increasing women’s well-being through headship-complementarian
strategies is the most likely path to feminist change. (Khader 2019, 116)
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Insofar as headship complementarianism, a binary system of sorts that is distinct from the
colonial gender binary, can support some feminist aims, it can improve women’s well-being
under nonideal conditions, while, notably, still having the effect of oppressing women, on
Khader’s view.
Nzegwu (2006), while not a proponent of headship complementarianism, has argued in
favor of a “dual-sex” (201) or dual-gender system as a way of eliminating sexist oppression in
the U.S., employing African societies as examples. Like headship complementarianism, there
would be two gender-based roles for Nzegwu, but such positions would not necessarily be
hierarchized. The gender-based positions would be largely distinguished by reproductive
capacity. Nzegwu argues that that such a dual-sex system crucially retains a gender social
location for women, resisting the theoretical urge to eliminate gender in response to its colonial
underpinnings. Retaining a gender position for women also prevents everyone from being
subsumed under the category ‘man’ and takes seriously the fact that care work is a necessary
feature of social life that women often perform (Nzegwu 2006, 222–23, 236–39). To this end, a
dual-sex system secures a gendered power balance without falling into the trap of liberal
equality, which only truly secures power for white men. Building on Khader’s and Nzegwu’s
approaches, it is possible to envision how a two-gender system is not necessarily inhibitory to the
interests of women and, in fact, can advance those interests. By contrast, the present colonial
gender binary in the U.S. enforces hierarchization on the basis of conforming to that binary.
Despite notable disagreement among decolonial and postcolonial theorists about whether
colonialism introduces gender itself or simply a new gender system, and whether it creates or
increases oppression on the basis of gender, it is reasonable to conclude that Euro-American
colonialism—more specifically, U.S. colonialism—introduces a binary of gender categories that
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are accompanied by their own set of gender norms and expectations that differ from previously
endorsed norms and expectations in precolonial societies. Furthermore, it is reasonable to
conclude that this particular colonial gender binary, in turn, creates a new form and degree of
gender hierarchy that serves imperialistic objectives of racial domination.

2 A colonial meta-axis of the dominant U.S. gender system and implications
for ‘nonbinary’ and ‘genderqueer’ resistance to the U.S. gender binary
So far, this chapter has examined the historical and present colonial underpinnings of the
dominant U.S. gender system, particularly the gender binary component of that system. I have
argued that one function of the U.S. gender binary is to cause colonial harm; the harms of the
gender binary and of U.S. colonial violence converge to advance colonial interests. I now assess
implications for understanding what resistance to the gender binary could mean, and ultimately,
at the end of this chapter, deny that the categories ‘nonbinary’ and ‘genderqueer’ accomplish
such a thing by their very definition. I put forth the following argument: In order for ‘nonbinary’
and ‘genderqueer’ to be correctly said to resist the binary axis, they must also resist another
power structure which I am terming a colonial meta-axis. This is true insofar as ‘nonbinary’ and
‘genderqueer’ are defined in relation to the binary axis, and the binary axis is affected by this
colonial meta-axis. Notice, though, that I am not quite making the stronger claim that for any
practice to resist the binary axis it must resist the colonial meta-axis. I am just claiming that for
‘nonbinary’ and ‘genderqueer,’ which understand themselves as inherently not conforming to the
gender binary, the colonial underpinning of that binary is metaphysically relevant to the question
of resistance that these categories undertake (or do not undertake). Since nonbinary and
genderqueer people do not necessarily resist the colonial effects of the gender binary that
reverberate in parts of the Global North and the Global South, and, moreover, many have a stake
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in upholding those effects, ‘nonbinary’ and ‘genderqueer’ cannot be correctly understood as
politically oriented against it.

2.1 Defining a colonial meta-axis
To help focus my analysis, I want to engage specifically with Dembroff’s illustration of
the axes of what they call Western dominant gender ideology. Recall from Chapter 1 that these
axes are: the binary axis, the biological axis, the teleological axis, and the hierarchical axis
(Dembroff 2020, 15–16). According to Dembroff, the binary axis describes the ideology
underpinning the gender binary, where the categories ‘man’ and ‘woman’ constitute “binary,
discrete, immutable, exclusive, and exhaustive” (15) categories. Recall, too, that on Dembroff’s
view ‘genderqueer’ amounts to a “critical gender kind” (12)—i.e., a category that critiques at
least one axis of the relevant dominant gender ideology, which in this case is the binary axis.
Insofar as the binary axis is situated within dominant gender ideology in the West, ‘genderqueer’
becomes a “Western gender defier” (15), on Dembroff’s account.
I now want to propose that Dembroff’s reconstruction of the ideology of the dominant
Western gender system is missing an axis which I refer to as a colonial meta-axis, though I focus
more specifically on dominant U.S. societies impacted by and impacting colonialism. This
colonial meta-axis is more accurately considered a meta-axis insofar as it extends beyond the
ideology of the dominant gender system in the U.S. and works more generally as a system of
power. I argue that, in dominant U.S. societies impacted by and impacting colonialism, resisting
the binary axis requires resisting this colonial meta-axis for social categories such as ‘nonbinary’
and ‘genderqueer’ which define themselves with respect to that binary, since in such societies the
gender binary is a colonial invention whose function is at least partly to inflict colonial harm. Yet
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‘genderqueer’ does not inherently resist this colonial meta-axis; genderqueer people do not resist
the colonial meta-axis insofar as they are genderqueer, and genderqueer people can even
reinstantiate the colonial meta-axis when they fail to resist colonial ideology. The upshot is a
new reason—in addition to the reasons presented in Chapter 2—for why ‘genderqueer’ does not
resist the gender binary. Unlike in Chapter 2, though, I now engage more thoroughly with the
colonial power structure sustaining the U.S. gender binary.
Many colonial meta-axes are possible, even in dominant U.S. contexts. The colonial
meta-axis that I reference here is constituted by the idea that white people are superior to nonwhite people. This colonial meta-axis is conceptually derived from Quijano’s coloniality of
power, which, engaging with Lugones, is connected to the coloniality of gender—as I will
unpack in my own framework throughout the remainder of this chapter. This colonial meta-axis
is also reminiscent of Paul C. Taylor’s explanation (2013) of how Euro-American colonialism
creates the tenants under which U.S. racism and the construction of race come to fruition:
US racialism takes shape under conditions established by the European colonial project.
[…] The idea that white people, whoever they turned out to be, were superior to nonwhites (and that some whites were superior to others) was crucial in establishing the
social and political relations that shaped modern Race-thinking. (P. C. Taylor 2013, 20)
By racialism, P. C. Taylor refers to “a way of thinking, a commitment to the validity or accuracy
of race-talk” (24)—a self-rationalizing strategy for making racial demarcations appear natural
and correct.
Clearly, I am not presenting a new idea by naming a colonial meta-axis here; I am simply
using terms to engage with Dembroff and reveal a gap in this previous construction of “Western
dominant gender ideology,” while emphasizing U.S. contexts. As I have argued throughout this
chapter (by engaging with a host of previous theorists), Euro-American colonialism introduces
the U.S. gender binary, including binary gender categories that are accompanied by a new set of
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gender norms and expectations in addition to a new form of hierarchization on the basis of those
categories. The gap in Dembroff’s theory is therefore a direct result of the failure to explore how
a colonial meta-axis affects what they call the binary axis and the hierarchical axis, at minimum
(i.e., possibly in addition to the biological axis and the teleological axis, though I have not
provided enough evidence for that here). My analysis so far has suggested that the colonial metaaxis and the binary axis have overlapping harms as a key function of U.S. colonialism: for
example, the denial of gender and hypersexualization of non-white women (or who a colonial
gaze would define as ‘woman’), the feminization and infiltration of non-white men (or who a
colonial gaze would define as ‘man’), and the attempt to make deviant and erase people who are
neither men nor women such as co-gendered and Two Spirit identities. The U.S. gender binary is
a tool of colonial power by a function of that system, inflicting colonial harm on Black and
African people, Indigenous Peoples of the Americas, and non-white people.

2.2 Implications for ‘nonbinary’ and ‘genderqueer’ resistance to the U.S. gender binary
I do not believe that any solidarity or homoerotic loving is possible among females who affirm
the colonial/modern gender system and the coloniality of power. (Lugones 2007, 188)
Following up about resistance in Chapter 2, I claim that resistance must address the
relevant diachronic power structure, via Abu-Lughod, which for the gender binary includes U.S.
colonial domination and violence both inside and outside of unceded U.S. spaces. Resistance
must correctly detect and respond to the power structure at play because otherwise it risks
reinforcing the very power it attempts to undermine, eliminate, or redistribute (or whatever the
goal may be). So, if a function of the gender binary (and oppression on the basis of that binary) is
to further colonial domination and violence, then, in order for a social category that is defined in
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relation to the gender binary to resist that binary, it must resist the colonial violence and
domination resulting from the gender divisions that the binary sets out.
I now ask: Does ‘genderqueer’ resist this colonial meta-axis?
When I state, ‘resist this colonial meta-axis,’ I am referring to genderqueer people’s lived
engagement in practices that attempt to challenge an ideology which asserts that white people are
superior to non-white people. Examining a category such as ‘genderqueer’ is not enough to
establish its core metaphysical properties; it is also vital to analyze what nonbinary and
genderqueer people do, or at least such an analysis could disqualify the category from possessing
radical, critical, defiant, etc. properties. Otherwise, a theory of genderqueer risks reifying the
category, distancing it from how it really exists (and has existed historically) in the world.
Thus, the question can be rephrased as follows: Do genderqueer people resist this
colonial meta-axis, and if and when they do, is it by virtue of them being genderqueer?
First, I want to examine how some genderqueer people do sometimes resist this colonial
meta-axis, as reflected by their practices—yet, as I will show, when they do, it is not necessarily
because they are genderqueer. There are many U.S.-based people who publicly organize and
agitate in support of Black life and who outwardly identify as nonbinary and genderqueer, such
as Makia Green (The Forge 2020), Ericka Hart (Sonoma 2020), Indya Moore (Parsons 2021),
and Alex Palacios (Bui 2020). There are also many nonbinary and genderqueer people in the
U.S. who participate in practices that target state power and control in less public settings. One
might argue that nonbinary and genderqueer university instructors who center the research and
creations of Black and African people, Indigenous Peoples of the Americas, non-white people,
and people in the Global South in their syllabi thereby attempt to undermine the colonial metaaxis that I referenced. This practice would address, for instance, the imperialistic idea that all
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theory is produced in the Global North, and that the Global South only produces specialized and
limited knowledge (Connell 2007; 2014). The colonial construction of the Global North and the
Global South as diametrically opposed and on different timescales entirely is, of course, rooted
in the ideology that white people are superior to non-white people (Coronil 2019, 128–62;
Quijano and Wallerstein 1992; Mignolo 2018).
In the examples I have given so far, it seems reasonable to conclude that nonbinary and
genderqueer people can certainly participate in practices that resist the relevant colonial metaaxis. But how much of these practices can be traced to gender categorization? In other words,
does their being nonbinary and genderqueer make these practices radical in the first place, or
perhaps simply make these practices more radical? Or is existing as nonbinary and genderqueer
coincidental to the radical properties of their practices?
It strikes me that being nonbinary or genderqueer does not make these practices radical—
it is not the deciding factor. Initially, it would seem dismissive to evaluate the same practices
performed by a man or woman as not radical (i.e., reinforcing a colonial system of power)
merely because they are not genderqueer, without good reason to do so. In addition to perhaps
being too flippant, that evaluation would also counter the basic accessibility of resistance, even
asking too much of resistance. Essentializing social categories in this way would stifle the
possibility of resistance to the gender binary that many men and women (particularly the most
politically, economically, and socially marginalized) undertake.
Nonetheless, there are cases where being nonbinary and genderqueer under such
circumstances makes such individuals’ practices more radical—for example, by enhancing or
making more salient the survival feature of a social category that those individuals already
inhabit. Consider, for instance, Alex Palacios—an Afro-Latinx, trans, and nonbinary Black Lives
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Matter organizer who facilitates efforts to reaffirm the importance of Black trans lives in the
movement. At a Chicago protest on Friday, June 5th, 2020, Palacios spoke along with fellow
activist Baki Z. Porter, a Black, Native American, and Two Spirit individual (Bui 2020). Porter
explained how this cross-section of identities increases vulnerability in resisting state power:
“Being out here, trying to protest with everybody and honor Black life has put me and mine at
risk” (quoted in Bui 2020). I am not examining Porter as a nonbinary or genderqueer person, of
course, because this person is not nonbinary or genderqueer, according to the article. But Porter’s
point, I think, applies to individuals such as Palacios, a nonbinary Black Lives Matter organizer:
If there are cases where resisting colonial domination is riskier because Palacios is nonbinary or
genderqueer, then it could be argued that partaking in such practices is more of a radical act.
The forcefulness of such a claim, though, runs into a problem that I raised earlier but did
not yet fully address: Does being harmed or navigating a threat of harm imply resistance? If what
I have called the survival feature is a valid way to resist oppression, then the answer is ‘yes,’ at
least for those social categories to which the survival feature accurately applies. However, I have
argued in Chapter 2 that ‘nonbinary’ and ‘genderqueer’ are not correctly ascribed the survival
feature because not all nonbinary and genderqueer people are immediate targets of attempted
genocide, forcible removal and displacement, disenfranchisement, and other forms of violence
that characterize U.S. colonial domination—e.g., owing to the dominant, intersecting
categorization ‘white.’ Of course, it could be thought that all nonbinary and genderqueer people
are disadvantaged by colonial rule to the extent that colonialism introduces the U.S. gender
binary. But there is a difference between being disadvantaged, and having one’s basic livelihood
threatened as a function of that system, historically and presently. It seems plausible that one can
still centrally hold and benefit from colonial power while experiencing some disadvantages—
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which is the case for white genderqueer people. For Black genderqueer people and non-white
genderqueer people, perhaps genderqueer categorization makes acts of resistance more radical
because of the way that racial identity intersects with genderqueer categorization for these
individuals. For categories to which the survival feature already applies, the intersection of a
genderqueer categorization can make the survival feature more salient. But acts of resistance
(such as the act of survival, via the survival feature) by non-white genderqueer people, for
example, would not be more radical simply because of their genderqueer categorization; rather, it
would be a result of inhabiting overlapping minoritized gender and racial categories in a white
supremacist society. Notably, though, it may not be possible to abstract ‘genderqueer’ outside of
a person who actually holds multiple interwoven identities that impact what it means to be
genderqueer in the first place. As such, it would still be misleading to conclude from such
examples that ‘genderqueer’ resists the relevant colonial meta-axis by definition.
Another reason why genderqueer people do not inherently resist this colonial meta-axis is
as follows: Some genderqueer people passively or actively uphold the colonial meta-axis, given
that a function of the U.S. gender binary is at least partly imperialistic and therefore benefits
members of the racial category ‘white’ and possibly more people in certain ways in particular
contexts. Consider, for example, how commonplace it is for white genderqueer people to be
treated as representatives of the whole category ‘genderqueer’ and do not take steps to challenge
this endorsement. An illustrative example is white genderqueer people who agree to be on a
genderqueer panel at an academic conference that only includes white panelists. Even if done
unwittingly, there is a certain agreement in failing to inquire whether the panel would be entirely
white. On a genderqueer panel, these panelists, by necessity, must be genderqueer. As such,
through being genderqueer on this panel, the panelists would fail to resist the colonial meta-axis
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by securing the dissemination of knowledge from white sources. The result is the normalizing of
white people as representatives of the categories ‘nonbinary’ and ‘genderqueer,’ which exposes
how these identities not only fail to evade gender norms and expectations but also are
accompanied by their own set of racist gender norms and expectations. This case therefore
provides an example of how white genderqueer people can reinforce imperialism by failing to
critique colonial ideologies that underly their category membership.
Centering and prioritizing white people as models of gender is a paradigmatic case of the
colonial meta-axis at work. In this vein, Travis Alabanza (2018) argues that the increasing
intelligibility of white nonbinary and genderqueer people in dominant Western societies has
accompanied a failure to acknowledge the realities of Black and non-white people who are
neither men nor women; according to Alabanza, “[w]hiteness becomes a default in deciding
when something exists, and with that erases the complex, nuanced and rich history of Black and
brown people” (Alabanza 2018). Just as white women have been considered representatives of
the category ‘woman’ and the only ones who can properly meet colonial standards of
womanhood, as Oyěwùmí and Lugones (among others) have claimed, white genderqueer people
are taken to be central examples of the category ‘genderqueer,’ while Black and non-white
genderqueer people are treated as peripheral in dominant U.S. societies impacted by and
impacting colonialism. Would it be correct to think that a white genderqueer person disrupts the
gender binary simply by existing, if they are simultaneously taken to be a model of
‘genderqueer’ at the expense of non-white genderqueer people and do not act to undermine this
conception of themself? Is the gender binary actually being resisted if colonial ideology is left
unquestioned? I think not. For these categories, which reference the gender binary in their very
definition, resisting the gender binary requires resisting the colonial meta-axis (for example, the
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idea that white people are the only ones who do gender correctly), and this follows from the fact
that the gender binary functions in part to advance colonial aims. This is in line with binaohan’s
argument that white genderqueer people benefit from the gender binary as a result of the role that
the gender binary plays in racist oppression (binaohan 2014, 109–30). Of course, white
genderqueer people benefit from the gender binary because of whiteness, not because of
genderqueer categorization. The point is just that if not all genderqueer people resist this colonial
meta-axis, and in fact, many directly benefit from and uncritically uphold it, then it cannot be the
case that ‘genderqueer’ by definition resists the colonial meta-axis.
Another way in which genderqueer people can endorse or fail to critique the colonial
meta-axis is through complacency: By not doing anything at all to resist colonial ideology or
resulting violence. Interestingly, this complacency may or may not arise from the very belief that,
by being genderqueer, one is being radical, critical, defiant, etc.—an idea which I also suggested
at the end of Chapter 2. A genderqueer person who takes their genderqueer identity to be
sufficiently political, without taking any necessary steps to undermine the binary axis as it
functions in collaboration with the colonial meta-axis, critiques neither the binary axis nor the
colonial meta-axis. One can simultaneously state oneself to be outside of the racist gender norms
and expectations imposed by the U.S. gender binary and actively participate in those very norms
and expectations. The exception, of course, would be any genderqueer person to whom the
survival feature applies by virtue of the specific intersection of minoritized gender and racial
categorizations in a white supremacist society. For such an individual to undertake resistance,
they should not be expected (via an academic theory such as mine) to go out of their way to
resist colonial domination when their very existence resists its destructive and genocidal
missions in the first place. However, genderqueer people to whom the survival feature does not
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apply—the paradigmatic case being white genderqueer people—can certainly be said to
reinforce the colonial meta-axis just by failing to critique it.
An important objection is as follows: ‘Genderqueer,’ contrarily, must reject the colonial
meta-axis simply because the binary axis in dominant U.S. contexts is rooted in colonialism.
According to this worry, the evidence I presented about the colonial underpinning of the gender
binary could just as well support a counterargument.
My reply is that these colonial motivations for the U.S. gender binary, according to the
supporting evidence, indicate that a relevant harm of the gender binary is at least partly colonial.
Genderqueer people certainly suffer from this harm. But just because genderqueer people suffer
from the gender binary does not mean that they resist it: For example, it could be argued that
even white genderqueer people are disadvantaged by the colonial meta-axis in light of the
relationship between the colonial meta-axis and the binary axis. However, to say that this
disadvantage implies resistance would be odd: Genderqueer categorization does not
automatically make genderqueer people participate in actions that reject colonial and racist
ideology. As such, the colonial underpinning of the gender binary (i.e., the fact that the harm of
the gender binary is at least partly colonial in specific ways) does not mean that resisting the
binary axis implies resisting the colonial meta-axis.
One might now wonder whether resistance to this colonial meta-axis (or the binary axis,
for that matter) can ever take place via gender categorization alone. In response, I argue that
gender categories can be radical or “destabilizing,” via Dembroff, due to properties of the
category itself, but that if and when they are, it is not inherently so (it is not by definition). The
Filipina/o/x category ‘bakla,’ for instance, can be properly considered to resist the colonial metaaxis and the binary axis and hence constitute what Dembroff would call a critical gender kind.
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As binaohan explains, ‘bakla’ is a Tagalog identity that combines elements of feminine gender
and queer sexuality—or, more accurately, “what would be considered ‘gender’ and ‘sexuality’”
(binaohan 2014, 32) according to the dominant (white) gender system in the West. It could be
argued that, in certain contexts, ‘bakla’ resists the relevant colonial meta-axis by rejecting the
colonial idea that gender and sexuality are entirely separable—an idea that implicitly validates
gender-distinctive categories like ‘genderqueer’ and ‘woman’ above categories that bridge
gender and sexuality. I will explore this idea in more depth in Chapter 4.
So far, I have argued that the U.S. gender binary is both a product and tool of historical
and ongoing Euro-American colonial domination, where one of its functions is to inflict harm on
Black and African people, Indigenous Peoples of the Americas, and non-white people in parts of
the Global North and the Global South. I then claimed that, in dominant U.S. societies impacted
by and impacting colonialism, ‘nonbinary’ and ‘genderqueer’ cannot be correctly said to resist
the U.S. gender binary unless they also resist the colonial ideology that founds it and that enables
U.S. colonial domination to persist. Insofar as the social categories ‘nonbinary’ and
‘genderqueer’ do not by their very definition resist relevant colonial ideology, they do not
automatically resist the U.S. gender binary.
Returning to the example from earlier of genderqueer philosophy graduate student Q in
the U.S., the implication of my view is as follows: Q’s existing as genderqueer does not
necessary resist the U.S. gender binary, because in order for ‘genderqueer’ to resist the U.S.
gender binary, it is necessary to resist the colonial ideology that motivates forms of racist
violence inflicted by that binary. Creating space for nonbinary and genderqueer people such as Q
by, e.g., disrupting other people’s beliefs that there are only two genders, is not radical, critical,
defiant, etc., unless it correspondingly undermines the idea that white people are superior to non-
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white people—which is foundational to the U.S. gender binary—and this follows in part from the
fact that these categories define themselves with reference to the gender binary. Otherwise,
resistance to the gender binary becomes diluted and abstracted away from its colonial origins as
well as its ongoing role in colonialism.
The question remains: What is ‘genderqueer’?
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Chapter Four: The Diachronic Approach to Defining Genderqueer
Genderqueer as an Imperialistic Social Category
My final chapter consists of my positive argument, where I defend what I am calling the
Diachronic Approach for locating metaphysical properties of nonbinary and genderqueer social
categories. The Diachronic Approach that I define is one historically robust approach of many
possible ones (it is a Diachronic Approach).
Motivated by the concerns I raised in Chapter 2 (that these categories do not inherently
resist the gender binary) and Chapter 3 (that these categories do not inherently resist colonial
ideology and so fail to address the power structure underlying the gender binary which they
reference), this Diachronic Approach characterizes ‘nonbinary’ and ‘genderqueer’ as
imperialistic social categories. As a concept, imperialistic social categories are a highly explored
topic in previous decolonial and postcolonial literature that I simply indicate here. Imperialistic
social categories, by definition, reinforce or “restabilize,” to borrow from Dembroff (2020, 14),
the colonial meta-axis that I defined in the previous chapter. Recall that this colonial meta-axis
puts forth the ideology that white people are superior to non-white people. I now argue that
‘nonbinary’ and ‘genderqueer’ either actively endorse or fail to resist the colonial meta-axis (at
least, to no greater or lesser extent than ‘man’ or ‘woman’) in dominant U.S. societies impacted
by and impacting colonialism because these categories:

1.1 Create and normalize racist gender norms and expectations for ‘nonbinary’ and
‘genderqueer’;
1.2 Endorse a harsh distinction between gender and sexuality, rendering unintelligible
categories such as ‘bakla’ and ‘Two Spirit’ which bridge gender and sexuality;
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1.3 Generalize a slew of categories under a “third gender” umbrella, which is at best
oversimplifying and at worst pejorative;
1.4 Recenter the U.S. gender binary by defining themselves in relation to it without
necessarily critiquing it; and
1.5 Establish the conditions of possibility for a new colonial binary that places these
categories in contrast to Indigenous and non-white identities that are neither ‘man’ nor
‘woman’ according to the relevant gender assignment imposed by a U.S. colonial gaze,
while both incorrectly assuming that this comparison is apt and harmfully reifying the
distinction in the form of a colonial Self/Other dichotomy.

My conclusion is that ‘nonbinary’ and ‘genderqueer’ can be correctly metaphysically described
as imperialistic social categories.
In the latter portion of this chapter, I will also raise a key meta-philosophical concern that
I think the Diachronic Approach evades. The concern is that resisting the gender binary has to
some extent become a Western value, an offshoot of what Jasbir K. Puar (2007) calls U.S. sexual
exceptionalism and Khader (2019) missionary feminism. However, the mechanisms for
‘nonbinary’ and ‘genderqueer’ are different: According to one discourse which I call a newness
discourse, the supposed “progressiveness” of ‘nonbinary’ and ‘genderqueer’ is taken to be a
natural result of their newness and thus innovativeness as a category. Specifically, I consider
how the claim that ‘nonbinary’ and ‘genderqueer’ inherently resist the gender binary is tied to a
specific conception of progress where the most “modern” and “developed” societies are those
that “accept” people who do not conform to the gender binary. Contrarily, via what I interpret to
be a counter-discourse to this newness discourse, ‘nonbinary’ and ‘genderqueer’ are not new but
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instead derive from historical and present Indigenous communities, which are then idealized as
superhuman models for nonbinary and genderqueer inclusion. Notice that this counter-discourse,
while initially avoiding the pitfalls of modernity that newness discourse typifies, conflates
‘genderqueer’ with Indigenous or non-white identities such as ‘Two Spirit,’ ‘Hijra,’ ‘waria,’ and
‘co-gendered’ categories, and it also harmfully romanticizes Indigenous communities that do not
marginalize people who would not be assigned ‘man’ or ‘woman’ under a colonial gaze. I will
draw some comparisons to the romanticization of matriarchal and gynecratic societies in Western
thought, as well as anti-Black idealizations about Black women’s supposed matriarchy in U.S.
communities. When it comes to oppression on the basis of the gender binary, this
superhumanization of Indigenous and non-white identities is deeply ironic: While Indigenous
and non-white communities are taken as a model of nonbinary advancement, they are
simultaneously viewed as premodern, at the end of what Fernando Coronil (2019, 141) calls the
“progressive arrow of time” that consistently views Latin America as falling behind and
experiencing “the syndrome of the ‘non-yet.’” This strategy attempts to secure nonbinary
acceptance in the West alone; according to an imperialistic viewpoint, only Western modernity
can truly bring nonbinary inclusion to the present. All the while, a guise of appreciation for
Indigeneity is maintained. In this sense, imperialism is viciously concealed through the counterdiscourse, yet no less violent than in the newness discourse it purports to contest.
The Diachronic Approach, on a meta-philosophical level, better characterizes ‘nonbinary’
and ‘genderqueer’ by rejecting harmful and inaccurate interpretations of how these categories
actually function in dominant U.S. societies.
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1 Why ‘nonbinary’ and ‘genderqueer’ are imperialistic social categories
I now turn to my argument that ‘nonbinary’ and ‘genderqueer’ constitute what I am
calling imperialistic social categories. They are imperialistic in the sense that they do not do
away with colonial ideology, or in my terminology, the colonial meta-axis that I previously
defined. Instead, ‘nonbinary’ and ‘genderqueer’ affirm this colonial meta-axis through at least
the following mechanisms named in this section.

1.1 Introducing racist gender norms and expectations
The Diachronic Approach, which defines ‘genderqueer’ as an imperialistic social
category, helps make sense of why the following claim is misleading: “Genderqueer persons
enact their identities in multiple ways because genderqueer does not present a new set of gender
norms; it seeks to disrupt existing gender norms” (Dembroff 2020, 19). It is not uncommon to
encounter the argument that ‘genderqueer’ is the only gender category for which “there are not
particular embodiments or social roles” (Dembroff 2020, 13n64), and this is what makes it
radical. This line of argumentation is typical of the views presented in Chapter 1. However,
claims such as this miss that ‘genderqueer’ does present a new set of gender norms: With
‘genderqueer’ comes the normalizing of white genderqueer people, which works in tandem with
the peripheralizing of Black, Indigenous, and non-white genderqueer people. As I will argue,
actualization of genderqueer identity is also accompanied by expectations of wealth that stem
from the capitalist function of white supremacy.
The category ‘genderqueer,’ in the context of dominant U.S. societies impacted by and
impacting colonialism, recenters whiteness by introducing and reinforcing racist gender norms
and expectations. One way in which ‘nonbinary’ and ‘genderqueer’ are accompanied by such
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norms and expectations is through the centering of white people as models of nonbinary and
genderqueer embodiment. This is similar to the introduction of racist gender norms and
expectations that accompany the colonial categories ‘man’ and ‘woman’ that I analyzed in
Chapter 3: White people are taken to epitomize gender categories, and ‘nonbinary’ and
‘genderqueer’ are no exception. White, thin, middle-class, able-bodied, and androgynous or
masculine-presenting nonbinary people are assumed to be representatives of these categories
(Alabanza 2018). It is not surprising, moreover, when statistics about genderqueer people exhibit
sampling bias by only or mostly sampling white populations. For example, 72.3% of the trans
and nonbinary sample in the “Health Care Experiences of Transgender Binary and Nonbinary
University Students” was white (Goldberg et al. 2019, 66); 67.5% of the nonbinary sample in
“Demographic and Behavioral Profiles of Nonbinary and Binary Transgender Youth” was white
(Todd et al. 2019, 257); and 91.3% of the “male-assigned” nonbinary sample and 89.2% of the
“female-assigned” nonbinary sample were white in “Non-binary and binary transgender youth:
Comparison of mental health, self-harm, suicidality, substance use and victimization
experiences” (Rimes et al. 2019, 233) Academic research on nonbinary and genderqueer people
also frequently fails to acknowledge how racism factors into experiences of marginalization on
the basis of nonbinary and genderqueer identity. For example, a meta-analysis of nonbinary and
genderqueer healthcare by Scandurra et al. (2019), “Health of Non-binary and Genderqueer
People: A Systematic Review,” did not even mention race in the paper, aside from brusquely
noting that “cross-cultural” (8) nuances in gender and sexuality are possible and calling for more
“culturally competent studies” (10). When race is not named as relevant to experiences of
marginalization, whiteness is overwhelmingly centered, for example, via white women’s attempt
to avoid responsibility for racism in discussions about sexism (Moreton-Robinson 2000). These
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studies offer just a few examples of the universalizing of whiteness in knowledge production
about nonbinary and genderqueer people, which in turn reveals how these categories function to
center white people in gender discourse. When only white people are viewed as valid nonbinary
and genderqueer people, non-white nonbinary and genderqueer people continue to be denied
material goods such as healthcare, housing, and employment.
Another way in which ‘nonbinary’ and ‘genderqueer’ are accompanied by imperialistic
norms and expectations—in addition to the normalizing of white nonbinary and genderqueer
people as models of these categories—occurs when racist and classist institutions make it appear
that wealth is a requirement for actualizing these gender identities. Consider, most notably, how
standards of androgyny are literally codified into the marketing category ‘nonbinary’ via data
mining practices, as Cannon argues and as I explained in Chapter 2. In Chapter 2, I also engaged
with Currah’s concerns (2022) with how white institutions can simultaneously hail fluctuations
from dominant gender norms and expectations and inflict capitalist harm on non-white people
(“Goldman Sachs flies the transgender flag!” (Currah 2022, 150)). Building on these critiques, I
want to show how the categories ‘nonbinary’ and ‘genderqueer’ do not do away with norms and
expectations of whiteness, where there is supposedly one way to be genderqueer properly and
that way involves being implicitly and explicitly racialized as white.
Wealth accumulation is a racist expectation of being validated as nonbinary and
genderqueer identity in dominant U.S. contexts. A key example is how nonbinary and
genderqueer people are often expected to dress in an androgynous fashion, combining masculine
and feminine attire or transcending gender entirely. It is not uncommon to find androgynous
apparel options such as PacSun’s “Gender-Free Shop,” which advertises itself as a “genderless
way to shop that rids the noise of who should be wearing what and grants you freedom to choose
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what’s right for you” (PacSun 2022), and Wildfang’s androgynous clothing options, where the
stated aim is “to rethink gender norms and how they show up in fashion” and “embrace our
masculine, our feminine, and our-everything-in-between” (Wildfang 2022). There are also
supposedly gender-neutral or gender-specific goods like Boy Smells candles—“Candles for
Every Identity: Full bodied scents that turn daily routines into rituals of self-exploration” (Boy
Smells 2022). If androgyny is a precondition for nonbinary and genderqueer people to be
socially validated in their identities, according to racist and classist institutions, then so is wealth.
This point is consistent with problems in previous articulations of the idea that
‘nonbinary’ and ‘genderqueer’ resist the gender binary. In the New York Times article that I
examined in Chapter 1, “The Struggles of Rejecting the Gender Binary,” Bergner puts forth the
image of a supportive mother to a nonbinary person named Kai:
His mother asked if she could buy him new clothes. “Shopping for clothes was something
we’d always done,” he said. “It was her way of saying, ‘I want to keep being part of your
life.’ That was really stepping through the door.” (Bergner 2019)
The uncritiqued assumption inherent to both Bergner’s description as an author and observer, as
well as Kai’s statement as a nonbinary person, is that Kai’s mother validates and affirms his
nonbinary identity through particular gender nonconforming clothing purchases. The impact of
capitalism on the actualization of trans identity has been previously explored by theorists such as
Bornstein, who powerfully describes her relationship to the commodification of gender during
her transition:
Every day I watched it, that television told me what was a man and what was a woman.
And every day I watched it, that television told me what to buy in order to be a woman.
And everything I bought, I said to myself I am a real woman, and I never once admitted
that I was transsexual. (Bornstein 1994, 57–58)
To achieve a gendered style, it appears necessary to buy clothes that reflect an expected gender
presentation, which in turn obligates wealth access. This is one way that ‘nonbinary’ and
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‘genderqueer’ put forth racist norms and expectations, as white people are granted wealth
intergenerationally and through increased access to education, employment, housing, healthcare,
and safety and can therefore systematically afford to actualize their nonbinary and genderqueer
identities in this particular normalized way—through purchases.
The categories ‘nonbinary’ and ‘genderqueer’ thus carry norms and expectations such
that realizing gender identity becomes associated with the very capitalist system that operates to
further white supremacy. Their introduction into this gender system is accompanied by the
enforcement of nonbinary-specific norms and expectations that take white nonbinary people as
paradigmatic. If one is expected to assimilate into racist norms and expectations in order to be
considered a valid member of these categories in U.S. contexts impacted by and impacting
colonialism, then ‘nonbinary’ and ‘genderqueer’ support an imperialistic function of the
dominant U.S. gender system. As such, these categories are simply additional ways to situate
oneself in a colonial power structure, no more or less so than ‘man’ and ‘woman’—which the
Diachronic Approach recognizes by labeling these categories as imperialistic.

1.2 Framing gender and sexuality as mutually exclusive
The categories ‘nonbinary’ and ‘genderqueer’ also reinforce the colonial meta-axis by
taking for granted that gender and sexuality are entirely nonoverlapping. Consider how, for
instance, the Oxford English Dictionary’s entry (2022) on ‘genderqueer’ is a subset of the entry
on ‘gender.’ This is worrisome because assuming a harsh distinction between gender and
sexuality erases categories that originate within colonized and formerly colonized communities
and that combine elements of gender and sexuality. This organization of social categories—
where “gender” and “sexuality” are taken to be entirely distinct—benefits political objectives
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that are oriented around constructions of gender-exclusive (non-sexuality) categories, which
uncoincidentally correlate with settler categories.
First, I explore how ‘nonbinary’ and ‘genderqueer’ frame gender and sexuality as
mutually exclusive. This is implicit in the language of the categories themselves, where
‘nonbinary’ covers nonconformity or nonadherence to the binary of gender, and ‘genderqueer’
involves a queering of gender. Even for the category ‘agender,’ which can be considered a
nonbinary or genderqueer category, the identification is with respect to gender—for example, by
not experiencing gender. The framing of gender and sexuality as entirely distinct and
nonoverlapping is also implicit in the ways that the categories ‘nonbinary’ and ‘genderqueer’ are
employed: as gender options. Surveys which include ‘nonbinary’ and ‘genderqueer’ boxes
frequently list them next to ‘man’ and ‘woman’ in an attempt to elicit participants’ genders.
When requesting and sharing third-person pronouns (‘she/her,’ ‘he/him,’ ‘they/them,’ etc.),
people often appeal to the misnomer “gender pronouns.” Even in contexts where speakers are
aware that pronouns do not denote gender identity in a one-to-one fashion, they are frequently
taken to have a gendered character, without implications for sexuality. While the question of
pronouns is certainly not inherently attached to discussions about nonbinary and genderqueer
categories, pronoun-sharing efforts are typically couched as efforts to include nonbinary and
genderqueer people insofar as these efforts refuse to assume pronouns based on appearance and
presumed sex traits (an assumption which overwhelmingly benefits cisgender people).
Assuming a crisp divide between gender and sexuality, reinforced by the language and
usage of nonbinary and genderqueer categories, is an endorsement of the colonial meta-axis.
This takes place through the marginalization and attempted erasure of categories stemming from
colonized and formerly colonized individuals which link gender and sexuality and do not answer
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to this colonial divide. My concern here parallels to binaohan’s critique of the category
‘transgender.’ binaohan is not trans but writes their book partly to explain what makes it possible
for them to be miscategorized as trans. One mechanism by which this takes place is by
reaffirming a crisp distinction between gender and sexuality, where ‘transgender,’ by its very
design, only refers to forms of gender deviation. However, dividing gender and sexuality in this
way “makes it hard or nearly impossible for” (binaohan 2014, 33) some non-white people to
understand their identities. For instance, binaohan’s identity ‘bakla’ combines elements of what a
colonial gaze would deem “gender” and “sexuality,” so the sharp line between gender and
sexuality erases that complexity. Insofar as ‘bakla’ is peripheral to “white gender discourse, it
actually represents a continuum of different genders, sexualities, and gender expressions all of
which are covered by this one word” (binaohan 2014, 32–33). binaohan describes their
experience at a San Francisco Trans March where their ‘bakla’ identity was listed along with
‘genderqueer,’ ‘Two Spirit,’ and other categories that were supposedly “gender” deviations.
They note that this was an artificial effort to include them; it was a false, poorly justified
umbrella description that was wrongly assumed to be correct (binaohan 2014, 4–5). As binaohan
argues, the function of the term ‘transgender’ is to make white understandings of gender the
focus of efforts to resist oppression, forcing non-white categories under a broad ‘trans’ umbrella
to quelch anti-racist efforts while appealing to gender-based solidarity (33). In their words: “It is
a standard tactic of white rhetoric to generalize (and thereby reduce, erase) identities and
categories” (binaohan 2014, 29).
Of course, there might be good reasons to support distinctions between “gender” and
“sexuality” for solidarity and activist purposes. Campuzano (2009), for instance, notes how the
assumption that travestis must be homosexual is false, as they might experience private romantic
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and sexual relationships that are coded as heterosexual: “For many travestis it is gender, their
own gender, which is the primary issue—and not their sexuality” (75). One feature of
imperialistic generalizing, it should be noted, is the conflationary practice of assuming that queer
and trans people are one conglomerate: for example, that any queer person necessarily has trans
experiences (for example, that gay men must be feminine), and that any trans person necessarily
experiences queer sexuality.
These generalizations are certainly violent. Yet this does not preclude the fact that
generalizations about “gender” and “sexuality” as ubiquitous, fixed, and crisp concepts are also
violent. There are many contexts in which sharp distinctions between gender and sexuality
peripheralizes the identities of colonized and formerly colonized people who would not be
assigned ‘man’ or ‘woman’ under a colonial gaze. Perhaps, though, there is room for both:
contexts in which employing “gender” and “sexuality” as mutually exclusive, self-evident ways
to parse the world make imperialistic metaphysical distinctions, and contexts in which avowing
metaphysical distinctions between gender and sexuality supports anti-imperialistic objectives by
recognizing nuance in how trans and gender-variant individuals experience marginalization. The
Diachronic Approach, crucially, recognizes that, insofar as ‘nonbinary’ and ‘genderqueer’
endorse a rigid divide between “gender” and “sexuality,” they do not critique or even
acknowledge this feature of the colonial meta-axis, which is another reason why designating
them as imperialistic social categories is appropriate.

1.3 Generalizing under a “third gender” banner
I now examine how ‘genderqueer’ enables a harmful conflation where any category that
would not conform to the categories ‘man’ and ‘woman’ under a colonial gaze becomes a “third
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gender.” The term “third gender” is often employed to encapsulate identities such as ‘nonbinary,’
‘genderqueer,’ ‘Two Spirit,’ ‘bakla,’ ‘Hijra,’ and other Indigenous and non-white categories.
This is another reason for which nonbinary and genderqueer categories are best couched as
imperialistic social categories.
In Beyond the Binary: Thinking about Sex and Gender, Shannon Dea (2016) includes a
chapter called “The Third Gender” where they evaluate “cultures” which endorse the idea “that
there are three human genders” (71). Dea argues that “traditional Inuit culture” of North parts of
Canada “seems to recognize three genders” (71), as demonstrated by “the Inuit practice of
raising some biological females to dress and act as boys, and some biological males to dress and
act as girls” (73). This is in reference to Bernard Saladin d’Anglure’s “The ‘Third Gender’ of the
Inuit” (2005)—for example, according to d’Anglure, the category ‘sipiniit’ (143). What these
authors call “gender swapping” (d’Anglure 2005, 138; Dea 2016, 73) is taken to mark the Inuit’s
“third gender” community. For Dea, this “third gender” conversation fits into their broader
examination of transgressing the gender binary, supposedly exemplified by both Indigenous
categories and nonbinary and genderqueer categories.
The “third gender” conflation might be symptomatic of the broader phenomenon of
assuming that Indigenous and non-white categories are necessarily “LGBTQ” categories—i.e.,
as a comparable way to be queer or trans in the U.S. Consider, for example, the Central Florida
organization Two Spirit Health Services, whose co-founder and president is a white nonbinary
person named David Baker-Hargrove (‘ve/ver/vers’ pronouns). On its Facebook page, Two
Spirit Health Services is described as “Central Florida’s LGBTQ Health Center” (Two Spirit
Health Services 2022). Baker-Hargrove, in addition to being found to have sexually harassed an
employee (Brinkmann 2017), creates and holds power in an organization that by its very name
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generalizes Two Spirit identities under the broader LGBTQ label. While the organization has
been rebranded under the name “26HEALTH,” this phenomenon is also present more broadly in
uncritical usages of acronyms such as ‘LGBTQ2S,’ where there is an attempt to “include” ‘Two
Spirit’ into the ‘LGBTQ’ label via ‘2S.’
I now argue this “third gender” generalizing is imperialistic because it: reinstantiates the
divide between “gender” and “sexuality” that I previously identified; incorrectly assumes
peripheralization to the gender binary, thereby centering a colonial concept; and has been
rejected by some colonized and formerly colonized people. Insofar as nonbinary and
genderqueer categories lend themselves to such generalizations (or, at the very least, they do not
inherently critique them), they are imperialistic social categories.
First, an immediate problem directly corresponds to the previous subsection: The “third
gender” umbrella defines categories which are taken to fall under this banner to be—of course—
gender categories. For instance, Dea assumes that the “third gender” categories they explore
represent diverging “social functions and roles that given cultures associate with the sexes” (71),
begging the question as to how these categories would amount to “gender” categories in the first
place. However, a category which bridges gender and sexuality would be inaccurately labeled a
third gender. In this sense, “third gender” attempts render illegible the lived experiences of many
colonized and formerly colonized people who would not correctly be classified under colonial
divisions between “gender” and “sexuality” that the term “third gender” invokes. Additionally,
“third gender” assumes peripheralization to the implied original genders ‘man’ and ‘woman,’
which thus centers a colonial gender binary by its very definition. As Bacigalupo explains, “third
gender” is a “Euro-American” invention (Bacigalupo 2004, 514) that assumes that there are first
and second genders to which third genders are peripheral; it assumes marginalization relative to
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the ‘man’/‘woman’ binary and thereby presumes the centrality of that binary to labeling and
understanding people.
Nonetheless, the concept “third gender,” it could be argued, can help articulate the
interests of people who do not conform to the gender categories ‘man’ or ‘woman’ under certain
circumstances. As Bacigalupo notes, the acceptability of the term is disputed within decolonial
theory, with some defending its usage: “Some writers argue that the terms third gender, alternate
gender, and two-spirit allow us to go beyond the woman-man binary and explicate
multigendered societies” (514). In addition to its applicability in theory, the “third gender”
banner can also promote formal recognition by institutions that have power over people’s access
to resources. According to Ina Goel (2016, 536), the Supreme Court of India’s identification of
the Hijra community as “third gender” in April 2014 marked a sort of positive acknowledgment
of Hijra individuals by the government.
Despite its potential usefulness as an explanatory tool and political concept, the “third
gender” category problematically assumes peripheralization relative to the ‘man’/‘woman’
binary: It assumes inferiorization that does not necessarily map onto all Indigenous and nonwhite categories in their respective societies, despite perhaps correctly articulating how
‘nonbinary’ and ‘genderqueer’ are situated in dominant U.S. contexts. For example, in a Foreign
Policy article titled “Third Gender: A Short History,” Jake Scobey-Thal (2014) couches a variety
of social categories under the “third gender” label as a way of demonstrating the historical roots
of marginalization faced by people who are not men or women. According to Scobey-Thal,
various cultures have long recognized members who buck the biological binary. The
ancients wrote of people who were neither men nor women; individuals have been
swapping genders for centuries; and intellectuals have fiercely debated the connection
between the body and the self. Today, there are many populations with alternative
identities, such as hijras in South Asia, kathoeys in Thailand, and muxes in Mexico. Yet
these groups haven’t had it easy, often facing discrimination and violence. Only recently
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has the fight for legal recognition — and respect — of “third gender” begun to bear fruit,
thanks to pioneering activists and policymakers. (Scobey-Thal 2014)
Scobey-Thal’s description of the “third gender” category as necessarily marginalized misses how
many people who take on or are assigned this label actually hold power and privilege in their
respective communities, as I explored earlier in reference to the Mapuche machi weye’s “special
powers” (Bacigalupo 2004, 515) owing to their ‘co-gendered’ position in Reche society. Arya
Karijo (2021) has also described how Kenya’s ‘mûgwe’ category—which describes individuals
“who were assigned male at birth, wore their hair like the women in the community and gave
blessings with their left hand (a symbol of the feminine)”—experienced acceptance in their
communities, in blatant contrast trans people’s livelihoods under British Victorian rule. At the
very least, the social and historical roles of individuals who would not be assigned ‘man’ or
‘woman’ from a colonial perspective are oftentimes more complex than the “third gender” label
lets on. For example, Goel (2016, 535) explains that Hijra individuals have been important
mythological figures in particular contexts in India and enjoyed special positions of trust with
leaders during Mughal rule. Notably, it is crucial to recognize that Hijra communities have also
been subject to “abject poverty,” “face extreme forms of violence,” and “are denied basic human
rights such as access to food, housing and the right to live a life with dignity” (Goel 2016, 536).
The point is that the “third gender” label obscures this nuance. For such reasons, it has been
argued that the assumption that such individuals constitute a “third gender” is rooted in
imperialistic judgments about colonized and formerly colonized individuals.14
Finally, it is important to examine how “third gender” has been resisted by colonized and
formerly colonized people themselves. According to binaohan, for instance, “third gender” as an
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This problem brings to bear Coronil’s discussion (2019) of the fetishization of “other” categories in Latin America
by the West in “Beyond Occidentalism” (323–367).
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umbrella term is worrisome: “third gender, while not a slur, is […] racist” (binaohan 16). In
identifying this category as one such settler term that they have reclaimed, they do not accept this
categorization for themself when ascribed by anyone who is not Southeast Asian (binaohan 16).
binaohan’s objection here parallels to their concerns about the harms of generalizing gender
terms such as ‘trans’ to Indigenous and non-white people (25–51). In binaohan’s example of the
San Francisco Trans March, where ‘bakla’ was itemized along with ‘genderqueer,’ ‘Two Spirit,’
and other assumed “trans” identities, they argue that this disingenuous attempt at inclusion (or
maybe even the best version of inclusion that reveals problems with this type of inclusion) is just
evidence of imperialism: “The problem lays in all of these white attempts to explain, educate,
and reduce the complexity of a complex subject for those who oppress us” (binaohan 2014, 5).
Taking for granted that ‘bakla’ is a “trans” experience in dominant U.S. contexts creates a false
representation of many Indigenous and non-white individuals and communities: It is a
simplification that mystifies and therefore fails to explain the connection it is making.
If ‘nonbinary’ and ‘genderqueer’ risk naturalizing the “third gender” concept, then they
do not necessarily resist the colonial meta-axis. The Diachronic Approach, in labeling
‘nonbinary’ and ‘genderqueer’ as imperialistic social categories rather than as technical terms to
describe anyone who deviates from the gender binary, identifies and moves away from the
imperialistic underpinnings of these nonconsensual “third gender” label ascriptions.

1.4 Recentering the gender binary through its continued reference
The categories ‘nonbinary’ and ‘genderqueer’ are imperialistic insofar as they reaffirm
the gender binary by understanding themselves in relation to that binary without necessarily
critiquing it. On a conceptual level, my worry here parallels to Wittig’s objections to the
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category ‘woman.’ According to Wittig, what it is to be a woman is to participate in the
heterosexual contract, which describes the social expectation of heterosexuality (33–45). The
category ‘woman’ entails subservience to men via confinement to the roles and responsibilities
laid out by the heterosexual contract. This is all part of an economic structure designed to benefit
men at the expense of women. In order for women to escape, they must escape the category in
the first place, as lesbians do by refusing to be romantically or politically involved with men
through sexual and marital commitments. Hence, as Wittig famously concludes, “[l]esbians are
not women” (32). Important here is Wittig’s claim that maintenance of the gender labels ‘man’
and ‘woman’ upholds heterosexuality (30). These categories, according to Wittig, are tools of
what she calls “the straight mind,” which is the set of institutions, disciplines, etc., that lay the
groundwork for “the obligatory social relationship between ‘man’ and ‘woman’” (27) and that
thereby ensure women’s subordination. The categories ‘man’ and ‘woman’ make talk of
heterosexuality possible, on Wittig’s view; they are the building blocks of the straight mind.
Wittig’s argument suggests the possibility that a category being defined in relation to an
oppressive system makes the category itself oppressive. She also provides a compelling
justification for such a claim: that the language of a category can offer linguistic tools that
function to inferiorize members of that category. However, while Wittig provides an initial
framework for arguing that ‘nonbinary’ and ‘genderqueer’ recenter the gender binary by their
very nature, it is worth noting that Wittig’s view is not equipped to handle cases where women
resist sexism on the condition that they label themselves as women; therefore, the conclusion that
women should ditch the category altogether is not warranted. Mekada Graham (2007), for
instance, argues that community-based solidarity between Black women caregivers can be a
source of power under oppressive circumstances. Graham’s view comes in response to white
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feminist theories that interpret care as demeaning or victimizing (199), without considering how
Black women can experience “[s]elf-determination and freedom” through care work that
translates to “resistance and empowerment in everyday action and experience” (200). Solidarity
between women at the margins of the state demonstrates how the category ‘woman’ and
communities formed at least partly on the basis of that categorization can put forth resistance to
sexism. This idea is in tension with Wittig’s claim that affirming the category ‘woman’ is, in
some sense, affirming that system of compulsory heterosexuality that necessarily victimizes
people who would be assigned the gender ‘woman’ under that system. In other words, there are
contexts where the concept ‘woman’ postulates a sense of community that can override concerns
about the dominant linguistic tools that the category risks serving. Thus, the impetus to eschew
the label altogether does not necessarily follow from her theory.
Even so, Wittig provides an important framework for arguing that ‘nonbinary’ and
‘genderqueer,’ by repeating talk of the gender binary, utilize the very tools of and therefore feed
into the same system that marginalizes deviations from that binary. The upshot, though, would
not necessarily be a refusal of the categories ‘nonbinary’ and ‘genderqueer’ by nonbinary and
genderqueer people themselves. Instead, I conclude that these categories are imperialistic, given
that the system they reference (the U.S. gender binary) is imperialistic.
I claim that discourse itself, such as using and reusing the terms ‘nonbinary’ and
‘genderqueer,’ risks recentering the U.S. gender binary, the very thing that the categories are said
to upend, without ridding itself of the system’s imperialistic features. That is, the language of the
categories brings to bear the binary, or the centrality of gender, respectively. ‘Nonbinary’ and
‘genderqueer’ both define themselves in relation to the gender binary—more explicitly for
‘nonbinary,’ which literally includes the word “binary,” though ‘genderqueer’ also alludes to the
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gender binary, at least in how the term implies queering rigid practices of gender. While the
categories themselves do not necessarily endorse the gender binary, they take the gender binary
as center and name themselves as deviations from that center; they orient themselves in relation
to the gender binary. I am concerned by this centering insofar as it is not necessarily a critical
evaluation of the gender binary. If indicating the gender binary does not also condemn that
binary, then it is just reinstating its power in discourse.
In this sense, the language of the categories ‘nonbinary’ and ‘genderqueer’ expresses
without passing judgment on the U.S. gender binary. This claim relates to Foucault’s idea in The
History of Sexuality (1978) that sexuality in dominant Western societies is not in fact repressed
but rather communicated via perhaps less direct (yet just as obsessive) references to sex. That is,
Foucault objects to what he calls the Repressive Hypothesis, which states that the 17th century
marked an era where sex began to be prohibited in society. Foucault questions the Repressive
Hypothesis: “A censorship of sex? There was installed rather an apparatus for producing an ever
greater quantity of discourse about sex” (23). According to Foucault, instead of silencing sex,
this period involves heightened awareness of sexuality in spheres such as schools, academia, the
confession, and the psychiatric office. Labeling so-called sexual deviations (i.e., queer people)
therefore served to stimulate talk of sexuality; people deemed sexual deviants “were condemned
all the same; but they were listened to” (Foucault 1978, 39). Sexual groupings become a means
by which the ‘abnormal’ individual became intelligible to oneself and others, thereby including
one’s sex into society. As Foucault explains, the “new persecution of the peripheral sexualities
entailed an incorporation of perversions and a new specification of individuals” (42–43). Groups
such as gay and bisexual people, for example, obtain a name that validates their role as subjects
of discourse. Sexual categories, according to Foucault, are legitimized through their scientific
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specification, and sexuality continues to be identified and communicated despite its appearance
as repressed.15
Nonbinary and genderqueer categories reinforce the gender binary and perhaps gender
itself, and they do so by trying to conceal the very thing that they reproduce. Interestingly, I think
the mechanism for ‘nonbinary’ and ‘genderqueer’ is actually more similar to the
individualization via criminalization that Foucault proposes in Discipline and Punish (1975) as
opposed to the individualization via scientific specification that he puts forth in The History of
Sexuality. This is because terms such as ‘gay’ and ‘bisexual’ are more integrated into everyday
language around sexuality, whereas ‘nonbinary’ and ‘genderqueer’ remain unintelligible in many
dominant U.S. contexts—for example, where the gender binary is unheard of because it taken to
be obvious that ‘man’ and ‘woman’ are the only gender options. As such, there are only certain
contexts in which ‘nonbinary’ and ‘genderqueer’ experience the form of inclusion (albeit, via
deviance and ostracization) that is typical of “deviant” sexual category labels. In Discipline and
Punish, Foucault argues that disciplinary power operating at the level of the law (e.g., prisons)
also functions at the personal level, where “slight evidence of a serious crime marked someone
as slightly criminal” and thus establishes a “continuous gradation” of criminality (Foucault 1975,
42). This partial criminal pervades spheres such as the school, the church (e.g., confession), the
army, and the household. Classifying people as partial criminals invokes a type of
individualization where, according to Foucault, “the criminal designated as the enemy of all,
whom it is in the interest of all to track down, falls outside the pact […]; he appears as a villain, a
monster, a madman, perhaps, a sick and, before long, ‘abnormal’ individual” (101). Foucault
seems to understand exclusion of the ‘abnormal’ in Discipline and Punish as (among other
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things) exclusion from physical proximity (e.g., the prison, or sometimes the ‘shameful’ in
military school), salvation (e.g., an unforgiven confessor) and—more broadly—the ability to
conceive oneself and be socially conceived as being morally valuable. The apparent moral fiber
of an individual is determined by their adherence to social codes; the person that commits a
crime (to at least some extent) earns a label that excludes them from the normalized group. The
making of individuals through discipline involves normalization according to a standard defined
by the extent to which their character and decisions are deemed ethical. On the outer edges of
this normalization are the “abnormal” people, whose specification serves to “measure gaps”
(Foucault 1975, 184) between them and the standard and exclude them from a homogenous ideal
of goodness, rightness and morality.16
Comparably, it could be argued that ‘nonbinary’ and ‘genderqueer’ violate the moral
code inherent to the U.S. gender binary, where being to be validated as a human being under a
white supremacist system is to conform to the colonial standards of ‘man’ and ‘woman.’ In this
sense, these category labels themselves reference the code from which they deviate; they indicate
the gap between themselves and people who are celebrated as meeting the norms and
expectations of the U.S. gender binary. It is in this sense that ‘nonbinary’ and ‘genderqueer’ keep
the gender binary in existence, despite (and even insofar as) being criminalized by it.
The result is that continuing to use the concepts ‘nonbinary’ and ‘genderqueer’ without
taking seriously (i.e., through one’s practices) the role that the gender binary has historically
played and continue to play in U.S. imperialism advances that very project. Coronil gives us
useful terminology for understanding how using and reusing colonial concepts without
criticizing them maintains the hierarchies governing them. In “Occidentalism” (2019, 315–22)
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and “Beyond Occidentalism” (2019, 323–67), Coronil critiques the construction of the
Self/Other binary and related constructs that—as features of Western imperialism—reproduce
subordinating images of the “Other.” His view responds to Edward W. Said’s concept of
orientalism (1979). Orientalism, as defined by E. W. Said, refers to how the non-West is viewed
by academic examinations in the West. E. W. Said describes Orientalism as “a style of thought
based upon an ontological and epistemological distinction made between ‘the Orient’ and (most
of the time) ‘the Occident’” (E. W. Said 1979, 2, quoted in Coronil 2019, 327). Occidentalism,
by contrast, indicates a conglomerate of images of the West, including how the West views itself
and is viewed by the non-West, that explains how Orientalism is epistemically possible. As
Coronil explains,
Occidentalism is an imperial epistemology that expresses a constitutive relationship
between Western constructions of difference and Western worldwide dominance. […] As
an ensemble of representation practices, Occidentalism consists of accounts that produce
polarized and hierarchical conceptions of the West and its others and makes them central
figures in narratives of global and local histories that separate the world’s components
into bounded units; disaggregate their relational histories; turn difference into hierarchy;
naturalize these representations; and thus participate in the reproduction of asymmetrical
power relations. (Coronil 2019, 319–20)
Coronil’s concept of Occidentalism explains how it is feasible for the West to make colonial
generalizations about the non-West, including designations that make the non-West appear
irreconcilably “different” from the West and render these distinctions natural rather than
grounded in historical relations.
One might now ask: Are ‘nonbinary’ and ‘genderqueer’ guilty of Occidentalism by their
very nature? It seems possible that these categories support an Occidentalist project insofar as
they reference and re-reference the gender binary without critiquing it; they exemplify this
phenomenon of the West referring to itself with a Western concept, which is assumed to be the
correct way to understand the world. The role that these categories play in imperialistic discourse
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constructs the West as diametrically opposed to the non-West. The hierarchy of difference is
taken for granted in the indication of that hierarchy. The terms ‘nonbinary’ and ‘genderqueer’ do
not inherently put into question the idea that the gender binary is the natural and obvious way to
represent people. By failing to do so, they “naturalize these representations” (Coronil 2019, 320),
no more or less than the categories ‘man’ and ‘woman.’
Of course, neither ignorance of that hierarchy nor pretending that it does not exist would
dismantle it, but a critical interrogation of the standards that make that hierarchy possible is
necessary to avoid the risk of “imperial epistemology” (Coronil 2019, 319). That is, ‘nonbinary’
and ‘genderqueer’ imply that the gender binary provides an accurate or real way to categorize
people, failing to inquire about the very idea of the gender binary as a correct interpretation of
the world. This is a central problem in the reasoning of theorists such as Wilchins and Dembroff:
They take the gender binary as given, however harmful, to affirm the correctness of ‘nonbinary’
and ‘genderqueer.’ But this strategy merely includes ‘nonbinary’ and ‘genderqueer’ into the
gender binary system that oppresses people who do not conform to that binary and attempts to
dehumanize Black and African people, Indigenous Peoples of the Americas, and non-white
people. The Diachronic Approach takes this seriously in defining ‘genderqueer’ and ‘nonbinary’
as imperialistic social categories insofar as they take for granted the centrality of the gender
binary to their very definition, without reacting to historical and ongoing imperialistic objectives
of that binary.

1.5 Creating a new colonial binary and marker of difference
…[T]he orientalization and exoticization of others—whether they are foreign others or
minoritized others within society—is part and parcel of the process of normalization of
ourselves. (Medina 2013, 172)
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The Diachronic Approach affirms how, in addition to taking as center the U.S. gender
binary, the categories ‘nonbinary’ and ‘genderqueer’ create and reinforce a new colonial binary.
A Self/Other dynamic, to draw from Coronil among other decolonial and postcolonial theorists,
appears and is normalized through unreflective reusage of the category terms. This binary entails
‘nonbinary’ and ‘genderqueer’ as “Self” and, as “Other,” Indigenous and non-white categories
that do not adhere to what would be considered ‘man’ or ‘woman’ under a colonial gaze. The
creation of this binary is particularly deceptive because, at the same time Indigenous and nonwhite categories are problematically assimilated under the ‘nonbinary’ and ‘genderqueer’ label,
they are also banished and diminished. This is accomplished, as Collins (2000) explains, by the
fact that “each term in the binaries white/black, male/female, reason/emotion, culture/nature,
fact/opinion, mind/body, and subject/object gains meaning only in relation to its counterpart”
(70).17 In dominant U.S. contexts impacted by and impacting colonialism, the objectives of
‘nonbinary’ and ‘genderqueer’ in a colonial project are to generalize and absorb Indigenous and
non-white categories under Western labels. This binary therefore serves to normalize ‘nonbinary’
and ‘genderqueer’ as the “Self” at the expense of the “Other.”
The harm of this binary logic can be traced to its self-referent nature, as with other
colonial binaries (Coronil 2019; Narayan 1997; Segato 2016). The focus becomes ‘nonbinary’
and ‘genderqueer’ as the supposedly universalizable categories according to which Indigenous
and non-white categories are oriented under imperialism. ‘Nonbinary’ and ‘genderqueer’ as
Western categories easily devolve into this pattern, using Indigenous and non-white categories to
examine and understand themselves—including, ironically, in claims about how these categories
purportedly resist the gender binary. Segato (2016) articulates how colonialism introduces
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binaries into the village-world, which, recall, refers to societies that existed precolonially and
persist through colonialism, that serve to center and naturalize Western self-constructions and
ostracize the non-West:
Binary structure results from the modern capture of the village world’s reciprocal, though
hierarchical, duality. In the binary world of modernity, the other of the One is removed
from its ontological fullness and reduced to fulfilling the function of alter or other
regarding the One as representative and referent of totality. This role of the—feminine,
nonwhite, colonial, marginal, underdeveloped, deficient—other, as Edward Said and a
generation of postcolonialist theorists have shown, represents the condition of possibility
for the existence of the One: the universal subject, the generalizable Human. A tribute or
gift of being that is exacted from the other flows to the center, the platform of the
universal human subject, constructing and nurturing it. (Segato 2016, 617)
Such colonial binaries, on Segatos’s view, ultimately serve to stroke the colonizer’s ego. This
self-centering parallels to Narayan’s notion of the “Mirror” as an example of how Western
feminists engage with feminists in the Global South. According to Narayan, there are crucial
epistemological, political, and moral problems with Western feminists falling into the pattern of
having “an interest in Other cultures without engaging in negative portrayals or moral criticisms
of that Other culture” (136). Narayan argues that Third World feminist academics are typically
pigeonholed into three main roles that she labels as “Preoccupations” (123). One such
“Preoccupation” is what she terms the “Mirror” (136–42). The “Mirror” as a “Preoccupation” is
the process by which Western feminists engage with Third World feminists for the sole purpose
of obsessing over the self, particularly weaknesses and failures of the self. Ultimately an
opportunity for Western self-absorption, the “Mirror” assumes that “[t]he Third World itself
functions as a Mirror for Western self-reflection” (Narayan 1997, 138). White feminists in the
West employ this Othering tactic, for example, when examining “dowry-murder” in India as
symptomatic of “Indian culture,” while not as consistently or unreflectively blaming what
Narayan calls “domestic-violence murders” of U.S. women on “U.S. culture.” Western feminists
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not only construct the notion of “dowry-murder” as synonymous with dowries (a conflation at
best), but also explain the phenomenon of “dowry-murder” by overlooking economic and
practical explanations and instead imposing “’exoticising’ and ‘ritualistic’ and ‘religious’
elements” (Narayan 1997, 112) onto events that white feminists sometimes incorrectly describe
as “dowry-murders.” The purpose of white feminists discussing “dowry-murders” and
“domestic-violence murders” in such different ways is to invent a picture of the Global South as
fundamentally inhumane and reinforce colonial notions of Western superiority.
For ‘nonbinary’ and ‘genderqueer’ categories, the mechanism is different than the one
named by Narayan: Unlike in discourse on the gender category ‘woman,’ the centralizing of
“Self” for ‘nonbinary’ and ‘genderqueer’ is accompanied by the assumption of derivation from
the “Other”—i.e., the idea that ‘nonbinary’ and ‘genderqueer’ have derived from Indigenous and
non-white categories which would not be assigned ‘man’ or ‘woman’ from a colonial
perspective, and that they therefore share their assumed radical properties. While ‘nonbinary’
and ‘genderqueer’ do not blame themselves for the gender binary in their centering of the gender
binary, as in Narayan’s “Mirror” case, they run into the problem of romanticizing Indigenous and
non-white genders resistance to the gender binary through the mechanism of this Self/Other
comparison. This glorification, which will be the focus of the latter part of the next section, relies
on a caricature of Indigenous and non-white people that is made possible by the binary that exists
between ‘nonbinary’/‘genderqueer’ and Indigenous and non-white categories. This caricature,
functioning as a “Mirror” in a related way to what Narayan describes, involves whatever fits the
needs of ‘nonbinary’ and ‘genderqueer’ in an imperialist project.
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2 Meta-philosophical concerns: The imperialistic character of ‘nonbinary’
and ‘genderqueer’ discourses
I now turn to my meta-philosophical defense of the Diachronic Approach. This defense is
grounded in worries about how the argument that nonbinary is radical, critical, defiant, etc.,
reinforces imperialistic aims. I claim that my alternative view, the Diachronic Approach, is better
off in this respect. My key meta-philosophical concern here—a concern that I think the
Diachronic Approach evades—is that ‘resisting the gender binary’ has to some extent become a
Western value, interconnected with what Puar calls U.S. sexual exceptionalism and Khader
missionary feminism.
The most obvious mechanism by which this takes place is through what I will call a
newness discourse around nonbinary and genderqueer categories in dominant U.S. contexts
impacted by and impacting colonialism. According to this newness discourse, ‘nonbinary’ and
‘genderqueer’ are new categories; they are unprecedented, gender-forward, and modern ways to
identify oneself. Nonbinary inclusion, by this newness discourse, is a sign of “progress”; it
purports to mark the Western world as superior in ways that many decolonial and postcolonial
theorists have already identified when it comes to Western claims about the supposedly superior
gender justice (Khader 2019) and gay equality (Puar 2007) of imperialistic states in the Global
North such as the U.S.
What is perhaps less obvious, though, is that ‘nonbinary’ and ‘genderqueer’ also advance
imperialistic objectives through a pervasive counter-discourse to this newness discourse. This
counter-discourse asserts something like, “Nonbinary is not new. Look at these Indigenous
genders across history!” Initially, it might appear that this counter-discourse evades the metaphilosophical concerns about modernity that the newness discourse risks. After all, the counterdiscourse refuses the idea that the U.S. is somehow more “advanced” with respect to nonbinary
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inclusion if Indigenous and non-white people have enjoyed what the counter-discourse would
take to be comparable to “nonbinary inclusion” for centuries. However, I will argue that there is
an insidious judgment present in the counter-discourse which consists in a romanticization of
Indigenous and non-white/non-Western societies that have community members who do not
conform to the colonial versions of the categories ‘man’ and ‘woman.’ This romanticization is
masquerading because on the surface it tries to appear appreciative, yet its awe-inspired,
reverential character is actually just another form of dehumanization that is typical of colonial
violence and domination.
Note that I will not take a stance on whether newness discourse or its counter-discourse
better characterizes nonbinary and genderqueer categories. Instead, my goal is to highlight
several issues with an imperialistic narrative around these identities in dominant U.S. contexts.
As I will claim, the Diachronic Approach to defining ‘nonbinary’ and ‘genderqueer’ sidesteps
the meta-philosophical problems entrenched in both this newness discourse and its counterdiscourse. The Diachronic Approach accomplishes this feat by recognizing the imperialistic past
and present of strict gender category labels that function within the confines of the dominant
U.S. gender system, where ‘nonbinary’ and ‘genderqueer’ are no exception.

2.1 Newness discourse: ‘Nonbinary’ and ‘genderqueer’ designated as arbitrators of
progress
According to what I am calling a newness discourse, nonbinary and genderqueer
categories are new ways to situate oneself in the gendered social world: Before ‘nonbinary’ and
‘genderqueer’ came into existence in the past few decades, there were only the categories ‘man’
and ‘woman.’ Newness discourse thereby views ‘nonbinary’ and ‘genderqueer’ as a recent
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development in human history—even, according to particularly bigoted versions of this newness
discourse, a fanciful trend.
I argue here that, as a feature of newness discourse, a specific notion of nonbinary and
genderqueer inclusion receives a celebration of “modern” in dominant U.S. contexts. This is
particularly relevant in societies with explicitly “progressive” aims and perhaps in additional
contexts as well. Newness discourse accomplishes this task through the assumption that
nonbinary inclusion places the U.S. and other Western countries as naturally “ahead of”
countries in the Global South, as well as certain contexts within the U.S. I will claim that
dominant U.S. discourse around nonbinary inclusion, like discourses around gender justice in
Khader’s analysis and gay equality in Puar’s, plays a particular role in justifying U.S.
imperialism where the U.S. interprets itself to be more “advanced” than people in the Global
South, as well as Black and African people, Indigenous Peoples of the Americas, and non-white
people within U.S. communities.
I begin with a few examples of this newness discourse around nonbinary and genderqueer
inclusion in the U.S. to ground this discussion. One case is the conflation of genderqueer
identities with young people in the U.S. This is demonstrated by, for example, The Guardian
series “Genderqueer generation,” which “highlights the experiences and perspectives of nonbinary and other gender-nonconforming young people” (The Guardian 2020). ‘Genderqueer’ is
made to appear as a new phenomenon that is brought to life by young people; as the series
claims, “[g]ender expression is changing.” Additionally, in Bergner’s “The Struggles of
Rejecting the Gender Binary,” the newness of nonbinary and genderqueer identities is
exemplified through increasing medical options for nonbinary people:
It may not be easy, but nowadays people who wish to exist somewhere other than these
two endpoints [of male and female], and who feel they can’t get far enough by
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nonmedical means – clothing choices; a name change; chest binding; penis tucking and
taping – can find endocrinologists and surgeons to treat them. Still, the goal of treatment
is often unclear to the patient themselves; the prevailing binary paradigm doesn’t apply.
The need is to get beyond, but how? (Bergner 2019, first emphasis added)
The performance of nonbinary identity is conceptualized as a medical breakthrough. There is a
supposed mystification of what it takes to be nonbinary and genderqueer—a hidden scientific
complexity that even nonbinary and genderqueer people themselves do not fully grasp but that
can be at least somewhat understood by highly trained experts such as “endocrinologists and
surgeons.” The impossibility of ‘nonbinary’ and ‘genderqueer’ is evidence of this newness
discourse in that these categories are couched as on the cusp of being understood, where being
understood is dependent on conclusions produced by the dominant scientific community. This
element of discovery of genderqueer identity—the innovativeness of it—makes it appear new.
In addition to the purported medical novelty of nonbinary and genderqueer categories,
this discourse employs recent examples of social and political inclusivity efforts as indicators of
newness. The linguistic introduction of third-person neopronouns like ‘ze/zim’ or ‘xe/xim’
(Devin-Norelle 2020) are taken to imply the recency of ‘genderqueer.’ State-sanctioned
mechanisms to officially recognize ‘nonbinary’ and ‘genderqueer,’ such as the addition of an ‘X’
gender option on applications for U.S. passports in April 2022 (Hernandez 2022), make these
categories increasingly legally detectable and thereby support the idea that they are new
categorizations.
Part and parcel of newness discourse is the idea that positive reception of nonbinary and
genderqueer people, the harbingers of this new and enigmatic gender category, signifies
“progress.” The most “advanced” societies are the ones that “include” and “accept” nonbinary
and genderqueer people. Asher and Lyric Fergusson’s article, “The 203 Worst (& Safest)
Countries for LGBTQ+ Travel in 2022” (previously titled “A study of the world’s most popular
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countries for LGBTQ+ travel reveals the good, the average & the ugly”) (2022), epitomizes this
imperialistic line of argumentation. The authors develop assessment criteria for the safest
LGBTQ+ places in the world that ground their conclusions on where LGBTQ+ people should
and should not travel. The most relevant criteria for trans and nonbinary people are likely
“worker protections” (such as protections for gender identity), “criminalization of violence,” and
“transgender legal identity laws,” among others. In this report, Canada, Sweden, the U.K., and
the U.S. are ranked among the top 25 best countries for LGBTQ+ people (labeled “the good” in a
previous version of the article), while the six lowest ranked are Malaysia, Guyana, Saudi Arabia,
Kuwait, Nigeria, and finally, in 203rd place, Brunei (labeled “the ugly” in a previous version of
the article) (Fergusson and Fergusson 2022). The presumably “bad” countries, who received a
grade of “F” for “Highest Danger” by the authors’ standards, are almost exclusively (and
uncoincidentally) located in Africa, Asia, the Caribbean, and the Middle East.
The imperialistic narrative that the U.S. and other countries in the West/Global North are
automatically more hospitable to queer and trans people—a narrative that furthers colonial
domination and violence—is not itself new. Puar famously describes how Americans reacted to
U.S. military torture of Iraqi prisoners at Abu Ghraib by fixating on methods of sexual torture,
the stated and unstated assumption being that these forms of violence were unacceptable in that
they disrespected the “culture” and religion of the prisoners in a manner that would not be
applicable to “American” modes of living (Puar 2007, 80–81). Critiquing U.S. military
employment of “sexual torture—specifically, violence that purports to mimic sexual acts closely
associated with deviant sexuality or sexual excess such as sodomy and oral sex, as well as S/M
practices of bondage, leashing, and hooding” (Puar 2007, 80)—was thereby a tool of
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condemning the culture and religion of the tortured prisoners as somehow “backwards,” i.e.,
chronologically behind the U.S.’s increasing acceptance of queer sexuality. As Puar explains:
Those questioned for their involvement, tacit and explicit, in torture at Abu Ghraib cited
both the lack-of-training and the culture-difference arguments to justify their behavior:
“If we had known more about them, about their culture and their way of life,” whines one
soldier plaintively on the U.S. news, “we would have been better able to handle the
situation.” The monolith of Muslim culture constructed through this narrative
(performatively reiterated by Bush’s tardy apology for the Abu Ghraib atrocities,
bizarrely directed at the token Muslim visiting at the time, King Abdullah of Jordan)
aside, the cultural-difference line has also been used by conservative and progressive
factions alike to comment on the particularly intense shame with which Muslims
experience homosexual and feminizing acts. […] The taboo of homosexuality in Islamic
cultures figures heavily in the equation for why the torture has been so “effective” […].
(Puar 2007, 83)
Following Abu Ghraib, Americans of any political party leveraged photos of torture as evidence
for homophobia supposedly inherent to Islam. The reasoning was that the violence incurred
against Iraqi prisoners was particularly embarrassing to them because of the sexual modesty and
“backwardness” of Islam. Puar argues that, by narrowly drawing out the supposedly “culturally”
derived homophobia of the people who were tortured, Americans ignored and reinforced
“misogyny, the erasure of women, and the demeaning of femininity” (93). In ascribing values to
the victims and condemning them for those values, Americans were thereby able to self-identify
as superior with respect to queer acceptance and other progressive issues (Puar 2007, 91–94).
This conclusion, of course, was accompanied by a flagrant lack of interrogation of the violence
that is homophobia, sexism, and Islamophobia inflicted by the U.S. within U.S. borders.
The American public’s response to Abu Ghraib reveals an investment in what Puar calls
U.S. sexual exceptionalism, which is “a narrative claiming the successful management of life in
regard to a people” where “an exceptional form of national heteronormativity is now joined by
an exceptional form of national homonormativity” (2). The combination of heteronormativity
and homonormativity that constitute U.S. sexual exceptionalism are mechanisms to “continue or
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extend the project of U.S. nationalism and imperial expansion endemic to the war on terror”
(Puar 2007, 2). The arm of sexual exceptionalism that idealizes a specific notion of homosexual
acceptance is called homonationalism. Puar argues that U.S. homonationalism is a way of
reaffirming Americans’ certainty in U.S. sexual exceptionalism, which is then used to justify the
American public’s self-conception as more “modern” than (and hence “superior” to) Muslimmajority nations in the Middle East. In Puar’s terms, Americans’ “reaction of rage, while to some
extent laudable, misses the point entirely, or perhaps more generously, upstages a denial of
culpability” (79).
The notion of U.S. exceptionalism is also present in white U.S. feminist approaches to
transnational feminisms. In Decolonizing Universalism, Khader (2019) examines what she aptly
terms missionary feminism, or the colonial violence of Western feminists’ commitment to
“saving” and transforming “other” women in accordance with Western values and ideals (23).
Khader describes, for instance, how missionary feminists idealize the public sphere as a site of
women’s freedom, even though this logic does not necessarily apply outside of dominant
Western contexts (126–28). In addition to the wrongheaded assumption that gender justice tracks
women leaving the domestic realm, Western values enforced by missionary feminism can
include the assumed superiority of “Western means”—e.g., citing divorce rates as examples of
women exercising agency, without social and geographical context about how marriage can
benefit women (Khader 2019, 128–29)—and the universality of Western “gender protocols”—
e.g., the French government’s presumption, in banning Muslim headscarves, that the hijab
prevents women from experiencing sexual freedom, even though the hijab can be a source of
sexual control and power for Muslim women (Khader 2019, 129). According to Khader,
missionary feminists thereby enact colonial violence by attempting to render “colonial histories
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irrelevant to contemporary exercises of power” (Khader 2019, 128). U.S. exceptionalism—more
broadly, a form of Western exceptionalism—is present in missionary feminist efforts to bring
concepts of women’s liberation in the West to women in the Global South, who not only do not
necessarily “need” this feminism, as they are illustrated to (Abu-Lughod 2002), but could be
actively harmed by its enforcement in their environments. Part of the violence of missionary
feminism, then, is its lack of context. Accompanied by this lack of context is the insidious
assumption that the West knows how to better support the well-being of women, and the West’s
mechanisms for doing this are superior to mechanisms in the non-West. In this sense, an ideal of
Western efficiency and progress is inherent to missionary feminism.
What I have been calling a newness discourse posits resistance to the gender binary as a
sign of advancement, even though (as I argued in Chapter 3) nonconformity to the U.S. gender
binary is viewed as depravity in earlier stages of U.S. colonization. Newness discourse in the
U.S. weaponizes nonbinary and genderqueer acceptance by taking dominant U.S. societies to
have a superior understanding of the complexity of nonbinary and genderqueer identities,
including (but not limited to) growing medical options for gender affirmation, an understanding
of neopronouns, and the incorporation of a nonbinary option into identity documents. In this
sense, this newness discourse around ‘nonbinary’ and ‘genderqueer’ functions in support of U.S.
queer exceptionalism, in a similar way that missionary feminism does. However, the nonbinary
and genderqueer inclusivity mission differs from the gender equality mission that Khader
describes in the following way: While, in missionary feminist aims that support U.S.
exceptionalism, ‘woman’ is viewed as a ubiquitous, global category to which the liberal notion
of equality applies transnationally, ‘nonbinary’ and ‘genderqueer’ function in U.S.
exceptionalism by being unique to the most progressive societies: Like a new technology,
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‘nonbinary’ and ‘genderqueer’ are signs of innovation in American society. Radical resistance to
the gender binary, by consequence, is of course only workable for those states in which these
presumably groundbreaking categories exist in the first place.
The U.N.’s recent concern with increasing the gender pluralism of its workforce,
including the very general need to “adopt a holistic and non-binary approach to gender” (Sandhu
2020) and its report on special procedures for defining trans and “gender-diverse” categories
(OHCHR 2022), provides a crucial example of how this newness discourse around ‘nonbinary’
and ‘genderqueer’ functions in efforts by the West/Global North to locate itself as the most
knowledgeable and advanced with respect to categories that do not conform to the gender binary.
Positing ‘nonbinary’ and ‘genderqueer’ as difficult to understand by virtue of their novelty is one
way in which the U.S. and other imperialistic states try to make themselves appear superior.
The U.S. military, more specifically, embraces this newness discourse in its absorption of
nonbinary identity into the same apparatus that degrades, surveils, and enacts violence upon nonwhite and non-Western people. Rebecca Kheel (2022), in a Military.com article, reports that the
Pentagon has instructed the Defense Department to research strategies for ensuring that
nonbinary people can openly serve in the U.S. military. In this article, Jennifer Dane, executive
director of the Modern Military Association of America (an organization dedicated to promoting
the interests of LGBTQ troops), compared the challenges of increasing nonbinary acceptance to
the experiences of binary trans people: “there’s going to be a lot of hurdles, more so than
transgender, I think, because there’s no binary on it” (quoted in Kheel 2022). Dane’s statement
exemplifies the appeal in this newness discourse to the obfuscating nature of nonbinary
identity—the incomprehensibility of it, which is taken to be a direct result of its recent
introduction into gender space (unlike ‘transgender’). According to Kheel,
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as more people in younger generations identify as nonbinary, including in official
documentation such as passports and driver’s licenses, Dane said an open service policy
will be crucial to recruitment and retention. […] “To get the talent, obviously, you’ve got
to kind of get with the times,” Dane said. (Kheel 2022)
By citing legal recognition of ‘nonbinary’ through “an ‘X’ gender marker,” Kheel couches the
incorporation of nonbinary categorizations into state vocabulary as an indicator of “get[ting] with
the times,” in Dane’s wording. This is a clear example of how the supposed newness of
nonbinary and genderqueer identities plays a specific function in the argument that nonbinary
and genderqueer “inclusion” (and, hence, resisting the gender binary) represents U.S. “progress.”
Additionally, Bree Fram, a lieutenant colonel in the Air Force and president of trans military
activist organization SPARTA, expressed optimism that “this will allow non-binary individuals
to serve authentically and realize their full potential in the military” (quoted in Kheel 2022).
Implicit in Fram’s statement is the idea that nonbinary inclusion in the U.S. military, an arm of
imperialistic violence, would not only further military efforts but also help nonbinary people
become their full nonbinary selves. The actualization of nonbinary and genderqueer identity
becomes a feature of the militarization of these categories; their role in the state is not wholly
separable from what it means to properly embody them under a white supremacist system.
This newness discourse, in situating ‘nonbinary’ and ‘genderqueer’ as new categories
whose innovative character can be traced to their status of “modern” and “up-to-date” in the
West/Global North, secures the U.S. and other imperialistic countries as the experts on nonbinary
inclusion and resistance to the gender binary—a new marker of advancement that accompanies
the newness of the categories themselves.
Crucially, this is true regardless of whether nonbinary and genderqueer are actually new
categories; I am simply pointing to how the narrative functions in imperialistic objectives.
Perhaps less intuitive is the fact that a similar assertion of U.S. exceptionalism can be drawn
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from a seemingly opposite route: that is, from an explicit refusal of this newness discourse.
Unlike in missionary feminism or homonationalism, however, the strategy here will be to paint
Indigenous and non-white societies as more progressive with respect to gender (in this case,
gender pluralism), rather than less progressive (in other cases, with respect to women’s rights
and gay rights). The next subsection will unpack and examine this idea in more depth.

2.2 Counter-discourse: The superhumanization of colonized and formerly colonized people
What I am calling a counter-discourse to newness discourse recognizes that ‘nonbinary’
and ‘genderqueer’ are not new, but then conflates them with “Other” categories or reifies the
acknowledged distinction between the two via the new colonial binary that I discussed at the end
of the previous section. The “Other” categories are those categories which can be properly
credited to Black and African people, Indigenous Peoples of the Americas, and non-white
people, depending on the context. The counter-discourse assumes that the Self/Other comparison
is natural, and that the positioning of the “Other” as socially and politically oriented against the
U.S. gender binary is natural. As I will argue, the result is reaffirming the imperialistic idea that
the gender binary has influenced the entire globe in a one-directional manner (Coronil 2019,
336–44; Narayan 1997, 136–42), at the expense of context, and the lives of colonized and
formerly colonized people are simultaneously romanticized and dehumanized.
Proponents of this counter-discourse often take seriously the history of social categories
that do not align with the colonial imposition of ‘man’ and ‘woman’ and problems with erasing
Black and African people, Indigenous Peoples of the Americas, and non-white people, thereby
refusing to claim that the U.S. is somehow more “modern” with respect to nonbinary inclusion.
However, the Self/Other comparisons which characterize this counter-discourse are meta-
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philosophically significant because of the role they serve in furthering imperialistic narratives: in
this case, they are accompanied by an idealization of (e.g.) the “village-world” (Segato 2021,
786). This caricature attempts to paint colonized and formerly colonized people as superhuman,
which ultimately denies their humanity. This phenomenon resembles what Crystal EchoHawk
(2021) refers to as “romantic stereotypes from idealized and false myths about Columbus,
Pocahontas, and Thanksgiving.” The counter-discourse to newness discourse is thus a symptom
of neoliberal progressivism in the U.S., simultaneously advancing U.S. imperialism and
disguising itself as a voice for interests at the margins of the state.
According to this counter-discourse, Indigenous and non-white people who would not be
labeled ‘man’ or ‘woman’ under a colonial gaze are taken to be the natural counterparts to
nonbinary and genderqueer people in the Global North. In the U.N.’s report on “gender
diversity,” titled “Beyond the Gender Binary,” Gurchaten Sandhu (2020) claims that
there is increasing awareness about gender diversity, and an increasing number of people
who identify beyond the binary of male and female. From the fa’afafine in Samoa, the
waria in Indonesia, the hijra in India, Muxe in Mexico, to the two Spirit from the United
States and Canada, shows us that gender identities other than male and female have
always existed throughout history. (Sandhu 2020)
Here, social categories that might be considered gender categories (for example, from an
imperialistic gaze) and that do not adhere to an imperialistic definition of ‘man’ and ‘woman’ are
taken to be derivatives of the same “gender diversity” label as nonbinary and genderqueer people
in the Global North. In this article, Sandhu is particularly concerned with “gender diversity”
within the U.N.’s workforce when they liken “trans and non-binary” U.N. applicants to nonwhite and non-Western people in the Global South who would not be considered ‘man’ or
‘woman’ from a colonial perspective. The unquestioned assumption is that these categories are
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comparable in the first place and that the latter’s position in society is on a par with respect to
forms of job discrimination that the former experience and that motivate Sandhu’s piece.
A related observation can be made in terms of how the gender binary is frequently
discussed in U.S. popular media and academic philosophy. In “Beyond Binary: Genderqueer as
Critical Gender Kind,” Dembroff (2020) suggests points of solidarity between ‘genderqueer’ and
“Other” categories owing to their shared role in some minimum conception of resistance to the
binary axis of the dominant Western gender system, be it what they call existential
destabilization or some other form of challenge to oppression:
Because genderqueer, on my proposal, essentially involves destabilizing the binary axis,
as understood within Western gender ideology, it is largely constrained to contexts where
this ideology is dominant. This is because ‘destabilizing’, I take it, connotes at minimum
a causal relationship. However, this is not to ignore a closely related kind—one whose
members challenge, via destabilizing or not—the binary axis. Such a category would
unify genderqueer with the variety of genders beyond male and female recognized in
other societies, such as Indonesia’s waria, Native American two-spirit, and Samoan
fa’afafine. In this, we have the tools for finding important similarities and points of
solidarity between critical gender kinds in a given context with gender kinds across other
contexts. We also thereby have a framework for interpreting common claims to the tune
of “nonbinary persons have always existed everywhere.” If we interpret ‘nonbinary’, in
such a claim, as any group that challenges the binary axis, then we can look to any time
or society to identify such persons. (Dembroff 2020, 19)
According to Dembroff, their distinction between the specific form of resistance that constitutes
“existential destabilizing of the binary axis” and the broader form of resistance that is
“challenging the binary axis” is essential for correctly applying their view outside of dominant
Western contexts (for example, for solidarity purposes). In fact, they mention in the next
sentence that if ‘nonbinary’ means, more specifically, “existential destabilizing of the binary
axis,” then it cannot be the case that “Other” social categories like ‘waria’ are critical gender
kinds by Dembroff’s lights. But the interesting part is the uncritiqued assumption that these
“Other” categories are the sort of categories that would participate in some broader form of
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resistance “that challenges the binary axis” (Dembroff 2020, 19), even if it is not in the exact
causal sense that “destabilizing” requires. In conflating these categories, while denouncing the
idea that ‘genderqueer’ is conceptually isolated from “Other” categories, Dembroff participates
in this counter-discourse to newness discourse.
So far, I have highlighted two examples of this counter-discourse to newness discourse
around ‘nonbinary’ and ‘genderqueer,’ where ungrounded comparisons are drawn between these
categories and “Other” categories. Notice how this counter-discourse, as it appears in these
examples (and common to many examples of this counter-discourse), assumes that the
Self/Other distinction is natural and that these “Other” categories must resist the gender binary.
Both epistemic components of this counter-discourse advance U.S. imperialist interests. One
reason (the main reason that I am putting forth) is that they are posited as undeniably true—the
uncontroversial result of deductive reasoning—despite well-documented evidence that they are
false: People who would not be labeled as either ‘man’ or ‘woman’ by colonial standards can
hold power and privilege in contexts such as the Mapuche (Reche) community (Bacigalupo
2004), and furthermore, some two-gender systems could plausibly exist in certain societies in
neutral or good ways (Nzegwu 2006). Such individuals should not be classified as resisting the
gender binary, or needing resistance to the gender binary, respectively. While Sandhu certainly
does not classify these categories as such, they play into the same counter-discourse that lends
itself to such claims. Dembroff also explicitly acknowledges this counter-discourse as a viable
way in which one might engage with their view. The problem lies in assuming that all people
who do not or would not adhere to the colonial categories ‘man’ and ‘woman,’ including Two
Spirit individuals, Hijra communities in India, co-gendered Mapuche people, and others, should
be homogenized under the same banner under which ‘nonbinary’ and ‘genderqueer’ fall.
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In doing so, the colonial idea that the gender binary has unilaterally influenced every
aspect of the world is reinstated, at the expense of context. One expression of Coronil’s concept
of Occidentalism—which, recall, is an imperialist epistemology that consists of merging images
of the West, including how the West views itself and is viewed by the non-West—is aptly
termed “The Incorporation of the Other into the Self” (Coronil 2019, 336). This expression
involves the West ignoring how the non-West affects the West: It requires making the “Other”
part of the history of the “Self.” According to Coronil, “[t]he result is that the Other has not
contributed to “the making of the modern world” (336). Here Coronil criticizes Eric Wolf,
among others, for generating a theory of capitalism that originates in the West and simply affects
the non-West. As Coronil explains, Wolf’s view of the Western role in capitalist expansion
pictures the West rolling in and creating a chain of events without the control of the non-West,
thereby enforcing capitalism in a one-way manner. In other words, only the West, the “Self,” is
ascribed decision-making capacity, and the non-West, the Other, is rendered powerless. In
response, Coronil appeals to the need for a view of capitalism that “decenters Eurocentric
concepts that reduce its development to a dialectic of capital and labor originating in advanced
‘centers’ and engulfing a passive ‘periphery’” (Coronil 2019, 341). The dissemination of
knowledge about capitalism (and other theories of power), according to Coronil, must reflect the
intricacies of influence, rather than reducing the web of actors to just the West.
Dembroff’s metaphysics of ‘genderqueer’ risks “The Incorporation of the Other into the
Self.” The many causal influences involved in U.S. imperialist projects are relevant to
understanding how and why nonbinary and genderqueer identities exist in the West, yet
Dembroff does not mention this colonial history. As such, their discussion leaves out the
complicated and mutual impact involved in “Western dominant gender ideology” (Dembroff
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2020, 15). It is this ahistoricity that leaves open whether or not their view actually takes seriously
these two-sided interactions between the West and non-West, or whether, like in the conquest of
the Americas, as Coronil explains, “Europeans need Mesoamericans in order to discover who
they are. […] Historical progress takes place not with, but at the expense of, others” (Coronil
2019, 335). Dembroff, notably, does not state that the Western gender system is isolated from the
rest of the world, but their lack of historical specificity raises concerns about how they are
conceptualizing ‘genderqueer’ as a kind. Perhaps, though, Coronil could weaken his argument
here: A theorist need not state that the West is the only influence in order to take on an
Occidentalist epistemology, but maybe all that is needed for Occidentalism (at least in the sense
of “The Incorporation of the Other into the Self”) is that the influence is not specified as twoway or more. The latter would be Occidentalist in that the dominant narrative—i.e., that the West
is the only influence—prevails in Western thought unless it is actively resisted.18
In any case, on top of assuming the ubiquity of the U.S. gender binary, and more broadly,
the domineering influence of the West/Global North, these examples of this counter-discourse
contribute to the romanticizing of Indigenous and non-white individuals in a way that I think is
dehumanizing. As I noted, one might be tempted to argue that this counter-discourse successfully
shows that not conforming to the gender binary is not some modern invention of the West/Global
North and so evades particular imperialistic concerns of the newness discourse. While this might
be true, the counter-discourse still serves different, yet no less well-documented, justifications
for U.S. imperialism. As I will show, the cruel irony of claiming that “nonbinary is not new—
look at these Indigenous genders” is that, at the same time they are romanticized (and, in fact, via
this romanticization), Indigenous and non-white individuals and communities are viewed as less
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Perhaps this is already an obvious logical implication of Coronil’s claim and so no revision to his theory is
needed.
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modern, reverting backward on the unidimensional stretch of time. What neoliberals envision
instead is a futuristic, gender-pluralistic world inspired by an idealized version of Indigenous
social categories, but still situated under colonial power.
Dea’s Beyond the Binary renders Indigenous categories that do not fall within the gender
binary symptoms of “culture” (71)—where “culture” here is not defined and is taken to
encompass “indigeneity” broadly. Dea assumes that, for Indigenous peoples, culture causes
gender divergence; gender divergence is an instantiation of culture. Perhaps the most egregious
example is the text under the heading, “Non-binary indigeneity,” as reported below:
We have focused here on d’Anglure’s view that Inuit culture recognizes three genders.
However, it is by no means the only indigenous culture that does so. From the fa’afafine
of Samoa to Navajo nádleehí, a number of indigenous cultures worldwide resist gender
binarism. (Dea 2016, 75)
Here, “indigenous cultures” with “third genders” are understood with reference to the gender
binary by being posited as examples of “nonbinary” categories that inherently resist the gender
binary. The passage goes on to describe the origins of the category ‘berdache’ as a term created
by 17th- and 18th-century French settlers “to describe North American First Nations people whose
gender expressions and gender roles did not align with their gender assignment at birth” (Dea
2016, 75). Dea then couches ‘Two Spirit’ as an alternative to ‘berdache’ that “was coined by
First Nations people themselves in order to situate an array of non-cisgender identities within the
framework of First Nations culture” (75–76). Settler terminology such as ‘gender assignment at
birth’ and ‘cisgender’ (or ‘non-cisgender’) is presumed to easily apply to understanding local
roles within First Nations communities. This worrisome assumption is disguised in the
handwringing of First Nations people electing their own terminology after the (certainly violent
and abhorrent) imposition of a settler category label.
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Broadly, Dea assumes that “Other” categories naturally fall under a discussion about
resisting the gender binary. Through the conflation between ‘nonbinary’ and “Other” categories,
Dea implies that “Other” categories are politically oriented and that this is a direct result of their
unique cultural symbolism in religion and mythology, which in turn is said to provide proof of
their existence. This is particularly evident in Dea’s discussion of Inuit communities, where they
cite “myths that provide further evidence of an Inuit third gender” (74). In one such myth,
according to Dea, “a ‘strange man’ dresses as a woman and adopts female gender roles, even
(thanks to supernatural intervention) giving birth” (74), and the strange man, as “evidence” of
gender binary transgression, is graced with “supernatural powers” and “parlays with the Maker
of All” (75).
The appeal of Indigenous communities to Dea—their implied automatic relevance to
Dea’s theory—is rooted in a generalizing and idealizing depiction of their “culture” and what
makes it possible for their “culture” to include and celebrate “third gender” people in such an
unprecedented way. Furthermore, deriving the very existence of Inuit people who would not be
labeled ‘man’ or ‘woman’ from myths mythologizes this community. This is what I mean when I
say that Dea romanticizes Indigenous Peoples of the Americas in their analysis of categories that
do not conform to the colonial impositions of the categories ‘man’ and ‘woman.’
While perhaps adequately demonstrating the power and privilege that such individuals
can have in their societies, for example, the “mediatory function” (Dea 2016, 75) of the ‘strange
man’ in Inuit communities, Dea creates what I think is a romanticized depiction of Indigenous
people that is by no means unique to Dea’s article. In fact, I think that it is characteristic of this
counter-discourse to newness discourse. It is even more easily noticeable in arguments that assert
that the existence of precolonial gender “variations” in Indigenous communities indicates the
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lack of newness of ‘nonbinary’ and ‘genderqueer.’ For example, GLSEN, a U.S. organization
devoted to creating LGBTQ+ educational resources for K-12 schools, published a suggested
teaching activity titled “Beyond the Gender Binary: A Look at Two-Spirit Identified People”
(2022) with the following introduction for instructors:
“Hello, everyone. Today we’re going to learn about the term Two-Spirit and take in
firsthand accounts of Native people who identify that way. Two-Spirit is an umbrella
term used to describe Native and Indigenous people whose gender identity encompasses
both male and female energies. Within the Native community it is recognized as a third
gender since it falls outside of the two-gender binary. They may or may not be LGBTQidentified. Please note that most Indigenous communities have their own unique words
for describing people who defy gender norms and distinct places of honor for those folks
in their communities.” (GLSEN 2022)
A problem here is the lack of specificity that comes with assuming that Two Spirit people “defy
gender norms” or that they necessarily hold “places of honor.” It is as if to say, “this society does
it better with respect to resisting the gender binary.” While not directly conflating ‘nonbinary’
and ‘Two Spirit,’ this GLSEN publication positions ‘Two Spirit’ as naturally referencing and
oriented against the gender binary. An implicit connection is drawn.
This counter-discourse, by romanticizing Indigenous categories that do not conform to
‘man’ or ‘woman’ by colonial standards, constructs the “Other” as superhuman. This is
disconcerting at least insofar as its lack of nuance depicts Indigenous and non-white people as,
ironically, non-human. The mythologizing practice in which Dea partakes, for example,
imagines Indigenous people who would not be labeled as ‘man’ or ‘woman’ under a U.S.
colonial gaze to be legends of sorts—beyond reality, beyond human. This ignores how Two
Spirit people today continue to be targeted, surveilled, and mistreated by the state. In addition to
experiencing police brutality and sexual violence, for instance, Two Spirit people are also
navigating the ongoing trauma of histories of U.S. military testing and mutilation by U.S.
soldiers following massacres of Indigenous societies (INCITE! 2018). Moreover, painting the
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colonial role in gender as displacing Two Spirit people (as the GLSEN publication does) ignores
Indigenous people who might be categorized as the colonial version of ‘man’ or ‘woman’ yet are
still harmed by the U.S. gender binary. After all, the forced placement of Indigenous children
into boarding schools on the basis of ‘girl’ and ‘boy,’ for example, is an act of violence against
any Indigenous child, even those who meet the binary criteria to the greatest extent possible.
In a similar vein, previous theorists have named the white supremacist violence involved
in treating Black folks as superhuman. This is particularly evident in racist claims about the
supposedly exceptional “natural talent” of Black athletes, which Andrew Lawrence (2018) has
critiqued, and the denial of Black patients’ pain by healthcare professionals owing to what Kelly
Hoffman et al. (2016) describe as “false beliefs about biological differences between blacks and
whites” (4297). Adam Waytz, Kelly Hoffman, and Sophie Trawalter (2015) have assessed what
they call a superhuman bias to which white people subscribe in perceiving Black people, where
this bias is an instance of dehumanization that differs from the more commonly analyzed
subhuman claims. According to Waytz, Hoffman, and Trawalter, superhumanization interprets
people “as possessing mental and physical qualities that are supernatural (transcending the laws
of nature), extrasensory (transcending the bounds of normal human perception), and magical
(influencing or manipulating the natural world through symbolic or ritualistic means)” (352).
One violent consequence of superhumanization, as Waytz, Hoffman, and Trawalter conclude in
their study, is that white people consider Black people to be more tolerant of pain—an idea that
has historically been and continues to be, in in the words of Hoffman et al., “championed by
scientists, physicians, and slave owners alike to justify slavery and the inhumane treatment of
black men and women in medical research” (Hoffman et al. 2016, 4297). The superhuman bias
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thereby carries efforts to rationalize political, economic, and social exploitation of Black people
both inside and outside the U.S.
Collins’ concept of controlling images (2000, 69–96) and her engagement with Black
women’s reactions to these images further contextualize and clarify problems with
superhumanization. Controlling images are stereotypes in the form of distortions of a
marginalized group that are designed to advance the objectives of a dominant group (69). The
controlling image of Black women as matriarchs is an example of superhumanizing that serves
the broader goal of attempting “to make racism, sexism, poverty, and other forms of social
injustice appear to be natural norms, and inevitable parts of everyday life” (Collins 2000, 69).
Collins describes how this controlling image arose in the 1960s in during “a time of significant
political and economic mobility for African-Americans” (75) as a way of attributing ongoing
Black poverty to the Black women, who were considered to lead (and fail at leading) Black
households. The implication, according to this thesis, is that Black women did not succeed in
providing their children with the care that white children received, which was taken to elucidate
“the persistence of Black social class outcomes” (Collins 2000, 76)—for instance, according to
Collins, when lack of success in school was attributed to supposedly poor mothering. The
matriarch image was also popularized by efforts to render Black women as ultra-strong and
therefore less feminine—by no coincidence, “at precisely the same moment that the women’s
movement advanced its critique of U.S. patriarchy” (Collins 2000, 75). Such ascriptions of
matriarchy in Black U.S. communities place both the burden of Black liberation and the blame
for conditions of anti-Black racism on Black women (Staples 1981), all while presuming that, in
Spillers’ words, the alleged “‘underachievement’ in black males of the lower classes is primarily
the fault of black females” (Spillers 1987, 66). This view highlights the racist and sexist violence
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that matriarchal depictions inflict on Black women, as well as the historical and present
significance of liberatory movements that target and resist these controlling images: Many Black
scholars have refused these controlling images, as Collins notes, by (e.g.) demonstrating the
sensitivity of Black women and the validity of their pain (Collins 2000, 76). These forms of
resistance undermine the superhumanizing narrative of Black women that is taken to justify
white supremacy, anti-Black racism, and misogyny against Black women in dominant U.S.
societies.
The romanticization of Indigenous categories that are neither ‘man’ nor ‘woman’ under a
colonial gaze is guilty of similar yet diverging issues. Of course, the formation of the “Other”
through controlling images benefits the “Self” by dictating who belongs and who does not; as
Collins reminds us, “those individuals who stand at the margins of society clarify its boundaries”
(70). Dominant narratives cast Indigenous and non-white categories as noble rejections of the
gender binary that are almost too incredible to be real—in fact, in Dea’s argument, they are
explicitly part of mythologies. Through this narrative of the “Other,” ‘nonbinary’ and
‘genderqueer’ are the implicit “Self”: They are the categories that are said to belong under white
supremacy. In this sense, these categories are already included into an imperialistic gender
system, despite deviating from the gender binary component of that system.
The romanticization of Indigenous categories that are neither ‘man’ nor ‘woman’ by
colonial standards has important similarities to the romanticization of women’s roles in
matriarchal societies such as in Chaqueño and Amazonian communities. Idealizing Indigenous
communities where women hold leadership positions and social power is evident when women’s
equality and freedom are taken to be naturally superior in matriarchal societies, as compared to
patriarchal Western ones, without a detailed examination of how women are actually situated in
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matriarchies, nor how matriarchies have impacted and been impacted by local factors as well as
specific historical conditions of colonization. On the website for the U.S. e-commerce company
Etsy, tote bags are available for purchase with the following sentiment, written in pink and
ornamental text: “Matriarchy Is Older Than Western Feminism” (NalgonaPositiveShop 2022).
This statement posits matriarchy and Western feminism as comparable in some way—perhaps,
in my interpretation, as alternative solutions to the same problem. Notably, in certain Chaqueño
and Amazonian communities, women must be addressed for decisions to finalize, and, otherwise,
there are serious consequences to the men who fail to do so, as Segato (2021, 792) claims. Yet
Segato also notes that, even in such contexts, women’s public contributions are limited, for
instance, in “participation and speech in their village’s public space—deliberation being the
prerogative of men due to their strict division of sex roles” (792).
Of course, it is very possible that women (or whoever would be labeled as a ‘woman’ by
U.S. colonial standards—another problem that this comparison raises) do fair better in those
Chaqueño and Amazonian communities that might be considered matriarchal. My point, though,
is not to affirm or reject such a conclusion. Rather, I am concerned about the uncritical depiction
of matriarchies as utopic and the consequences that this has on Indigenous Peoples of the
Americas and non-white people. Namely, glorifying Indigenous matriarchies denies colonized
and formerly colonized people the nuance and complexities that are granted to white Western
people in the U.S. The result is an exaggeration, a caricature—a denial of humanity. This
romanticization, furthermore, is often expressed ahistorically: In couching matriarchies and
Western feminism, for example, as alternative solutions to the same problem, matriarchies are
imagined in a state (a bubble) where they do not interact with local factors or external factors
such as imperialism. Certainly, some matriarchies meet this criterion or count as what Segato
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would call the village-world, i.e., the parts of precolonial societies that persist through colonial
violence. The point is just that some matriarchies could affect and be affected by imperialism.
And, furthermore, there can be elements of patriarchy even in gynecratic societies, typifying
what Segato calls low-intensity patriarchy: “In the Andean world, the authority of the mallku is
always dual: it involves a male and a female lead, even though these two are ranked
hierarchically” (Segato 2021, 792). Such ascriptions of matriarchy, regardless of accuracy, can
also be a way of obscuring the role of local factors in reproducing systems of power. Analisa
Taylor (2006) analyzes relevant problems of assuming that an Isthmus of Tehuantepec city
called Juchitán in México is a “matriarchal utopia” (815):
I ask whether this myth [of matriarchal utopia], by projecting an image of indigenous
women’s empowerment onto one specific region, may serve to legitimize nationalist
discourses that imagine women, especially indigenous women, as passive and powerless
yet paradoxically self-serving and treacherous. The question then becomes this: Is our
ability to take note of women’s, gay people’s, and indigenous people’s social agency in
regions of Mexico other than the isthmus foreclosed by nationalist myths that equate
femininity and indigeneity with the resigned acceptance of imperialist domination over
home and body? (A. Taylor 2006, 819)
A. Taylor describes how the matriarchal myth of the Isthmus of Tehuantepec falsely envisions
this society to be “a simple inversion of patriarchal domination” (821), when in reality, the mere
attempt to force a ‘matriarchy’ or ‘patriarchy’ ascription makes it more difficult to understand
“traditional [Isthmus] Zapotec gender roles as they are locally understood” (821).
These illustrations of Black and African people, Indigenous Peoples of the Americas, and
non-white people are inherent to the romanticization of Indigenous and non-white categories that
a colonial perspective would not assign either ‘man’ or ‘woman.’ Romanticization of these
categories is typical of what I have been calling a counter-discourse to newness discourse
(“nonbinary is not new—look at these Indigenous genders!”) insofar as Indigenous and nonwhite categories (the “Other”) are taken to be models of nonbinary acceptance and celebration.

177

Yet the irony is that the construction of Indigenous and non-white categories as utopian omits
nuance and is ultimately dehumanizing for that reason. Indigenous people, including Indigenous
people who would not be categorized as colonial ‘man’ or ‘woman,’ are still viewed as less
modern through this lens. The ahistorical “perfection” of this gender-variant utopia fails to
explore past and ongoing interactions with local and imperialistic factors. When Indigenous and
non-white categories are taken as the ideal, a certain nostalgia is performed. What is imagined
for nonbinary and genderqueer people is a future world inspired by a romanticized version of
Indigenous gender variance, but still placed in the same colonial society that manufactures the
U.S. gender binary in the first place.

2.3 The Diachronic Approach as a viable alternative
I argue that the Diachronic Approach to defining ‘nonbinary’ and ‘genderqueer’ refuses
the imperialistic logics of this newness discourse and its counter-discourse by acknowledging the
historical and present role that these identity categories play in U.S. colonialism. Recall that,
according to the Diachronic Approach, ‘nonbinary’ and ‘genderqueer’ in dominant U.S. contexts
are imperialistic social categories, meaning that their existence fails to critique U.S. imperialism
and plays an active role in its continued presence in colonized and decolonizing spaces. I now
want to explain how the Diachronic Approach avoids pitfalls of this newness discourse and its
counter-discourse—both of which, it should be noted, are possible avenues for the argument in
Chapter 1 that ‘nonbinary’ and ‘genderqueer’ are radical social categories insofar as they resist
the gender binary.
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First, the Diachronic Approach takes into account the role of colonial modernity19 in
shaping ‘nonbinary’ and ‘genderqueer.’ Colonial modernity produces an image of these
categories as not only without history, but also as signals of progress. ‘Nonbinary’ and
‘genderqueer’ do not function in substantially different ways from ‘man’ and ‘woman’ within the
confines of a U.S. colonial infrastructure; they are features of an imperialistic knowledgeproducing system. My point here relates to Walter Mignolo’s concern (2018) with ways that
dominant knowledge systems conceal notions of coloniality by burying it under the banner of
modernity when, in reality, modernity and coloniality co-constitute each other. Mignolo is
especially concerned with the ongoing effects of colonization (relating to what Quijano has
termed the coloniality of power), adding historiographical nuance to his thesis in the sense that
he believes the colonial binaries of ‘human’/‘sub-human’ started in Latin America in 1492 with
the violent arrival of Christopher Columbus in the Americas. With Columbus-led colonial
violence and attempted domination came the ‘modern’/‘unmodern’ distinction. Social categories
and the binaries they introduce are symptoms of that distinction. As Mignolo explains,
The domains do not exist independently, with tags saying “I am knowledge,” “I am
nature,” “I am Black,” “I am heterosexual,” “I am gay,” “I am politics,” “I am finances,”
and so forth. All these domains have been invented by the rhetoric (the narratives) of
modernity. They have come into existence through the various flaws of the enunciation
(scientific and media discourses, education and pedagogy from kindergarten to the
university, etc.). (Mignolo 2018, 150)
These category terms—in addition to the concept of liberties and even the individual—are
features of a colonial apparatus through the mechanism of modernity.
While Mignolo’s theory is susceptible to valid criticism, for example, from Adom
Getachew’s claim (2019) that historiographies which paint colonialism as ongoing disregard
certain pan-African resistance movements, he provides an important framework for
19

See, e.g., Vasant Kaiwar’s discussion (2014, 103–155) of the term ‘colonial modernity.’
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understanding how the appearance of social categories as independent from attempted political,
economic, and social domination is a consequence of how colonialism impacts the dissemination
of knowledge. Colonial discourse counts dominant categories as “modern”—as current and
timely, while the “unmodern” is taken to fall behind and remain stuck in the past.
‘Nonbinary’ and ‘genderqueer’ are no less symptomatic of these colonial discourses. Of
course, I do recognize that some categories might evade the ascription of ‘imperialistic social
category’ by possessing the survival feature or the generative feature, as I argued in Chapter 2,
and by resisting the colonial meta-axis that I defined in Chapter 3. However, as I have claimed,
‘nonbinary’ and ‘genderqueer’ do not meet these criteria. Rather, they are simply alternative selfidentification options within an imperialistic gender system.
Second, the Diachronic Approach does not leave it up to interpretation whether
‘nonbinary’ and ‘genderqueer’ are technical terms for any social category that is said to fall
outside of the boundaries of ‘man’ or ‘woman’; instead, it requires that they are historically and
geographically specific terms that do not have an independent existence outside of political
discourses. Notably, the glossary of Theo Hendrie’s X Marks the Spot: An Anthology of
Nonbinary Experiences (2019) defines ‘genderqueer’ as “a precursor to the term ‘nonbinary’”
that “originated from LGBTQ+ zines in the 1980s” (238). The term has been credited for its rise
to popularity as a result of the work of Wilchins and other activists in the 1990s, and the
introduction of ‘nonbinary’ followed. There is good reason to be cautious of ubiquitously
applying these terms to people who would not be ascribed ‘man’ or ‘woman’ by U.S. colonial
standards.
The Diachronic Approach prevents this conflation. If ‘nonbinary’ and ‘genderqueer’ are
imperialistic social categories, then there are no grounds for comparison with what I have been
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(imperfectly) referring to as Indigenous and non-white categories that are neither ‘man’ nor
‘woman’ under a colonial gaze. By ‘comparison,’ I mean an assumption of likeness
metaphysically, not just an assumption of common political orientation—an orientation that, as I
have shown, not even nonbinary and genderqueer people in the U.S. share. The commonly
conflated categories ‘nonbinary’ and ‘Two Spirit,’ for example, are actually categorically
distinct, and this is a direct consequence of understanding the roles that ‘nonbinary’ and
‘genderqueer’ play in colonial modernity. Conflating these terms, a problem that the Diachronic
Approach avoids, is oftentimes accompanied by the condescending presumption that the West
has something to learn from Indigenous categories—a form of colonial extraction and depletion
of resources (e.g., Coronil 2019, 344–51). This phenomenon is most blatantly observable when
white people in the U.S. actually self-identify (or attempt to self-identify) as ‘Two Spirit,’ a
behavior that has motivated justifiable criticism (White Noise Collective 2015). There are also
less blatant, yet no less violent, cases, such as the employment of Indigenous knowledge and
histories to advance Western conceptions of progress in dominant U.S. societies. The Diachronic
Approach precludes the logical possibility of such an analysis: Recognizing the imperialistic
features of ‘nonbinary’ and ‘genderqueer’ means that it actually does not make sense to leach off
of decolonial Indigenous movements, or Indigenous existences as such, if one objective is to
decolonize what the U.S. has violently stolen, rather than to merely reconceive gender inclusivity
with the borders of colonial modernity.
An important objection to the Diachronic Approach is that categories such as ‘nonbinary’
and ‘genderqueer’ should not be primarily couched as imperialistic if the language of these terms
can increase the momentum of anti-imperialist liberatory projects. After all, it is possible that
some Indigenous people who are not ‘man’ or ‘woman’ from a colonial perspective see
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themselves as having commonalities with nonbinary and genderqueer people and, in fact, define
themselves as ‘nonbinary’ or ‘genderqueer’ (or use multiple labels to describe themselves,
including ‘nonbinary’ or ‘genderqueer’). And, as the objection goes, such individuals might
furthermore position themselves as resisting the U.S. gender binary through an allegiance to
these identity categories. However, upon further examination, it is clear that such resistance
would not stem from category membership alone, and that category membership is not necessary
for such resistance, as I argued in earlier chapters. Many people who are not nonbinary or
genderqueer actively advance such movements by partaking in practices such as advocating for
clean, accessible, and fully functional all-gender restrooms in public spaces. At the same time,
nonbinary and genderqueer people themselves can further imperialistic objectives and can do so
via category membership. In other words, it cannot be a metaphysical property of nonbinary and
genderqueer that they resist the U.S. gender binary and the colonial violence that created and
maintains it, when these categories themselves are nodes in an imperialistic network. To the
extent that ‘nonbinary’ and ‘genderqueer’ cannot extract themselves from the dominant U.S.
contexts in which they are situated, they are imperialistic social categories—with no substantive
difference in this respect from the categories ‘man’ and ‘woman.’
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Conclusion
It might be tempting to view what I have called the Diachronic Approach for defining
‘nonbinary’ and ‘genderqueer’ as a blueprint for doing U.S. metaphysics of gender in a way that
refuses imperialistic ideologies.
However, I think this would be a misunderstanding of the project I have undertaken. On
the one hand, the blueprints already exist. Decolonial and postcolonial literature on the
consequences of white U.S. feminism and other neoliberal strategies to further imperialistic
violence has already laid the blueprint for critiquing sexual and gender “equality” and “justice”
efforts that aim to reinforce U.S. superiority and global capitalist domination. On the other hand,
perhaps there is no such thing as a blueprint for the sort of project I have undertaken. I have only
attempted to provide one possible framework for identifying and explicitly rejecting imperialistic
logics in doing a metaphysical inquiry into ‘nonbinary’ and ‘genderqueer.’ There are many
routes toward accomplishing this goal (if it is feasible), and this is one such potential route.
Recall that my main line of argumentation has been that ‘nonbinary’ and ‘genderqueer’
do not inherently resist the U.S. gender binary because nonbinary and genderqueer people do not
all share a stake in doing so: for example, because their privileged social location can entail
power and material advantages derived from the gender binary, or because their marginalized
social location can motivate an interest in retaining specific features of the gender binary to
secure safety and resources. Furthermore, these categories are imbued with gender norms and
expectations, such as presenting as androgynous or gender-ambiguous, and so do not find
themselves external to gender normativity. I then argued that a closer look at the relationship
between the U.S. gender binary and Euro-American colonialism reveals that a key function of
the gender binary is to impose colonial harm—and this is another path to rejecting the argument
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that ‘nonbinary’ and ‘genderqueer’ inherently resist the U.S. gender binary. The U.S. gender
binary inserts racist standards for who counts as a ‘man’ or ‘woman’ in many colonized and
decolonizing spaces in both the Global North and the Global South. According to these
standards, white people are the only ones who perform ‘man’ and ‘woman’ properly, and
through being denied these standards of gender, non-white people face conditions of
objectification and dehumanization that try to justify imperialistic violence and colonial rule.
After engaging with this evidence, I suggested the need to define a colonial meta-axis when
examining resistance to “the binary axis,” the term employed by Dembroff (2020, 15) to describe
the ideology of the gender binary. This colonial meta-axis asserts that white people are superior
to non-white people. I argued that ‘nonbinary’ and ‘genderqueer’ do not inherently resist the
colonial meta-axis because many nonbinary and genderqueer people—paradigmatically, white
nonbinary and genderqueer people—reap massive benefits from it owing to racial positioning
under a white supremacist system. It cannot be the case, then, that simply existing as nonbinary
or genderqueer targets these real, material consequences of the gender binary expressed by the
colonial meta-axis (i.e., that these categories address the power structure underlying the gender
binary), which is important at least insofar as these categories are defined in relation to that
binary, and so I am skeptical that they should be defined in terms of their capacity to resist its
power.
Finally, I articulated my own metaphysical theory of ‘nonbinary’ and ‘genderqueer’ that I
termed the Diachronic Approach, which identified these categories as imperialistic social
categories. I defined imperialistic social categories as those which fail to resist the colonial metaaxis that I previously named. According to the Diachronic Approach, ‘nonbinary’ and
‘genderqueer’ are imperialistic social categories insofar as they: are accompanied by gender
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norms and expectations that center white nonbinary and genderqueer people as models for
inhabiting these categories; obscure the reality that what a colonial view would call “gender” and
“sexuality” actually overlap for many categories of colonized and formerly colonized people;
provide the analytical tools for improperly labeling Indigenous and non-white categories under
the “third gender” umbrella; define themselves in relation to the U.S. gender binary without
necessarily passing judgment on that binary; and support the introduction of a new colonial
Self/Other binary that places ‘nonbinary’ and ‘genderqueer’ in contrast to Indigenous and nonwhite identities that are neither ‘man’ nor ‘woman’ according to the gender imposed by a U.S.
colonial gaze.
I ended by demonstrating how, on a meta-philosophical level, the Diachronic Approach
also avoids some concerns that I have with views which paint ‘nonbinary’ and ‘genderqueer’ as
resisting the gender binary. My argument was motivated by the idea that resisting the gender
binary has become a Western value in particular unsettling ways. To better understand and
interpret problems with this function of ‘nonbinary’ and ‘genderqueer’ in colonial discourses, I
engaged with Puar’s concept of U.S. sexual exceptionalism and Khader’s missionary feminism,
ultimately arguing that in the current political, economic, and social climate in dominant U.S.
contexts, ‘nonbinary’ and ‘genderqueer’ are mobilized as tools for creating an ideal of U.S.
progress centered around nonbinary inclusion. I then explored how ‘nonbinary’ and
‘genderqueer,’ when taken as derivatives of Indigenous and non-white categories, end up
justifying arguments that romanticize and harmfully attempt to render superhuman those
categories (i.e., that would not be labeled ‘man’ or ‘woman’ by a colonial gaze). The Diachronic
Approach, as I claimed, prevents these ahistorical conflations between ‘nonbinary’ and
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‘genderqueer’ and “Other” social categories that should not immediately be considered as
assimilated or assimilating into the state.
The Diachronic Approach, then, takes seriously the reality that ‘nonbinary’ and
‘genderqueer’ are not independent from the conceptual machinery of U.S. imperialism, and they
should not be treated as unique from ‘man’ and ‘woman’ in this respect. Rather, ‘nonbinary’ and
‘genderqueer’ are simply another way to situate oneself within the white supremacist violence
that is the dominant U.S. gender system. If this is true, then being nonbinary or genderqueer is
not the radical act that it has been thought to be.
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